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Chapter 1
Introduction
Gender differences in pay are a global phenomenon and have obtained much attention from
both policy makers and economic literature (see for example Blau and Kahn, 1992; 2003;
2006; Goldin, 2014; Fortin, 2015). In order to reduce gender differences in earnings, anti-
discrimination laws, female board quotas and family-friendly policies were implemented. A
general result in the literature is that the earnings gap between men and women converges
over time (e.g. Goldin, 2014). However, in recent years, the rate of convergence slowed
down (see Blau and Kahn, 2006; England, 2006). Smaller differences in human capital and
labor market presence (Goldin, 2006), occupational segregation (Cotter et al., 2004; England,
2006), technical development (Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010) as well as anti-discrimination
legislation and changes in attitudes towards women in the labor market (Goldin, 2006; Fortin,
2015) are identified as major causes for the decline of the Gender Pay Gap (GPG) over time.
Despite the implementation of equal-pay legislation and a converging GPG, women continue
to earn considerably less than men; about 20.0% in the United States (US) and 16.0% in
Europe in 2014, respectively.1 The pay gap between men and women also varies significantly
across sectors, occupations and countries (Melly, 2005; Blau and Kahn, 2006; Lucifora and
Meurs, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007). In fact, gender differences in pay are a pervasive
feature of modern labor markets and exist in various subsamples.
In order to understand the drivers of the GPG, the gap is decomposed in different parts.
The standard approach in decomposing mean pay differences between groups is the Oaxaca
(1973) and Blinder (1973) method that allows to decompose the wage gap into an explained
1The data is taken from the United States Department of Labor (2017) for the US and from Eurostat (2017b)
for Europe. See also Blau and Kahn (2003), where the pay gap between men and women in several countries is
compared from 1985-1994.
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(due to group differences in observable characteristics) and an unexplained part (due to group
differences in coefficients). Despite the popularity of the method, it suffers from the index-
number problem, i.e. the problem that the choice of the non-discriminatory wage structure
influences the estimation results (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and
Ransom, 1994).2 The latter is a main pitfall of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition model.
Various studies have proposed solutions to this problem. The solutions can be divided in two
main categories: methods attributing different weights to the various groups (Reimers, 1983;
Cotton, 1988) and the intercept-shift approach (Fortin, 2008; Elder et al. 2010). Yet, none of
the approaches provides a completely satisfactory solution to the problem (see Lee, 2015,
for an overview). Regardless of this problem, the Oaxaca-Blinder approach is still used in
academic research (e.g. Mandel and Semyonov, 2014; Juhn and McCue, 2017). One reason
for this is its intuitive decomposition (in an explained and an unexplained part; Fortin et al.,
2011). The unexplained part, often referred to as discrimination, is identified as the main
driver of the wage gap. This result holds across various countries (Blau and Kahn, 1992; 2003)
as well as over time (Goldin, 2014). There are also other factors that influence the GPG (in a
specific year or time period). Differences in human capital and labor market characteristics,
for example, are accounted for by the explained component, while industrial and occupational
segregation as well as the persistence of gender stereotypes in the labor market enter in the
unexplained part of the pay gap. Similarly, productivity differences are absorbed by this effect
(Blau and Kahn, 2006). Consequently, even though the unexplained component of the GPG is
generally attributed to gender discrimination, gender differences in unobservables influence
this term as well. Hence, it is pivotal to explicitly account for unobservables in the estimation
of the GPG and its components. Individual selection in the labor market, in employment or
in a specific industry or occupation may be based on individual-specific motivation, ability
and productivity. Moreover, the respective selection processes may be different for men and
women. For example, women are more likely to work in family-friendly occupations such as
jobs with flexible working times or child-care provision (Sorensen, 1989; Waldfogel, 1997;
Centra and Cutillo, 2009). It is thus important to account for selection processes into wage
work when estimating gender differences in pay. An extensive part of the literature has shown
that individual heterogeneity, due to differences in the decision to participate in the labor
force or to accept a job offer, has a significant effect on wages (e.g. Heckman, 1979; Sorensen,
1989; Bar et al., 2015). As GPGs differ across subsamples, additional selection procedures
matter, such as the choice of a specific job. In order to model both selection decisions, double
selectivity approaches are applied (Tunali, 1986; Sorensen, 1989; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000;
2Further information about problems of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder model are provided in Chapter 5.
3Cutillo and Di Pietro, 2006; Baffoe-Bonnie, 2009). An example of such models are models
with ‘partial partial observability’ by the definition of Meng and Schmidt (1985). These
models account simultaneously for sample selection or endogeneity of individual choices
(e.g. the participation and job decision). Thereby, unobserved characteristics or unobserved
heterogeneity are included in the model (Tunali, 1986; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). The
GPG can then be consistently estimated in the specific subsample (Meng and Schmidt, 1985).
Another body of literature focuses on gender stereotypes in the labor market (for example
Becker, 1985; Castagnetti and Rosti, 2013). It is a well-known result of this literature
that gender stereotypes contribute to the wage gap among men and women (e.g. Becker,
1985). In particular, significant differences in the assessment of candidates arise from
unconscious discriminatory behavior (Lindzey et al., 1998; Schein, 2007). This implies
that an identical curriculum is evaluated differently if attributed to a woman compared to a
man (Valian, 1998). The impact of stereotypes can be reduced by the use of specific screening
devices (such as educational attainment, aptitude tests or letters of recommendation as well
as competitive mechanisms ranking the applicants; Castagnetti and Rosti, 2013). Open
competition is thereby identified as the most effective screening device for weakening the
effects of stereotypes. In Chapter 2 (joint work with Carolina Castagnetti and Luisa Rosti),
we use public contests as a special recruitment method of open competition. The analysis
focuses on Italy as public contests are particularly regulated by Italian constitutional law and
used in both the public and the private sector. Public contests are based on objective criteria
and require the employer to provide justification for his or her hiring decision. This allows
to eliminate GPGs in the labor market given certain institutional characteristics. Contrary,
wages between men and women that are not hired by public contest significantly differ in
favor of men. In particular, the GPG is found to be mainly due to the unexplained part and
hence gender discrimination may play a role. In the sample of young individuals (18–34
years) recruited by public contest, average earnings are even higher for women than for men.
This reversal is driven by the explained part of the gap. Overall, the results suggest that
public contests are merit-based and gender-fair instruments for the evaluation of applicants.
By using a double selectivity model, we explicitly account for selection into employment and
public contests and obtain consistent parameter estimates. The main analysis is conducted
on both a panel data set of ten years as well as on the single cross sections. The estimation
results are robust over these ten years.
Another phenomenon of modern labor markets is overeducation, i.e. individuals possess
higher levels of educational attainment than actually required for their current job (Hartog,
2000). Understanding the reasons of differences in earnings related to overeducation is
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relevant for policy evaluation as overeducation may implicate a waste of human capital (Flisi
et al., 2014). Higher investment in schooling is a loss of resources if both overeducated and
properly educated individuals have equal or similar levels of productivity and motivation.
However, if there are significant differences between over- and properly educated individuals
due to differences in both unobservables and observables, then there is no waste of resources.
In Chapter 3 (joint work with Carolina Castagnetti and Luisa Rosti), we estimate the GPG
separately for overeducated and properly educated workers using Italian microdata. The
study of overeducation and gender differences in pay is particularly interesting for Italy,
where, on the one side, the share of individuals with tertiary education is comparably low.3
On the other side, the problem of overeducation is particularly pronounced in Italy. In Italy,
40.0% of all labor market participants with a university degree are overeducated compared
to 21.5% at European Union (EU) level and 26.3% in the US (Cutillo and Di Pietro (2006)
and Meliciani and Radicchia (2016) for Italy and Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000)
for the EU and the US). Additionally, the share of female graduates in Italy is relatively
high. The latter underlines the importance to consider both the GPG and the effects of
overeducation. Our approach presents a novelty in the literature as it integrates insights
from two usually separate research fields: gender differences in pay and the effects of
overeducation on wages. Up to now, the literature has mainly focused on wage differences
between properly and overeducated individuals and detects larger pay gaps between over-
compared to properly educated workers (see e.g. Cutillo and Di Pietro, 2006). We find that
the GPG is significantly higher among overeducated individuals. In particular, we correct
for labor market participation and the overeducation decision, and thus consistently estimate
the components of the respective wage gap. We find that the discriminatory part of the gap
vanishes in the corrected model. This implies that properly educated individuals would
earn more than an overeducated individual with similar characteristics even if the latter was
properly matched.
In gender economics, empirical work has recently focused on the estimation beyond
the mean (Albrecht et al., 2003; Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly, 2005; Arulampalam et
al., 2007; Firpo et al., 2009). The literature identified significant variation in the GPG at
different points of the earnings distribution (e.g. Albrecht et al., 2003; Arulampalam et al.,
2007). Particularly pronounced wage gaps at the top (glass ceiling) and in fewer cases
also at the bottom (sticky floors) of the wage distribution are found. Policy makers are
interested in the effects of a policy on different points of the earnings distribution in order
3Italy has, with approximately 20.0%, the lowest share of university graduates in Europe (Meliciani and
Radicchia, 2016).
5to address potential inequality or distributional effects. The latter cannot be detected in
the case of the mean analysis (Fortin et al., 2011). The main part of the literature going
beyond the mean concentrates on Conditional Quantile Regressions (CQRs). However,
Unconditional Quantile Regressions (UQRs) may be preferable over CQRs as they allow for
the unconditional mean interpretation and offer a way to conduct path-independent Oaxaca-
Blinder type decompositions across the wage distribution (Fortin et al., 2011). The traditional
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is the benchmark in applied labor economics, when it comes
to decomposing mean differences by groups. The approach uses the unconditional mean
interpretation and offers an intuitive way to interpret the different components of the wage
gap. The detailed Oaxaca-Blinder model allows to attribute to each covariate a specific part
of the wage gap. Decompositions based on CQRs are, particularly in the case of detailed
decompositions, computationally heavy (Fortin et al., 2011). This is another disadvantage
of CQR models. As stated, selection issues may be important in the estimation of the GPG
and its components. However, only a comparably small part of the literature beyond the
mean accounts for sample selection issues (Buchinsky, 1998; Albrecht et al, 2009). Studies
considering wage differences between men and women across the wage distribution and
accounting for individual participation or employment decisions find that selection processes
vary across quantiles (Albrecht et al., 2009; Chzhen and Mumford, 2011). This result is
important for policy makers as not only different policy actions may be required across the
wage distribution but also adjusted and unadjusted coefficient estimates may be considerably
different. However, the approaches considering selection effects beyond the mean are based
on CQRs. In Chapter 4 (single authored), parametric UQRs are used to conduct a detailed
decomposition of the GPG at different quantiles (Firpo et al., 2009). The approach is
extended such that it can be accounted for quantile-specific employment selection. The
selection correction is estimated based on semiparametric methods (Ichimura, 1993; Klein
and Spady, 1993). The proposed model offers two methodological advances. First, the more
intuitive UQR model or the RIF-OLS model is used and corrected for sample selection.
Second, the adjusted UQR model is based on selection processes that do not require any
distributional assumptions (Martins, 2001).
So far, sample selection issues at the mean as well as beyond were discussed. Another
important body of literature is, as stated, concerned with the decline of the GPG over time. In
particular, the unexplained part (attributed to gender discrimination) was found to decrease
over time, while the educational level of females was found to increase (e.g. Blau and Kahn,
2006). In Chapter 5 (joint work with Carolina Castagnetti and Luisa Rosti), the convergence
of the GPG over the last decade in Italy is examined. An alternative estimation approach is
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proposed allowing to directly estimate the change of the GPG as well as of its components
over time. Up to now, studies examining changes in the wage gap over time and between
groups do not directly estimate the difference of the GPG but rather compare ex post the
results of the differentials in the corresponding subsamples (Christofides and Michael, 2013;
Mandel and Semyonov, 2014). Moreover, statistical inference is often not possible (as no
standard errors are provided). Despite the empirical application of the proposed model of the
GPG over time, we also estimate the change in the Public-Private Sector Wage Gap (PPWG)
between men and women. Sectoral differences in pay are significant and more pronounced
for women than for men (Lucifora and Meurs, 2006; Mandel and Semyonov, 2014). The
literature identifies a higher unexplained part of the PPWG for women than for men. This
effect is more pronounced in the private sector compared to the public sector. Our model
confirms that the unexplained part significantly varies between men and women. In line with
the results from Chapter 2, institutional differences between the public and the private sector
are found to matter as well. In both empirical applications, we estimate the standard procedure
as well as our suggested model and compare the results of the two approaches. All in all, the
proposed estimation model allows to draw conclusions of changes in mean group differences
in wages. In particular, the insights may differ if conclusions are drawn by simply comparing
the results for different subsamples. Additionally, we show that our model can be made
robust to the index-number problem of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca
and Ransom, 1994) and the indeterminacy problem of the intercept-shift approach (Lee,
2015).
The empirical part of this thesis focuses on Italy. Italy is particularly interesting for
the study of selection into labor force participation or employment as female labor force
participation is relatively low in Italy. The literature generally finds that countries with
low GPGs have high employment gaps between men and women (Olivetti and Petrongolo,
2008). The GPG in Italy amounted to 5.6% between 2005-2014, while it was equal to 16.8%
at EU-28 level.4 In the same period, 49.8% of all labor market participants in Italy were
female, in comparison to 62.1% in the EU. This corresponds to gender employment gaps
of 23.3% in Italy and 13.5% at EU-level.5 The data set used is the Participation, Labor,
Unemployment Survey (PLUS) from the Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational
Training for Workers (ISFOL). The data was collected in the context of a joint project of
ISFOL and the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy that started in 2005. Up to now,
the survey was released for the following years with a longitudinal structure: 2005, 2006,
4The rates are calculated using data from Eurostat (2017a).
5The rates are calculated using data from Eurostat (2017a).
72008, 2010, 2011 and 2014. In this work, the entire release of panel and cross-sectional
dimension is used. The survey is particularly designed for the study of wage inequality
and includes detailed information on the personal working profiles and the intervieews’
motivation to work as well as on the cultural and territorial background of the participants
(Mandrone, 2006; Centra and Cutillo, 2009). The survey uses subjective measures only
and was conducted by Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). In ISFOL PLUS,
the individuals self-select themselves in certain conditions such as whether being active or
inactive in the labor market, while in other data sets the individuals’ labor market status is
often identified via characteristics such as having worked at least one hour during the last
week. This characteristic of ISFOL PLUS allows us to identify a homogeneous group of
voluntarily unemployed individuals (Chapter 2 and 4) as well as individuals (voluntarily) out
of the labor force (Chapter 3). Studies examining selection issues often cannot distinguish
between voluntary and involuntary unemployment or voluntary and involuntary absence from
the labor market (Heinze et al., 2003). Case-specific sample restrictions are discussed in the
corresponding Chapters.
This thesis adds to literature on selection effects on wages and shows that individual
participation or employment decisions matter at the mean as well as across the earnings
distribution. It is, to the author’s best knowledge, the first work that shows the empirical
disappearance of the GPG and combines the literature on gender pay differences and overe-
ducation. In particular, it provides a model to adjust the wage equation, the GPG and its
components at different quantiles using UQRs. Additionally, this work examines gender
differences in pay over time by proposing a novel approach to model changes in the wage
gap over time.
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Chapter 2
Discriminate Me – if You Can!
The Disappearance of the Gender Pay
Gap among Public-Contest Selected
Employees
2.1 Introduction
There is a huge literature on the Gender Pay Gap (GPG) and on its narrowing in recent years
(e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2003; 2006; 2007; 2016; Goldin, 2014; Kahn, 2015). Nonetheless,
women still earn considerably less than men; about 20.0% in the United States of America
and 15.0% in Europe.1 Despite the empirical finding that the difference in pay between
men and women has decreased in the last decades, a consistent part of the GPG remains
unexplained and this part has not declined over time but has been roughly stable over the
past 30 years (Blau and Kahn, 2016). The unexplained GPG, i.e. the portion of the GPG not
due to gender differences in observed characteristics, is generally taken to be an estimate of
gender discrimination2 and may be influenced by cognitive processes such as stereotyping.
The literature on gender stereotypes finds that systematic errors in screening and performance
assessment of applicants arise from unconscious discriminatory behavior (Lindzey et al.,
1998; Schein, 2007). This literature is relevant for the analysis of the GPG as it highlights
1See Kahn (2015), where the GPG in several countries is compared from 2010 to 2012.
2However, as stressed by Blau and Kahn (2006), the unexplained portion of the GPG may include effects
of unobserved productivity differentials.
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how, because of stereotypes, an identical curriculum is evaluated in a substantially different
way if attributed to a woman instead of to a man (Valian, 1998). Based on findings from
social psychologists that discriminatory attitudes and stereotyping may be unconscious
and therefore difficult to detect and erase, Blau and Kahn (2016) argue that as gender
discrimination has become less socially acceptable, it has become less overt and more subtle
as well as unconscious. Castagnetti and Rosti (2013) identify specific environments in which
the use of stereotypes is expected to be more likely to exert an influence on screening devices3
and show that the unexplained component of the GPG increases in line with the expected
influence of stereotypes. Open competition is thereby identified as a screening device that
weakens or even deletes the impact of stereotypes on performance appraisal in the labor
market. Public contests are a special recruitment method of open competition. They increase
the accuracy of assessment as they require the use of objective criteria and justification of
the candidate choice (Dobbs and Crano, 2001). This allows to increase the probability of
fair assessment for both men and women compared to other recruitment methods.4 The aim
of this paper is to show that the selection procedure of public contests may counteract the
discrimination mechanisms in the hiring process. The results suggest that public contests
are merit-based and gender-fair instruments for the evaluation of applicants. The paper
focuses on Italian public contests as their implementation is strictly regulated by Italian
constitutional law. Italian public contests are based on clear rules that are difficult to distort.
The analysis of the Italian case is of particular interest as public contests are the major
way of recruitment in the public sector. In particular, the Italian Constitution states that
in Italy every public employee shall be recruited following open competition procedures.
Recruitment not by public contest in the public sector is only possible if explicitly regulated
by law.5 Due to this regulation, there are also employees in the public sector not selected by
public contest. Legislative acts regulating recruitment in public employment by mechanisms
different from public contests were adopted by a wave of reforms starting in the 1980’s. These
reforms aimed to reorganize public-sector employment in Italy (Carinci et al., 2002).6 Even
3Screening devices include for example educational attainment, aptitude tests or letters of recommendation
as well as competitive mechanisms ranking the applicants.
4Dobbs and Crano (2001) argue that individuals who have to justify their decisions have a stronger
incentive to bypass their stereotyped impressions than those that do not have to provide justifications. As a
consequence, when decision makers are required to justify their choices and describe the criteria they use to
evaluate candidates, as in open competition, they are less likely to discriminate against a specific group.
5In general, in other European countries, only higher public servants are recruited through open competition,
yet with different legal constraints compared to the Italian public contest. Other public-sector recruitment takes
place via private methods of recruitment such as candidate submittal or agency recruitment. The latter is the
main procedure used in the private sector. See Cardona (2006) for a detailed description of the recruitment in
civil service systems in Europe.
6Examples are ‘ope legis’ promotions and hiring of ‘pro tempore’ workers.
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though public contests are the main recruitment method in the public sector, public-contest
recruitment takes also place in the private sector. However, public contests in the public or
private sector may evolve differently, as public-sector employees enjoy different institutional
norms compared to private-sector employees. In public employment, for example pay levels
are largely immutable and jobs are highly stable in order to guarantee the efficient exercise
of public functions (Carinci et al., 2002). Therefore, as a robustness check, we analyze the
GPG for public-contest and not public-contest selected employees separately for the public
and private sector.
The underlying study uses the survey ISFOL PLUS of the Italian labor market over
the period 2005–2014. The survey was conducted by Isfol. The empirical strategy relies
on the estimation and comparison of the GPG between two groups of employees which
differ by hiring method (i.e. recruitment by public contest or not). The GPG is estimated
using the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition. Additionally, we account for
double selection into the sample (considering selection in employment as well as selection in
public-contest recruitment). The double selection model is applied in order to detect selection
differences by recruitment group and gender as well as to account for otherwise unobservable
characteristics of the individuals in the sample.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the GPG
vanishes among public-contest selected employees and even reverses in favor of women
in the sample of young employees. Moreover, the reversal is entirely due to the explained
component of the decomposition. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
shows the empirical disappearance and reversal of the GPG. In addition, the result is robust
over time as it holds for the period of ten years considered in this paper. As a second result, we
show that recruitment through public contest has a sizeable positive effect on wages (stronger
for women than for men). This finding is in line with empirical evidence of a public-sector
wage premium in Italy given that about 90.0% of the individuals in our sample hired by
public contest work in the public sector. Both selection bias channels (i.e. the employment
and recruitment decision) are indeed relevant for explaining the GPG. Given more equal
and less discriminatory assessment of candidates, women may self-select themselves in
public-contest recruitment (endogeneity bias). The work decision depends on individual
heterogeneity and unobservable characteristics (sample selection bias). Therefore, it is crucial
to account for self-selection deriving from both biases. Thanks to the detailed questionnaire
underlying the data we use, we are able to identify instruments for the employment selection
as well as for the recruitment selection. The analysis accounting for double selection
suggests that public contests are merit-based selection methods. Individuals (both men and
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women) recruited by public contest possess more favorable unobserved characteristics (and
wages) than individuals not recruited by public contest. Moreover, the Counterfactual Pay
Gap (CPG) adjusted for double selection shows that in the case of recruitment without public
contest the unexplained component is (still) highly statistically significant and positive. The
results show that public contests are gender-fair and merit-based mechanisms for applicants’
evaluation. Public contests are merit-based because public-contest selected employees hold
better productive characteristics than unselected ones. They are gender-fair because among
public-contest selected employees women’s characteristics are rewarded as men’s. We show
that, even though public contests are not entirely driven by the institutional framework of the
public sector, the institutional environment plays an important role in making public contests
effective mechanisms for gender-fair and merit-based recruitment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data. Section 2.3 shows
the effect of public contests on log hourly wages. Section 2.4 provides evidence on public
contests as gender-fair selection methods. Section 2.5 extends the analysis to a double sample
selection model, thereby accounting for sample selection and endogeneity problems. In
Section 2.6, the counterfactual GPG adjusted for selectivity bias is computed. As a robustness
check, we compute in Section 2.7 the GPG by public-contest recruitment separately for the
public and private sector. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on microdata collected by the Italian Institute for the Develop-
ment of Vocational Training for Workers (ISFOL) in the Participation, Labor, Unemployment
Survey (PLUS). ISFOL released up to now the following data waves with a longitudinal
structure; 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2014. The empirical analysis is conducted by
exploiting both the cross-section and panel dimension of the data set. In particular, the panel
data set includes all individuals that have been interviewed for at least two periods. However,
given that the focus is mainly on the impact of individual variables constant across time as
being hired by public contest7 and that part of the analysis relies on the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition model of the GPG or an extension of it, we base our estimates on a pooled
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model. In the panel estimation, we include wave
or year dummies as explanatory variables.
In our analysis, we focus on full-time employees aged between 18 and 64 years. Part-time
workers are excluded from the sample as they have a larger dispersion in pay than their full-
7The number of transitions in and out of being hired by public contest is very low (about 1.0%).
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time colleagues that may raise the probability of earning less than the average hourly wage.
Moreover, the incidence of part-time work differs significantly between men and women in
favor of women (e.g. Chzhen and Mumford, 2011). Similarly, self-employed workers are not
considered in the study, as the focus in this paper is employees’ selection mechanisms, but
self-employed are unselected or, if selection takes place it serves as an entrance examination.
An example are notaries, where the main aim pursued is not to fill job vacancies but to
ensure the citizens on the quality of the services provided. The analysis is also constrained
to earnings from the main job only, i.e. from the job that yields the highest income. As
only 1.0-2.0% of the individuals in the sample have more than one job, the impact of this
restriction should be negligible. Similarly, we exclude all individuals with disabilities (less
than 2.0% of all observations). The sample is further restricted by excluding students and
pensioners as well as individuals not disposable to work or involuntarily unemployed. This
restriction is justified by the aim to form a homogeneous sample of employed individuals and
individuals that are voluntarily out of work (Heinze et al., 2003). In the sample, individuals
not in wage work are individuals indicating not to accept every job offer but only job offers
in line with their characteristics (such as the level of educational attainment or labor market
experience). Thus, in the sample all individuals out of employment are voluntarily out of
work or in search unemployment. Consequently, the employment decision considered in this
paper consists in the decision between voluntary or search unemployment and employment.
We do not take into account the selectivity bias stemming from labor market participation
but the bias deriving from search unemployment. We are aware of the fact that the selectivity
bias from the labor force participation may be important for Italy given a comparably low
female labor force participation rate in Italy (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008; Centra and
Cutillo, 2009). However, as this participation bias is well known for the Italian case, we
focus here on search unemployment that – similar to labor market participation – may be
significantly different for men and women and particularly relevant for Italy.8
We delete observations with missing values on other variables used in the analysis. Then
we are left with a sample size of 72,928 for the panel and 109,172 for the cross sections. In
the panel, 39,345 are female (54.0%) and 33,538 are male employees (46.0%) (in the cross
sections; 59,406 women and 49,766 men). Out of this sample 41,845 (58,151) individuals
are employed: 19,398 are female (26,956) and 22,447 (31,195) are male employees in the
panel data (and the cross sections, respectively). In the panel data, 6,798 male (45.6%)
and 8,116 female employees (54.4%) entered via public contest in their current job. In the
8The observation of a positive wage may depend either on the decision of the employee to accept a job
offer or not, or on the firm decision to hire the candidate or not (Nicaise, 2001; Baffoe-Bonnie, 2009). We
assume that the selection into employment depends only on the individual decision and not on the firm decision.
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cross-section dimension 9,255 men (45.2%) and 11,230 women (54.8%) were recruited by
means of public contest. We use log hourly wages as dependent variable. The basic hourly
wage rate is defined by the net monthly wage perceived and divided by the number of actual
working hours per month.9 A complete list of variables included in the analysis along with
the corresponding definition and coding is provided in Appendix 2.A.
Table 2.1 for the panel and Table 2.B.1 for the cross sections report means and standard
deviations for some of the variables considered in the analysis. On average, more women
are recruited via public contests than men (Female). Generally, employees hired by public
contest have higher educational attainment (Educ) and hence graduated more often from
university (University_Degree).10 Moreover, they have more often obtained the maximum
grade when holding a university degree (Max_D_Mark). On average, public-contest selected
employees have more experience (Exper) as well as job tenure (Tenure). Individuals hired by
public contest are on average more often married (Married) and have more often children
(Kids) as well as young children (Kids_10). Public-contest selected employees are on average
more than ten years older than employees not selected by public contest. Our data show that
the selection by public contest is not a prerogative of the public sector; about 9.0% of the
recruitment in the private sector takes place by public contest. Similarly, approximately 16.0%
of the observed individuals employed in the public sector are not hired by public contest.
More than 90.0% of the employees hired by public contest have an unlimited contract, while
on average only 80.0% of employees not hired by public contest have an unlimited contract
(Contract_Type). Finally, public-contest selected employees are more often occupied in
highly specialized and intellectual occupations (Manager), while individuals not hired by
public contest are slightly more often engaged in intermediary positions (Intermed_Prof ).
9The survey includes monthly gross earnings, which however contain for more than 98.0% of all individuals
in the data missing values. Alternatively, using gross annual earnings would be possible. Yet, when dividing
gross annual earnings by the number of months in a calendar year plus one (in order to account for a potential
13th income), the difference between the artificially created monthly gross income and the reported monthly
gross income amounts on average to more than 800 Euros per month. Therefore, we prefer to use the reported
monthly net income. Individuals with children obtain tax credits in Italy – given an annual gross income below
95,000 Euro (see for example Worldwide Tax Summaries, 2017, for further details). The tax credit is rated on a
monthly basis but depends on the annual gross income and is granted yearly. Consequently, the children-related
tax credit does not impact on the monthly perceived net income and does not directly affect monthly net wages
in Italy.
10The dummy variable University_Degree is presented only for illustration of the variation of university
graduation in the data and not included in the regressions as the effect of having a university degree on earnings
is already captured by the years of schooling completed Educ.
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics – Panel
Year Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public-Contest Not Public-Contest
Selected Employees Selected Employees
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Female 0.544 0.498 0.419 0.493
Educ 14.043 2.218 12.573 2.812
University_Degree 0.464 0.499 0.231 0.422
Max_D_Mark 0.094 0.292 0.035 0.182
Exper 25.500 10.839 16.627 12.978
Tenure 20.684 11.248 10.860 11.047
Married 0.743 0.437 0.466 0.499
Kids 0.758 0.429 0.480 0.500
Kids_10 0.300 0.458 0.261 0.439
Age 48.713 10.092 37.317 12.484
Public_Sector 0.912 0.284 0.163 0.370
Contract_Type 0.927 0.261 0.778 0.416
Manager 0.387 0.487 0.147 0.355
Intermed_Prof 0.496 0.500 0.455 0.498
Observations 14,914 26,931
2.3 The Effect of Public-Contest Selection on Earnings
The unadjusted GPG11 is a key indicator used within the European employment strategy to
monitor imbalances in wages between men and women. The Eurostat data show that in the
period considered, 2005-2014, the GPG is estimated to be on average 16.8% in the EU-2712
as a whole and 5.6% in Italy.13 In our data the gender gap in hourly wages among full-time
11“The unadjusted gender pay gap provides an overall picture of gender inequality in hourly pay. This
gap represents the difference between the average [. . .] hourly earnings of men and women expressed as a
percentage of average [. . .] hourly earnings of men. It is called unadjusted as it does not take into account all of
the factors that influence the gender pay gap, such as differences in education, labor market experience or type
of job” (Eurostat, 2016).
12EU-27 include: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
13According to Eurostat (2017), the GPG in Italy varies between 4.4% and 7.3% in the period considered.
The GPG indicator is calculated using the Structure of Earnings Survey - NACE Rev. 2. The population consists
of all paid employees in enterprises with 10 employees or more.
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employees is 6.6% for the panel data set and varies between 10.1% and 3.1% for the cross
sections (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 GPG of Net Hourly Wages
Year Panel 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPG in % 6.60 10.10 8.18 7.10 5.66 3.06 3.85
Observations 41,845 9,520 9,305 8,601 9,420 8,977 12,328
Source: Own elaboration on ISFOL PLUS.
A small GPG in hourly wage does not imply a thin overall income inequality between
men and women within the economy. When considering the annual income instead of the
hourly wage, the differential increases significantly due to a lower number of hours worked
by female employees. Moreover, besides the GPG and the gender gap in paid hours, it is
important to consider gender gaps in employment, as they also contribute substantially to
increases of the difference in average earnings between men and women. In particular, in
countries with low female employment rates, women choosing to work may decide to do so
due to relatively higher job profiles and earnings expectations. In order to give a complete
picture of the GPG, Eurostat has developed a synthetic indicator called Gender Overall
Earnings Gap (GOEG). This indicator measures the impact of three combined factors (hourly
earnings, hours paid and employment rate) on average earnings of all men of working age
compared to all women of working age. Eurostat (2016) estimates the 2010 GOEG to amount
to 44.3% in Italy, and to 41.1% for the EU-27. At EU-level, the GOEG was mostly driven
by the GPG (contribution of 37.0%), the gender employment gap (contribution of 35.0%)
and the gender gap in paid hours (28.0%). In Italy the gender gap in employment rates
was the main contributor to the total earnings gap (contribution of 65.0%), followed by the
gender gap in paid hours (26.0%) and by the GPG (contribution of 9.0%, see Eurostat, 2016).
This result suggests that considering sample selection is particularly relevant for Italy. Even
though the GPG in hourly wages is only a part of the overall income inequality by gender in
Italy, it is the analysis of that (relatively small) gap which brings out discrimination from the
data and drives the gender gap in both paid hours and employment rates.
The paper analyzes the GPG separately for employees recruited by public contest and
employees recruited by different methods. The basis for the following analysis is the
estimation of a standard Mincer-type wage equation separately for gender and recruitment
group augmented by factors such as human capital and job as well as personal and family
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background characteristics. In order to identify public-contest recruitment, we use the
indicator variable Public_Contest, which is equal to one if the individual was hired by public
contest and zero otherwise. The estimation results show that recruitment carried out by
public contest has a positive effect on wages. Entering in employment by public contest
has a relevant positive impact on log hourly wages in all data waves (see Table 2.3).14 The
negative and significant coefficient estimate of the variable Female confirms the usual result
of the literature: being a woman significantly reduces wages. The coefficient estimate of the
interaction term Contfem being positive and significant shows that female employees receive
from public-contest selection a wage premium. In particular, women hired by public contest
perceive a wage premium – except for 2005 – at par or even higher than the gender penalty.
Hence, the bonus received by female employees for public-contest recruitment outweighs
the negative wage effect of being a woman significantly in the majority of the data waves.
Table 2.4 shows the effect of public contests on earnings in a Mincer-type wage model.
Indeed, recruitment through public contest has a sizeable positive effect on earnings and the
dummy Public_Contest emerges as one of the most important among the considered variables
to predict earnings. In the full sample of individuals aged 18-64, the wage premium for
public-contest selection lies between 5.8% and 10.6%. This finding is in line with empirical
evidence of a public-sector wage premium in Italy (Cappellari, 2002; Dickson et al., 2014)
as the correlation between being hired by public contest in Italy and working in the public
sector is very high. About 90.0% of the individuals in our sample hired by public contest
are employed in the public sector. Again, being a woman has a significant negative impact
on earnings. In our sample, earnings are reduced between 8.3% and 14.1%, all else equal.
Positive and significant coefficient estimates of the interaction term Contfem show, again,
that female employees receive from public-contest employment a wage premium.15
Both theoretical literature and empirical evidence on the GPG suggest that small differ-
ences in the early career greatly expand with age and give rise to large lifelong observed
gender disparities in earnings (Lazear and Rosen, 1990; Blau and Kahn, 2000). This is driven
by gender differences in promotion, bargaining and particularly women’s absence from the
labor market due to childbearing and -care (Blackaby et al., 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007; Fortin, 2008; Heilman and Okimoto, 2008; Bertrand et al., 2011). As the positive
effect of public-contest selection impacts to a greater extent on early wages, we expect to find
14Table 2.3 shows the regression output of log hourly wages on the indicator variables Public_Contest and
Female as well as the interaction term Contfem. The variable Contfem is given by the interaction between the
indicator variables Female and Public_Contest.
15The other explanatory variables included in the regression impact on wages as expected. For a full
list of the regression output, see Table 2.B.2 for the results of the panel data and Tables 2.B.3–2.B.8 for the
cross-sectional data in Appendix 2.B.
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a stronger effect of public-contest recruitment among young people by taking the early age
as a proxy for the early career. The results presented in Table 2.4 (columns (2), (4) and (6),
respectively) confirm that the positive effect on wages of recruitment carried out by public
contest is stronger in the early career. Moreover, the positive effect of recruitment through
public contest is less volatile and generally higher among young employees: their earnings
increase between 7.3% and 14.4% if individuals are selected by public contest (compared to
the non selected). The coefficient estimate of the variable Female impacts as in the regression
on the full sample negatively and statistically significantly on log hourly earnings. The
coefficient estimate of the variable Contfem is again statistically significant and positive.
Hence, being a woman and entering in employment by public contest, all else equal, raises
log hourly wages on average also for the young sample. As public contests are assumed to be
less discriminatory or discretionary than other private methods of recruitment, they may be
preferred by women (all else equal). In line with this, Table 2.B.9 and Tables 2.B.10-2.B.15
show that the positive effect on wages of recruitment carried out by public contest is stronger
for women than for men.16
Table 2.3 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Indicator Variable Public_Contest,
Female and Interactive Effect Contfem Only – Full Sample
Year Panel 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Full Sample
Female -0.099*** -0.140*** -0.126*** -0.106*** -0.084*** -0.049*** -0.065***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Public_Contest 0.362*** 0.347*** 0.356*** 0.367*** 0.366*** 0.367*** 0.285***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Contfem 0.092*** 0.101*** 0.122*** 0.100*** 0.085*** 0.058*** 0.074***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
Constant 2.065*** 1.942*** 1.958*** 1.999*** 2.015*** 2.016*** 2.077***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Year Dummies Yes No No No No No No
Observations 41,845 9,520 9,305 8,601 9,420 8,977 12,328
R-squared 0.171 0.179 0.188 0.187 0.134 0.136 0.099
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
16In all years, except for 2005.
23
Table 2.4 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Indicator Variable Public_Contest
and Interactive Effect Contfem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample inclu- Individuals Individuals Hired Individuals Hired Individuals not Hired Individuals not Hired
ding Individuals Aged 18-34 by Public Contest by Public Contest by Public Contest by Public Contest
Aged 18-64 and Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34 and Aged 18-64 and Aged 18-34
Panel
Public_Contest 0.068*** 0.128***
(0.006) (0.016)
Female -0.104*** -0.069*** -0.064*** -0.008 -0.104*** -0.069***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.021) (0.005) (0.008)
Contfem 0.040*** 0.050***
(0.008) (0.019)
2005
Public_Contest 0.062*** 0.070**
(0.014) (0.035)
Female -0.132*** -0.138*** -0.105*** -0.050 -0.137*** -0.139***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.045) (0.010) (0.014)
Contfem 0.025 0.062
(0.015) (0.040)
2006
Public_Contest 0.060*** 0.102***
(0.014) (0.033)
Female -0.096*** -0.067*** -0.043*** 0.033 -0.101*** -0.070***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.042) (0.011) (0.015)
Contfem 0.047*** 0.059
(0.015) (0.037)
2008
Public_Contest 0.056*** 0.134***
(0.013) (0.032)
Female -0.111*** -0.089*** -0.066*** -0.014 -0.115*** -0.094***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.043) (0.010) (0.014)
Contfem 0.037** 0.027
(0.016) (0.039)
2010
Public_Contest 0.076*** 0.112***
(0.015) (0.040)
Female -0.093*** -0.043** -0.068*** -0.030 -0.089*** -0.040**
(0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.053) (0.013) (0.018)
Contfem 0.031* 0.038
(0.018) (0.045)
2011
Public_Contest 0.101*** 0.111***
(0.015) (0.031)
Female -0.079*** -0.024 -0.058*** 0.108** -0.080*** -0.023
(0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.051) (0.013) (0.019)
Contfem 0.023 0.105***
(0.019) (0.039)
2014
Public_Contest 0.072*** 0.119***
(0.013) (0.030)
Female -0.087*** -0.048*** -0.073*** -0.027 -0.085*** -0.050***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.034) (0.011) (0.017)
Contfem 0.014 0.019
(0.016) (0.037)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Notes: The regressions include the full set of control variables. The full regression output can be found in Table 2.B.2 –2.B.8 in
Appendix 2.B. The regression on each data set, panel or cross sections, contains sectoral as well as year or wave dummies.
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2.4 The GPG by Public-Contest Selection
In the previous Section, we have found evidence that hiring carried out by public contest has
a positive effect on earnings that is more pronounced for female and young employees. In this
Section we use the standard Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) methodology to decompose
the GPG. We analyze the GPG all else equal as well as the (so-called) discriminatory
part of the wage gap for both public-contest recruited employees and not public-contest
recruited employees. We assume that public contests, contrary to other private, methods of
recruitment are merit-based and gender-fair. Indeed, private recruitment methods are more
discretionary and unregulated and hence may create conditions for gender discrimination to
flourish. Therefore, we expect that both the GPG as well as the discriminatory part are lower
among public-contest selected employees. By using the implicit assumptions in Oaxaca
(1973) and Blinder (1973), we decompose the wage differential in two parts; endowments
and coefficients:
ln(WM)− ln(WF) = X¯ ′MβˆM− X¯
′
F βˆF
= (X¯
′
M− X¯
′
F)βˆM + X¯
′
F(βˆM− βˆF) (2.1)
where ln(WM) and ln(WF) are the log hourly wages for the male and female sample evaluated
at the mean, respectively, with X¯G and βˆG being K× 1 vectors of average characteristics
and estimated coefficients for G = (F,M), where G = F stands for female and G = M
stands for male. The first term is the endowments effect that evaluates the GPG in terms of
characteristics at the rate of return of men.17 As different endowments should have different
effects on earnings, the difference in endowments represents the explained component of
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The second term is the coefficients effect evaluating
the GPG in terms of different returns for female characteristics. As the same endowments
should have the same effect on earnings for both men and women, coefficients should not
differ by gender, which is why this term represents the unexplained part of the GPG. If the
GPG depends mainly on the difference in returns on characteristics, this may indicate the
presence of gender discrimination.18
17Thus, we follow the standard approach using male coefficients as non-discriminatory wage structure.
18As stated before, the unexplained part of the GPG is often taken to be an estimate for gender discrimination.
However, the unexplained portion of the GPG may include the effects of unmeasured productivity and some of
the explanatory variables, such as the regressors accounting for gender differences in industries or occupations,
may be affected by discrimination (Blau and Kahn, 2006).
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In the case of public-contest recruitment, the GPG vanishes from 2005 onwards (see
Table 2.5).19 In contrast, Table 2.6 shows that if individuals do not enter by public contests
in employment, there is a significant GPG in all years. In particular, the component generally
referred to as discrimination is the main driver of the pay gap in all years. in fact, the
endowments effect is mostly not statistically significant. Table 2.5 shows that the GPG
among public-contest selected employees vanishes in the full sample of individuals aged
18-64 and even reverses in the young sample aged 18-34 years (Table 2.7). This is because
the career path erodes the head start that young women receive by public-contest recruitment.
Recruitment carried out by public contest significantly reverses the GPG among young
employees in all years, except for 2014, where the reversal is not statistically significant.
Moreover, the reversed wage gap is mainly explained by endowments, i.e. by the fact that
women have better observable characteristics than men. The unexplained component is never
statistically significant: given the same set of observable labor market characteristics for
men and women, the difference in coefficients by gender is negligible (i.e. not statistically
significant). In contrast, in the sample of young individuals not hired by public contest
(Table 2.8), the GPG is either statistically significant and positive or zero, apart for 2011,
where, however, the reversed GPG is substantially smaller compared to the reversal found
for young public-contest selected employees. In the case of young individuals not hired by
public contest, the coefficients component is significant (when a positive and significant GPG
is found) suggesting that discrimination may already play a role in the early career, when
individuals are not recruited by public contest. The different magnitude of the GPGs shown
in Tables 2.6 and 2.8 may be due to the fact that even small differences at the start of the
career expand greatly in the career path and give rise to large lifelong wage gaps.
19We do not decompose the zero-GPG arguing that in the absence of a pay disparity, there is no need to
decompose the wage gap.
CHAPTER 2: THE GPG AMONG PUBLIC-CONTEST SELECTED EMPLOYEES 26
Table 2.5 Log Hourly Wages and Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Gender Log Hourly
Wage Gap, Public-Contest Selected Employees – Full Sample 18-64
Year Panel 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Differential
Male Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 2.356*** 2.289*** 2.313*** 2.366*** 2.381*** 2.383*** 2.361***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Female Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 2.352*** 2.250*** 2.310*** 2.360*** 2.382*** 2.392*** 2.370***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Difference 0.004 0.039*** 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009
(0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Decomposition
Explained -0.050***
(0.013)
Unexplained 0.089***
(0.015)
Observations 14,914 3,679 3,482 2,978 3,037 2,905 4,404
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 2.6 Log Hourly Wages and Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Gender Log Hourly
Wage Gap, Not Public-Contest Selected Employees – Full Sample 18-64
Year Panel 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Differential
Male Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 2.001*** 1.942*** 1.958*** 1.999*** 2.015*** 2.016*** 2.077***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Female Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 1.901*** 1.802*** 1.832*** 1.893*** 1.932*** 1.967*** 2.012***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Difference 0.100*** 0.140*** 0.126*** 0.106*** 0.084*** 0.049*** 0.065***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Decomposition
Explained 0.005 0.004 0.035*** -0.002 0.010 -0.031*** -0.012*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Unexplained 0.095*** 0.136*** 0.091*** 0.108*** 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.077***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Observations 26,931 5,841 5,823 5,623 6,383 6,072 7,924
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.7 Log Hourly Wages and Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Gender Log Hourly
Wage Gap, Public-Contest Selected Employees – Young Sample 18-34
Year Panel 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Differential
Male Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 2.054*** 1.988*** 2.005*** 2.066*** 2.052*** 2.035*** 2.172***
(0.015) (0.033) (0.027) (0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.028)
Female Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 2.185*** 2.083*** 2.142*** 2.217*** 2.184*** 2.241*** 2.229***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
Difference -0.131*** -0.094** -0.137*** -0.151*** -0.132*** -0.206*** -0.057
(0.018) (0.039) (0.036) (0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.035)
Decomposition
Explained -0.149*** -0.164** -0.098** -0.128** -0.157*** -0.160***
(0.025) (0.064) (0.050) (0.060) (0.054) (0.049)
Unexplained 0.017 0.070 -0.039 -0.024 0.024 -0.047
(0.031) (0.077) (0.062) (0.072) (0.069) (0.058)
Observations 2,088 576 484 394 517 444 851
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 2.8 Log Hourly Wages and Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Gender Log Hourly
Wage Gap, Not Public-Contest Selected Employees – Young Sample 18-34
Year Panel 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Differential
Male Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 1.835*** 1.775*** 1.778*** 1.832*** 1.852*** 1.869*** 1.934***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Female Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 1.819*** 1.711*** 1.756*** 1.811*** 1.860*** 1.903*** 1.933***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Difference 0.016** 0.064*** 0.022 0.021 -0.007 -0.033* 0.002
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Decomposition
Explained -0.049*** -0.073*** -0.059***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.014)
Unexplained 0.065*** 0.138*** 0.026
(0.009) (0.016) (0.022)
Observations 14,368 3,061 3,154 3,015 3,563 3,207 3,703
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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2.5 Accounting for Double Sample Selection: Model and
Results
The GPG disappears when employees are recruited by public contests and even reverses
in favor of women among public-contest selected employees aged 34 or younger. This
may be due to the fairness of the public-contest selection mechanism rewarding women’s
characteristics as men’s. However, the selection process into public-contest or non public-
contest recruitment may be non-random and different for men and women (Heckman, 1979).
The selection rule depends on two individual decisions; the work decision and the entry
choice (recruitment by public contest or not). Our setup refers to the case of a censored
probit, i.e. partial partial observability in the sense of Meng and Schmidt (1985). The output
of the first decision is always observed, but the output of the second decision is observed
if and only if the individual is in employment. In the model, the individual’s work and
entry decision are estimated simultaneously. The selection into employment may depend on
positive factors such as individual ability, motivation or educational quality that raise both
the probability of being employed and the level of wages but are omitted in the estimation of
the earnings equation as these factors are unobservable. Additionally, we need to correct for
any possible endogeneity bias that may result when the individual decision for public-contest
recruitment also depends on the individual work decision. The selection rules are described
by the following relations:
Employment Selection: Y ∗iW = Z
′
iγ+uiW (2.2)
Public-Contest Selection: Y ∗iR = Q
′
iα+uiR (2.3)
where Y ∗iW represents the unobservable index function underlying individual i’s decision
whether to work or not and Y ∗iR represents the unobservable index function underlying
individual i’s decision to use the channel of public contest or not; with Zi and Qi being
Kz× 1 and KQ× 1 vectors of explanatory variables, respectively, and the error terms ui
are assumed to be N(0,1) with Cov(uW ,uR) = ρ . The corresponding coefficients are the
KZ×1 vector γ and the KQ×1 vector α , respectively.20 The model is completed with wage
equations for paid-employees. We estimate the model separately for the recruitment method
chosen as well as for the female and male sample. The model can also be consistently
estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Yet, the number of parameters to
20Further details on the methodology can be found in Appendix 2.C.
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be estimated is rather large and by using FMLE we run into many convergence failures
of the optimization methods. Therefore, we follow Tunali (1986) and Sorensen (1989) in
extending the Heckman (1976; 1979) and Lee (1979; 1983) procedure by including selectivity
coefficients as explanatory variables in the wage regression. The method proposed by Tunali
(1986) is a two-step procedure that in the first step estimates equations (2.2) and (2.3) via
MLE in order to obtain consistent estimates of the correction or selectivity terms, λ¯W and
λ¯R. This procedure allows wages to be generated through multiple selection rules explicitly
recognizing the roles of both the work and the recruitment decision for the determination of
the individual’s employment status.
Table 2.9 presents the estimation results of the bivariate probit regression for men and
women from the panel data. In Appendix 2.B, Tables 2.B.16–2.B.21, the corresponding
results of the cross sections are shown. The parameter ρ measuring the correlation of the
residuals from the two models shows that the unobservable parts of the two equations are
strongly and positively correlated for both men and women. Hence, it is important to model
the two decisions jointly. The estimated values for ρ suggest that there are positive and
significant selection (or truncation) effects and that those who select into public-contest
employment receive higher wages than a randomly chosen individual not selected into public-
contest recruitment with a similar set of characteristics would receive. For identification of
the two selection processes, each selection equation must contain at least one variable that
is correlated with the respective decision but uncorrelated with the earnings equation or the
other selection equation. In the case of the work decision, we use the indicator variables
Kids and Kids_10 as instruments. The intuition behind is that women with children and
in particular with young children spend a significant amount of time with child-rearing
and -caring and hence have a lower probability of accepting wage offers (Martins, 2001;
Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008; Lee, 2009; Chang, 2011). In contrast, men with children or
young children have higher employment probability. This derives from the persistence of the
male-breadwinner and mother-caretaker model in particular in Southern European countries
like Italy, Greece or Spain (Mínguez, 2004). Similarly, we add the dummy Partner_Works21
only to the employment equation following the literature that finds a strong relationship
between the decision of women to work and spousal income (Devreux, 2004; Bar et al.,
2015). The dummy variable Age5064 controls for the effect of being on the last career
stage on the employment probability. These regressors are assumed to affect individual
reservation earnings but not the level of wages or individual preferences for a particular
21The dummy variable Partner_Works is equal to one if the partner of the individual is employed and zero
otherwise.
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recruitment method directly. We include also an indicator variable controlling for whether
the individual has the Italian citizenship or not in the employment equation as there may be
earnings as well as employment discrimination based on different cultural backgrounds of
the individuals (Neuman and Oaxaca, 2003; Piazzalunga, 2015).22 Additionally, controls for
the individual’s geographic position are included in the employment equation (as well as in
the wage equation) as the probability of finding a job may increase significantly from the
South to the Centre and the North of Italy. We do not include the dummies North and Centre
in the recruitment equation as public contests do not differ across regions but are organized
centrally. Similarly, whether an individual lives in Northern, Central or Southern Italy should
not affect the probability of public-contest admission.
Variables measuring the level of work satisfaction (including the level of satisfaction with
the working climate, the job stability, the working time and the task at the current job) are
included in the recruitment-choice equation (as well as in the wage equation) as they are
assumed to affect, besides the level of wages, the individual’s propensity of public-contest
recruitment. Indeed, jobs with public-contest entry may offer particular job characteristics.
We use the indicator variables Reloc and Risp in order to identify the public-contest decision.
Reloc indicates whether the individual relocated for his or her current job. In the public as
well as in the private sector, public contests are generally organized at a central level and
refer to positions in different regions. Consequently, the decision to participate in a public
contest implies a willingness to relocate. The indicator variable Risp accounts for whether
the individual answered questions on the quality of public services provided (such as on
infrastructure, regularity of public bus services in the individual’s city of residence or on
the quality of health services provided by the government). Individuals responding to these
questions may be more caring for others or interested in changing the current level of public
services. Thus, they may be more prone to public-contest selection as, firstly, there is a strong
correlation between public-sector employment and public-contest recruitment.23 This implies
that individuals wanting to improve or contribute to the quality of public services offered
are more likely to choose public contests as channel of recruitment. Secondly, it may imply
an inner consciousness for fairness as well as an aversion against discriminatory behavior
of any kind and consequently higher probability to choose public-contest recruitment. Both
22The indicator variable Italian is not included in the recruitment equation as the general requirement for
participation in a public contest (in particular in the public sector) is to hold the Italian citizenship and hence
the indicator variable Italian does often not vary for public-contest selected individuals.
23We assume that public-sector employment is particularly interesting for individuals concerned about the
quality of public services provided.
31
instrumental variables are excluded from the earnings as well as the employment equations
as they should not affect marginal productivity or reservation earnings.
In the second step, the (double) selection-corrected wage equations are estimated for
the respective subsamples. Adding the selection terms λ¯W and λ¯R to the earnings equations
allows us to consistently estimate the earnings for public-contest and not public-contest
selected individuals, respectively (Lee, 1983; Tunali, 1986):
ln(W mG ) = X¯
m′
G βˆ
m
G + δˆ
m
W,Gλ¯
m
W,G+ δˆ
m
R,Gλ¯
m
R,G (2.4)
where m = (PC,NPC), m = PC controls for individuals selected by public contest and
m = NPC for individuals not selected by public contest, and G = (F,M), where G = F
accounts for female and G = M for male. Following Heinze et al. (2003), when considering
sample selection, the decomposition in equation (2.1) becomes:
ln(W mM )− ln(W mF ) = (X¯m
′
M − X¯m
′
F )βˆ
m
M + X¯
m′
F (βˆ
m
M− βˆmF )
+(δˆmW,Mλ¯
m
W,M− δˆmW,F λ¯mW,F)+(δˆmR,Mλ¯mR,M− δˆmR,F λ¯mR,F) (2.5)
The double selection mechanism may reveal benefits from selection through public
contest for men and women. If the selection effect of both the employment decision and
the recruitment decision is significant and positive, women and men selected by public
contest would have higher unobserved characteristics and wages than women and men
with the same observed characteristics not selected by public contest. Table 2.10 defines
the four selection variables considered in this study and presents the coefficient estimates
of the selection terms for both men and women in the full sample.24 The signs of the
estimated coefficients of the respective λ ’s25 for the employment decision, λPCW and λ
NPC
W , are
positive and statistically significant. Thus, individuals in employment have on average higher
unobservable characteristics compared to otherwise observationally identical unemployed
individuals. This means that those unobserved characteristics raising the probability of being
employed also increase wages. If not positive, the coefficient estimate of the selectivity
variable λW is generally not statistically significant.26 In this case, employees not selected
(or selected) by public contest have almost the same unobserved characteristics and wage
offers than unemployed individuals. In the sample of individuals recruited by public contest,
24The complete wage regressions with selection variables for both the panel and cross sections are provided
in Appendix 2.B, Table 2.B.22 and Table 2.B.23–2.B.28.
25In the following, for simplicity; λ¯ = λ .
26Except for women not selected by public contest in 2006 and men not selected by public contest in 2011.
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the positive sign of the estimated coefficient of λPCR indicates that those unobserved positive
characteristics raising the probability of winning a contest also increase wages. Hence,
individuals that are recruited by public contest have more favorable unobserved characteristics
and wages than individuals not recruited by public contest would have obtained if they were
recruited by public contest. In contrast, as expected, the selectivity variable λNPCR has negative
and (generally) statistically significant coefficient estimates. Employees recruited without
public contest have lower levels of unobserved characteristics impacting negatively on the
wage level than individuals actually selected by public contest.
To sum up, we find evidence that individuals recruited by public contest have more
favorable unobserved characteristics and earnings than other employees with similar ob-
served characteristics and actually unemployed individuals would have obtained if they were
recruited by public contest.
The results shown in Table 2.10 strengthen the results found in Section 2.4 that public
contests are merit-based selection methods. The coefficients of λPCR , positive and signifi-
cant, confirm that women selected by public contest have better unobserved characteristics
than women not selected by public contest. The male coefficients of λPCR are statistically
insignificant, and thus men do neither receive a wage premium nor a wage penalty from
public-contest recruitment. All in all, the positive effect from public-contest selection is more
pronounced for women than for men.
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Table 2.9 Bivariate Probit Estimation by Gender – Panel
Year Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Variables Public Contest Employment Public Contest Employment
Age 0.066*** 0.025*** 0.044*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ 0.804*** 0.493*** 0.528*** 0.217***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
Married 0.138*** -0.060** 0.300*** 0.528***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030)
Homeowner 0.164*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.193***
(0.027) (0.018) (0.025) (0.021)
Age5064 0.789*** 0.345***
(0.030) (0.030)
Italian 0.259*** 0.246***
(0.059) (0.093)
North 0.797*** 0.776***
(0.016) (0.017)
Centre 0.499*** 0.504***
(0.019) (0.021)
Partner_Works 0.036* 0.128***
(0.021) (0.026)
Kids -0.172*** 0.153***
(0.024) (0.026)
Kids_10 -0.152*** -0.023
(0.024) (0.034)
Work_Climate -0.026** -0.063***
(0.013) (0.012)
Work_Stab 0.166*** 0.233***
(0.010) (0.011)
Work_Time 0.082*** 0.057***
(0.013) (0.012)
Work_Task -0.032** 0.000
(0.014) (0.013)
Reloc 0.417*** 0.442***
(0.039) (0.029)
Risp 0.051** 0.123***
(0.023) (0.023)
Constant -7.000*** -3.123*** -5.638*** -1.506***
(0.100) (0.081) (0.085) (0.108)
ρ 0.618*** 1.222***
(0.055) (0.111)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39,345 33,538
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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2.6 Counterfactual GPG Adjusted for Double Selection
In Section 2.4 we have shown that the GPG in the case of public-contest recruitment is
reduced to zero (see Table 2.5). In the case of non public-contest recruitment, the coefficients
effect was identified to be the main driver of a positive and significant GPG. In order to
verify the robustness of these results in the presence of selection bias, we compute the CPG
adjusted for (double) selectivity bias for individuals not selected by public contests.27 In
particular, the CPG adjusted for double selection is given by:
CPGm = X¯m
′
F (βˆ
m
M− βˆmF )+(δˆmW,M− δˆmW,F)λ¯mW,F +(δˆmR,M− δˆmR,F)λ¯mR,F (2.6)
where m = (PC,NPC).
Table 2.11 shows the estimated adjusted difference in pay between men and women not
hired by public contest after having corrected for (double) selectivity bias. For individuals not
selected by public contest, the counterfactual analysis corrected for selectivity bias confirms
the results obtained before. In both cases, with and without taking into account the correction
for selection bias, the unexplained part turns out to be the most important driver of the GPG
in the case of non public-contest selection. The estimation results predict that women in non
public-contest jobs earn between 3.3% (in 2011)28 and 12.5% (in 2005) less than they would
earn if they were remunerated as men. Hence, in the case of non public-contest recruitment,
a non-trivial pay disparity between women and men still exists even after adjusting for
selectivity and productivity-related characteristics.
Table 2.11 CPG Adjusted for Double Selection, Not Public-Contest Selected Employees –
Full Sample 18-64
Year Panel 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Difference 0.100*** 0.140*** 0.126*** 0.106*** 0.084*** 0.049*** 0.065***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Counterfactual 0.109*** 0.125*** 0.109*** 0.124*** 0.086*** 0.033 0.105***
(0.013) (0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021)
Observations 26,931 5,841 5,823 5,623 6,383 6,072 7,924
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
27As in the case of public contest recruitment, the GPG – except for 2005 – is zero and thus no additional
insights can be gained by looking at the CPG for public-contest recruited individuals.
28In 2001, the CPG is statistically insignificant.
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2.7 Public- versus Private-Sector Recruitment
The institutional rules and practices that typically apply to public-sector employment to
some extent insulate public-sector jobs from the uncertainties of labor market forces. Public-
sector jobs are generally more stable over time and more tightly linked to experience and
education than private-sector jobs. Overall, this higher degree of job security for civil servants
comes along with higher barriers to entry into public employment. Differences in entry
requirements, wage-setting practices, contract types and career paths between the public
and the private sector affect the public-private sector gap in both pay and lifetime values.
In the 1980’s, permanent hiring without public contests of ‘pro-tempore’ workers29 and
‘ope legis’ promotions has increased recruitment in general and, in particular, recruitment
without public contests in the public sector (Craveri, 2016). Pay increases for public-sector
employees were automatic until the reform of 1993.30 Since then, remuneration is determined
by employee collective agreements. Automatic wage increases and career promotions
linked to seniority were substituted with more discretionary, selective and performance-
related mechanisms. After changes in public employment in the 2000’s31 for the purpose
of optimizing labor productivity and in order to make the organization of public-sector
employment more flexible, hiring on open-ended contracts and flexible forms of employment
are now allowed in the public administration. Moreover, collective agreements regulating
fixed-term contracts, training contracts, and the supply of temporary labor are now possible.
Hence, institutional differences between the public and private sector (e.g. in the legislative
regulation, employment relationships or personnel policies) persist, but are decreasing
nowadays (Postel-Vinay, 2015).
We calculate the GPG by entry channel only for the public sector, in order to show that
the disappearance of the wage gap is due to the mechanism of public contests and not due
to public-sector employment. The decomposition results for the public sector are shown in
Table 2.12. The results confirm the results of the previous analysis. In the case of public-
contest recruitment, the GPG is insignificant and thus disappears on average, while in the case
of non public-contest recruitment, even in the public sector, there is a positive and statistically
significant GPG. In the case of non-public contest recruitment, the unexplained or coefficients
part is again the main driver of the wage gap. This suggests that the disappearance of the
29‘Pro-tempore’ workers are individuals in temporary employment.
30The main changes were introduced by legislative decree 29/1993, and subsequently by legislative decrees
396/1997, 80/1998 and 387/1998, with consequences on the status of public-sector employees, their employment
relationships and personnel policies.
31In particular: law 133/2008 and the legislative decree 150/2009.
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GPG among public-contest selected employees is not entirely driven by the institutional
environment of the public sector (as without the mechanism of public-contest selection, a
significant and positive GPG for public-sector employees is found).
In the following, we test whether the impact of public contests on the GPG depends on
the institutional environment of the public sector at all. Therefore, we analyze the GPG by
recruitment method only for the private sector. Table 2.13 presents the decomposition result
by public-contest recruitment for the private sector only. We find a positive and significant
GPG, regardless of whether individuals are selected by public contest or not. Moreover,
the difference in pay between men and women is even higher for public-contest selected
employees in the private sector compared to not public-contest selected individuals. In
both subsamples, the unexplained as well as the explained part are positive and statistically
significant. Thus, the mechanism of public contests as gender-fair and merit-based screening
devices requires specific institutional environments. In the public sector, these institutional
requirements are given. Even though the institutional background is not the only factor
contributing to the success of merit-based and gender-fair screening via public contests (there
is a positive and significant GPG among public servants not selected by public contest), it is
a crucial one.
Table 2.12 Log Hourly Wages and Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Gender Log Hourly
Wage Gap – Public Sector
Year Panel
(1) (2)
Public-Contest Not Public-Contest
Selected Employees Selected Employees
Differential
Male Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 2.366*** 2.180***
(0.006) (0.011)
Female Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 2.367*** 2.129***
(0.005) (0.011)
Difference -0.001 0.052***
(0.007) (0.015)
Decomposition
Explained -0.024**
(0.012)
Unexplained 0.075***
(0.017)
Observations 13,595 4,394
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.13 Log Hourly Wages and Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Gender Log Hourly
Wage Gap – Private Sector
Year Panel
(1) (2)
Public-Contest Not Public-Contest
Selected Employees Selected Employees
Differential
Male Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 2.289*** 1.974***
(0.014) (0.004)
Female Wages (Log Hourly Wages) 2.122*** 1.843***
(0.014) (0.005)
Difference 0.167*** 0.131***
(0.020) (0.006)
Decomposition
Explained 0.029* 0.032***
(0.017) (0.004)
Unexplained 0.138*** 0.099***
(0.023) (0.006)
Observations 1,319 22,537
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
2.8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of hiring methods on earnings in Italy. Therefore, the GPG
is decomposed in an explained and an unexplained component using the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition approach. The estimates are then corrected for double selection using the
partial partial observability approach by Meng and Schmidt (1985). The decision to enter in
employment as well as the individual’s entry decision are thereby modeled simultaneously.
Employment selection may be particularly relevant for Italy given especially pronounced
gender differences in employment and labor force participation. Similarly, public-contest
selection may be non-random and different for men and women. In fact, public-contest
recruitment may be preferred by women given less potential for discriminatory behavior in
the hiring process. Consequently, failure to account for (double) sample selection leads to
inconsistent estimates of the gender-specific wage equations as well as of the components of
the GPG.
Our results suggest that public contests reduce the conditions for gender discrimination
to flourish and are merit-based and gender-fair mechanisms for performance appraisal. They
are merit-based because employees hired by public contest hold better observable and
unobservable characteristics than unselected employees. They are gender-fair because among
public-contest selected employees, there is no gender-related penalty on wages. We show that
recruitment carried out by public contests erases the GPG in the full sample of individuals
39
aged 18-64, and even reverses the gap in favor of women among young employees. The
relatively strong wage gap in favor of young women is only explained by endowments, i.e.
by the fact that women have better observable characteristics than men. The reversal of the
GPG observed among public-contest selected young employees vanishes in the full sample,
even in the case of public-contest recruitment. This is because the career path erodes the
head start that young women receive by public-contest recruitment. This result is in line with
the literature finding that women are less often promoted and have generally more breaks in
their careers due to childbearing and -care (Blackaby et al., 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007; Fortin, 2008; Heilman and Okimoto, 2008; Bertrand et al., 2011). In the case of
employees not hired by public contest, the component accounting for discrimination is the
main driver of the disparity in pay. Even after adjusting the unexplained component of the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for double selection (i.e. estimating the CPG), we still find a
substantial GPG for not public-contest selected individuals. The robust CPG underpins the
result that public-contest recruitment significantly impacts on gender differences in pay. In
particular, it provides an option for gender-fair screening. Analyzing the GPG by recruitment
in different institutional environments, i.e. in the public and the private sector, shows that the
institutional background does indeed matter for gender-fair and merit-based screening. A
positive and significant GPG persists for both public-contest and not public-contest selected
employees in private-sector employment. However, this does not necessarily imply that
the disappearance of the GPG among public-contest selected employees is entirely driven
by the public sector. In fact, a statistically significant and positive GPG among individuals
not selected by public contest in the public sector is found. Moreover, the decomposition
reveals that the wage gap is entirely due to the unexplained component. Thus, even though
an institutional environment similar to that in the public sector was found to be important for
the mechanism of public-contest selection to work, the results suggest that public contests
are gender-neutral and merit-based procedures picking out the most deserving participants as
they are less discretionary and more regulated by law than other screening devices. Further
research on the environments necessary for public contests as gender-fair and merit-based
screening devices is certainly needed. To the best of our knowledge, so far no other research
establishes a relationship between recruitment procedures and the GPG and shows empirically
the disappearance of the wage gap – given certain institutional characteristics.
CHAPTER 2: THE GPG AMONG PUBLIC-CONTEST SELECTED EMPLOYEES 40
Appendices
Appendix 2.A Definition of Variables
Table 2.A.1 Definition of Variables
Variable Name Definition
Dependent Variables
Net_ Hourly_Wage Hourly wages in Euros and net of taxes and social security contributions
Log_Hourly_Wage The natural log of net hourly earnings; wages are in Euros and net of taxes and
social security contributions
Employment One if the respective individual decided to accept a wage offer, i.e. to enter in
employment, zero if (voluntarily) unemployed
Public_Contest One if individual entered via public contest in the current job, zero otherwise
Public_Contest is also used as independent variable
Independent Variables
Female One if the respective individual is a woman, zero otherwise
Contfem Interactive effect of the dummy variables Public_Contest and Female,
i.e. one if the respective employee entered via public contest in his or her
current job and is female, zero otherwise
Exper Number of years of work experience
Exper2 Exper squared
Tenure Number of years worked for current employer
Educ Number of years of schooling completed
University_Degree One if the respective individual has graduated from university, zero otherwise
Max_D_Mark One if the maximum degree mark was attained, i.e. 110 e lode, in the case of
graduation from university, zero otherwise
North One if the respective individual lives and works in the North of Italy,
zero otherwise
Centre One if the respective individual lives and works in the Centre of Italy,
zero otherwise
Age Age of the respective individual (in years) ∈ (18,64)
Age5064 One if the age of the respective individual is between 50 and 64 years,
zero otherwise
Married One if the respective individual is married, zero otherwise
Italian One if the respective individual holds the Italian citizenship, zero otherwise
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Hometime Years the respective individual spent out of the labor force
Educ_Moth_Uni One if the mother’s education is equal to University_Degree, i.e. the mother
holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Educ_Fath_Uni One if the father’s education is equal to University_Degree, i.e. the father holds
a university degree, zero otherwise
Kids One if the respective individual has at least one child, zero otherwise
Kids_10 One if the age of the youngest child is below 10 years, zero otherwise
Homeowner One if the respective individual owns a house, zero otherwise
This includes bank loan-financed houses
Partner_Works One if the partner of the respective individual is employed, zero otherwise
Risp One if the respective individual responds to questions on the quality of
public services, zero otherwise
Reloc One if the respective individual relocated in order to take the current job,
zero otherwise
Work_Climate Level of satisfaction with working climate at current job ∈ (0,4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Stab Level of satisfaction with stability of current job ∈ (0,4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Time Level of satisfaction with working time at current job ∈ (0,4)
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Task Level of satisfaction with tasks at current job ∈ (0,4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Contract_Type One if the respective individual holds an unlimited contract, zero otherwise
Manager One if the respective individual is occupied in an intellectual profession;
scientific or highly specialized occupations, zero otherwise
Intermediate_Prof One if the respective individual is occupied in an intermediary position
in the commercial, technical or administrative sector, in health services or
is a technician, zero otherwise
Sec_02 - Sec_15 Sectoral dummies for employment in manufacturing, energy, construction,
tourism, commerce, transport, communication, financial activities,
service industry, public administration, education, health, sciences and
family services, respectively
Public_Sector Dummy variable for public-sector employment; one if the respective individual
is employed in the public sector, zero otherwise
Year_1-Year_5 Year dummies, one if year = 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, respectively,
and zero otherwise
Selection Correction Terms
λPCW Measures the selection bias from the work decision for those selected by
public contest
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λPCR Measures the selection bias from the recruitment decision for those selected
by public contest.
λNPCW Measures the selection bias from the work decision for those not selected by
public contest
λNPCR Measures the selection bias from the recruitment decision for those not selected
by public contest
Appendix 2.B Descriptive Statistics Cross Sections and
Further Estimation Results
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Table 2.B.2 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Indicator Variable Public_Contest
and Interactive Effect Contfem – Panel
Year Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample inclu- Individuals Individuals Hired Individuals Hired Individuals not Hired Individuals not Hired
ding Individuals Aged 18-34 by Public Contest by Public Contest by Public Contest by Public Contest
Aged 18-64 and Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34 and Aged 18-64 and Aged 18-34
Public_Contest 0.068*** 0.128***
(0.006) (0.016)
Female -0.104*** -0.069*** -0.064*** -0.008 -0.104*** -0.069***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.021) (0.005) (0.008)
Contfem 0.040*** 0.050***
(0.008) (0.019)
Exper 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.016** 0.018*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Educ 0.148*** 0.098*** 0.196*** 0.100*** 0.126*** 0.100***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.019) (0.005) (0.008)
Max_D_Mark 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.029** 0.049* 0.043*** 0.044**
(0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.027) (0.015) (0.020)
Contract_Type 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.004 -0.018 0.042*** 0.038***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.025) (0.007) (0.009)
Work_Climate 0.000 -0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005)
Work_Stab 0.005* 0.005 0.008* 0.026** 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.003) (0.005)
Work_Time 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.005 0.017 0.022*** 0.029***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005)
Work_Task 0.014*** 0.009* 0.018*** 0.002 0.012*** 0.010*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005)
Intermed_Prof 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.008 0.012 0.055*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.025) (0.006) (0.008)
Manager 0.158*** 0.060*** 0.155*** 0.077** 0.139*** 0.054***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.030) (0.010) (0.015)
North 0.028*** 0.066*** -0.022*** -0.033* 0.057*** 0.082***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.009)
Centre 0.011** 0.037*** -0.006 -0.029 0.026*** 0.049***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.023) (0.007) (0.010)
Home_Time 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.085*** 0.056*** 0.045***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.006) (0.009)
Italian 0.061** 0.029 0.074 0.117 0.065** 0.027
(0.026) (0.032) (0.067) (0.185) (0.028) (0.033)
Homeowner 0.027*** 0.011 0.021** -0.014 0.031*** 0.015
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.006) (0.010)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.012 -0.026* 0.006 -0.033 0.008 -0.026
(0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.027) (0.013) (0.017)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.008 0.024 0.019 0.006 0.003 0.025
(0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.036) (0.016) (0.018)
Constant 0.942*** 1.066*** 1.038*** 1.285*** 0.957*** 1.040***
(0.034) (0.053) (0.077) (0.220) (0.039) (0.056)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,845 16,456 14,914 2,088 26,931 14,368
R-squared 0.380 0.170 0.342 0.210 0.243 0.115
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
45
Table 2.B.3 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Indicator Variable Public_Contest
and Interactive Effect Contfem – 2005
Year 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample inclu- Individuals Individuals Hired by Individuals Hired by Individuals not Hired Individuals not Hired
ding Individuals Aged 18-34 Public Contest and Public Contest and by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Public_Contest 0.062*** 0.070**
(0.014) (0.035)
Female -0.132*** -0.138*** -0.105*** -0.050 -0.137*** -0.139***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.045) (0.010) (0.014)
Contfem 0.025 0.062
(0.015) (0.040)
Exper 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.032* 0.020*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.017) (0.002) (0.006)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.001 -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.002*** 0.001 0.002** -0.010* 0.002*** 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Educ 0.167*** 0.154*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 0.145*** 0.149***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.038) (0.010) (0.015)
Max_D_Mark 0.048** 0.020 0.027 0.005 0.048 0.002
(0.020) (0.037) (0.025) (0.068) (0.033) (0.043)
Contract_Type 0.035** 0.035** 0.010 0.042 0.035** 0.031*
(0.014) (0.017) (0.031) (0.061) (0.015) (0.018)
Work_Climate 0.006 -0.007 0.003 -0.027 0.007 -0.002
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.007) (0.010)
Work_Stab 0.007 -0.003 0.011 -0.004 0.006 -0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.006) (0.007)
Work_Time 0.012** 0.028*** -0.003 0.046* 0.022*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.023) (0.007) (0.009)
Work_Task 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.048** 0.016** 0.023**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) (0.010)
Intermed_Prof 0.030*** 0.017 -0.003 -0.053 0.051*** 0.028*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.046) (0.012) (0.015)
Manager 0.251*** 0.097*** 0.268*** 0.077 0.200*** 0.088**
(0.017) (0.031) (0.025) (0.063) (0.024) (0.037)
North 0.047*** 0.086*** -0.012 -0.049 0.087*** 0.111***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.037) (0.011) (0.016)
Centre 0.042*** 0.060*** 0.023 -0.022 0.065*** 0.079***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.016) (0.047) (0.015) (0.020)
Home_Time 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.008 0.008*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
Married 0.036*** 0.086*** 0.016 0.147*** 0.045*** 0.070***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.044) (0.013) (0.021)
Italian 0.019 -0.004 0.290 0.009 -0.002
(0.059) (0.086) (0.232) (0.061) (0.086)
Homeowner 0.017* -0.035** 0.013 -0.050 0.017 -0.030
(0.010) (0.017) (0.016) (0.042) (0.013) (0.018)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.017 -0.012 -0.005 0.010 0.034 -0.010
(0.019) (0.033) (0.026) (0.063) (0.029) (0.040)
Educ_Moth_Uni -0.004 0.013 -0.030 -0.094 0.020 0.035
(0.026) (0.038) (0.039) (0.081) (0.035) (0.042)
Constant 0.788*** 0.791*** 0.677*** 0.700*** 0.788*** 0.797***
(0.075) (0.120) (0.246) (0.201) (0.085) (0.123)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,520 3,637 3,679 576 5,841 3,061
R-squared 0.442 0.238 0.385 0.250 0.314 0.171
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.4 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Indicator Variable Public_Contest
and Interactive Effect Contfem – 2006
Year 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample inclu- Individuals Individuals Hired by Individuals Hired by Individuals not Hired Individuals not Hired
ding Individuals Aged 18-34 Public Contest and Public Contest and by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Public_Contest 0.060*** 0.102***
(0.014) (0.033)
Female -0.096*** -0.067*** -0.043*** 0.033 -0.101*** -0.070***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.042) (0.011) (0.015)
Contfem 0.047*** 0.059
(0.015) (0.037)
Exper 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.039** 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.016) (0.002) (0.005)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.002** -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.004* 0.002* -0.000 0.004*** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002)
Educ 0.137*** 0.088*** 0.185*** 0.101*** 0.112*** 0.089***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.037) (0.010) (0.014)
Max_D_Mark 0.034 0.056 -0.022 0.005 0.093** 0.066
(0.021) (0.040) (0.025) (0.065) (0.038) (0.050)
Contract_Type 0.041*** 0.045*** -0.011 -0.024 0.048*** 0.050***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.032) (0.051) (0.015) (0.017)
Work_Climate -0.001 -0.010 -0.003 -0.009 0.001 -0.008
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.028) (0.007) (0.010)
Work_Stab 0.006 0.007 0.017* 0.034 0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.025) (0.006) (0.008)
Work_Time 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.009 0.017 0.019*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.027) (0.007) (0.008)
Work_Task 0.020*** 0.025** 0.020** 0.034 0.020*** 0.022**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.025) (0.007) (0.010)
Intermed_Prof 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.002 0.008 0.071*** 0.056***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.043) (0.012) (0.016)
Manager 0.198*** 0.082*** 0.177*** 0.127** 0.177*** 0.068**
(0.016) (0.029) (0.024) (0.057) (0.022) (0.035)
North 0.017** 0.053*** -0.038*** -0.039 0.054*** 0.069***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.036) (0.012) (0.016)
Centre -0.005 0.032* -0.038** -0.090* 0.025* 0.052***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.051) (0.013) (0.017)
Home_Time 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
Married 0.043*** 0.026 0.034** 0.070 0.044*** 0.021
(0.010) (0.018) (0.014) (0.045) (0.014) (0.020)
Italian 0.078 0.032 -0.247*** 0.097* 0.040
(0.050) (0.056) (0.087) (0.050) (0.056)
Homeowner 0.026*** 0.019 0.013 -0.020 0.030** 0.023
(0.010) (0.018) (0.016) (0.048) (0.012) (0.019)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.026 -0.007 0.027 -0.029 0.027 0.004
(0.018) (0.029) (0.024) (0.057) (0.026) (0.034)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.017 0.018 0.019 -0.025 0.003 0.022
(0.022) (0.029) (0.035) (0.074) (0.029) (0.031)
Constant 0.858*** 0.942*** 1.257*** 1.085*** 0.859*** 0.917***
(0.066) (0.096) (0.114) (0.228) (0.073) (0.100)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,305 3,638 3,482 484 5,823 3,154
R-squared 0.427 0.204 0.351 0.246 0.292 0.133
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.5 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Indicator Variable Public_Contest
and Interactive Effect Contfem – 2008
Year 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample inclu- Individuals Individuals Hired by Individuals Hired by Individuals not Hired Individuals not Hired
ding Individuals Aged 18-34 Public Contest and Public Contest and by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Public_Contest 0.056*** 0.134***
(0.013) (0.032)
Female -0.111*** -0.089*** -0.066*** -0.014 -0.115*** -0.094***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.043) (0.010) (0.014)
Contfem 0.037** 0.027
(0.016) (0.039)
Exper 0.017*** 0.010 0.012*** -0.013 0.017*** 0.012
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.015) (0.002) (0.008)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.007** 0.001 0.002 0.004*** 0.008**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003)
Educ 0.146*** 0.117*** 0.209*** 0.075 0.119*** 0.123***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.046) (0.009) (0.014)
Max_D_Mark 0.056** 0.085*** 0.008 0.058 0.088*** 0.091**
(0.022) (0.033) (0.029) (0.065) (0.032) (0.036)
Contract_Type 0.029** 0.036** 0.034 -0.018 0.025* 0.043***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.034) (0.050) (0.015) (0.016)
Work_Climate -0.011** -0.008 -0.016* -0.016 -0.008 -0.007
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.006) (0.009)
Work_Stab 0.019*** 0.016* 0.008 0.029 0.023*** 0.014
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.030) (0.006) (0.009)
Work_Time 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.018* 0.041** 0.024*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007) (0.009)
Work_Task 0.011* 0.013 0.008 -0.033 0.012* 0.018*
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.007) (0.009)
Intermed_Prof 0.050*** 0.023 0.027 0.039 0.065*** 0.025
(0.010) (0.017) (0.020) (0.062) (0.012) (0.018)
Manager 0.138*** 0.006 0.134*** 0.087 0.126*** -0.008
(0.017) (0.032) (0.025) (0.082) (0.025) (0.037)
North 0.023** 0.072*** -0.029** -0.073 0.053*** 0.090***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.049) (0.012) (0.017)
Centre 0.013 0.064*** -0.027 -0.017 0.040*** 0.074***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.017) (0.052) (0.015) (0.022)
Home_Time 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.002 0.003 0.007*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003)
Married 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.011 0.048 0.066*** 0.059***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.038) (0.012) (0.016)
Italian 0.041 0.021 0.047 -0.059 0.047 0.024
(0.055) (0.073) (0.110) (0.264) (0.059) (0.078)
Homeowner 0.035*** 0.038** 0.011 -0.000 0.045*** 0.041**
(0.012) (0.019) (0.024) (0.061) (0.014) (0.020)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.038** 0.009 0.027 -0.120 0.041 0.031
(0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (0.074) (0.027) (0.035)
Educ_Moth_Uni -0.007 0.009 0.051 0.086 -0.036 -0.009
(0.026) (0.033) (0.044) (0.100) (0.031) (0.034)
Constant 0.972*** 0.978*** 1.152*** 1.886*** 0.959*** 0.906***
(0.068) (0.103) (0.143) (0.440) (0.075) (0.107)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,601 3,409 2,978 394 5,623 3,015
R-squared 0.426 0.225 0.335 0.282 0.302 0.163
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.6 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Indicator Variable Public_Contest
and Interactive Effect Contfem – 2010
Year 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample inclu- Individuals Individuals Hired by Individuals Hired by Individuals not Hired Individuals not Hired
ding Individuals Aged 18-34 Public Contest and Public Contest and by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Public_Contest 0.076*** 0.112***
(0.015) (0.040)
Female -0.093*** -0.043** -0.068*** -0.030 -0.089*** -0.040**
(0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.053) (0.013) (0.018)
Contfem 0.031* 0.038
(0.018) (0.045)
Exper 0.020*** 0.018** 0.019*** -0.005 0.019*** 0.020**
(0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.015) (0.002) (0.009)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003)
Educ 0.140*** 0.090*** 0.184*** 0.079* 0.122*** 0.093***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.043) (0.013) (0.020)
Max_D_Mark 0.070*** 0.087*** 0.056** 0.089* 0.066** 0.086**
(0.020) (0.032) (0.025) (0.046) (0.032) (0.040)
Contract_Type 0.035** 0.031* 0.011 0.002 0.035** 0.033*
(0.016) (0.018) (0.038) (0.057) (0.017) (0.020)
Work_Climate -0.004 -0.006 0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.013)
Work_Stab 0.002 0.002 -0.008 0.013 0.006 0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.007) (0.011)
Work_Time 0.020*** 0.028** 0.005 0.013 0.026*** 0.030**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) (0.013)
Work_Task 0.012* -0.002 0.011 -0.055* 0.012 0.005
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.030) (0.009) (0.014)
Intermed_Prof 0.029** 0.000 -0.001 0.068 0.046*** -0.002
(0.012) (0.019) (0.021) (0.048) (0.014) (0.020)
Manager 0.122*** 0.038 0.108*** 0.088 0.113*** 0.032
(0.016) (0.029) (0.025) (0.057) (0.022) (0.034)
North 0.035*** 0.067*** -0.002 0.009 0.054*** 0.075***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.015) (0.043) (0.015) (0.022)
Centre 0.007 0.018 0.000 -0.010 0.016 0.020
(0.012) (0.022) (0.018) (0.054) (0.017) (0.024)
Home_Time 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.004** 0.012* 0.007*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
Married 0.057*** 0.040** 0.049*** 0.086** 0.057*** 0.033
(0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.040) (0.014) (0.020)
Italian 0.007 0.062 0.156 0.131 -0.001 0.059
(0.037) (0.044) (0.198) (0.359) (0.038) (0.044)
Homeowner 0.045*** 0.036 0.074** 0.060 0.037** 0.032
(0.015) (0.024) (0.031) (0.076) (0.018) (0.025)
Educ_Fath_Uni -0.020 -0.066** -0.006 -0.077 -0.040 -0.063*
(0.020) (0.032) (0.026) (0.064) (0.029) (0.037)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.013 0.026 0.028 0.104 0.009 0.006
(0.028) (0.037) (0.039) (0.077) (0.036) (0.042)
Constant 1.017*** 1.018*** 0.980*** 1.350*** 1.039*** 0.979***
(0.058) (0.103) (0.217) (0.451) (0.069) (0.110)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,420 4,080 3,037 517 6,383 3,563
R-squared 0.315 0.117 0.316 0.242 0.183 0.075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.7 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Indicator Variable Public_Contest
and Interactive Effect Contfem – 2011
Year 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample inclu- Individuals Individuals Hired by Individuals Hired by Individuals not Hired Individuals not Hired
ding Individuals Aged 18-34 Public Contest and Public Contest and by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Public_Contest 0.101*** 0.111***
(0.015) (0.031)
Female -0.079*** -0.024 -0.058*** 0.108** -0.080*** -0.023
(0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.051) (0.013) (0.019)
Contfem 0.023 0.105***
(0.019) (0.039)
Exper 0.012*** 0.014* 0.009*** 0.017 0.013*** 0.013
(0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.015) (0.002) (0.008)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.009 0.004*** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
Educ 0.162*** 0.074*** 0.216*** 0.116** 0.139*** 0.072***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.047) (0.012) (0.020)
Max_D_Mark 0.025 0.022 0.047* 0.080 -0.015 0.004
(0.021) (0.035) (0.025) (0.055) (0.035) (0.042)
Contract_Type 0.043*** 0.031 0.015 -0.005 0.044** 0.037*
(0.016) (0.019) (0.033) (0.061) (0.018) (0.020)
Work_Climate 0.006 0.004 0.010 0.057** 0.005 -0.004
(0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.027) (0.009) (0.014)
Work_Stab -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.011 -0.004 -0.000
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.028) (0.007) (0.010)
Work_Time 0.007 0.019 0.006 -0.012 0.008 0.023*
(0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.026) (0.009) (0.013)
Work_Task 0.003 0.000 0.011 -0.038 -0.001 0.004
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.026) (0.008) (0.012)
Intermed_Prof 0.022* 0.033* 0.008 -0.048 0.036** 0.039*
(0.012) (0.019) (0.022) (0.050) (0.014) (0.020)
Manager 0.106*** 0.081*** 0.121*** -0.023 0.085*** 0.088***
(0.016) (0.029) (0.025) (0.058) (0.021) (0.032)
North 0.034*** 0.078*** -0.008 -0.021 0.056*** 0.094***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.016) (0.046) (0.015) (0.022)
Centre 0.023* 0.033 0.026 -0.041 0.027 0.045*
(0.013) (0.023) (0.018) (0.052) (0.017) (0.025)
Home_Time 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.009 0.009*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
Married 0.054*** 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.114*** 0.051*** 0.064***
(0.011) (0.021) (0.016) (0.040) (0.016) (0.025)
Italian 0.158*** 0.063 -0.016 -0.441*** 0.174*** 0.071
(0.058) (0.084) (0.194) (0.143) (0.060) (0.086)
Homeowner 0.027* -0.006 0.030 -0.062 0.025 0.001
(0.015) (0.025) (0.022) (0.060) (0.019) (0.027)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.012 -0.028 0.030 0.030 -0.007 -0.047
(0.021) (0.034) (0.031) (0.060) (0.029) (0.040)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.006 0.051 -0.035 -0.053 0.036 0.070*
(0.028) (0.036) (0.052) (0.077) (0.034) (0.040)
Constant 0.905*** 1.198*** 1.074*** 1.986*** 0.946*** 1.161***
(0.078) (0.124) (0.210) (0.265) (0.087) (0.131)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,977 3,651 2,905 444 6,072 3,207
R-squared 0.302 0.111 0.314 0.228 0.158 0.069
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.8 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Indicator Variable Public_Contest
and Interactive Effect Contfem – 2014
Year 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample inclu- Individuals Individuals Hired by Individuals Hired by Individuals not Hired Individuals not Hired
ding Individuals Aged 18-34 Public Contest and Public Contest and by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34 Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Public_Contest 0.072*** 0.119***
(0.013) (0.030)
Female -0.087*** -0.048*** -0.073*** -0.027 -0.085*** -0.050***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.034) (0.011) (0.017)
Contfem 0.014 0.019
(0.016) (0.037)
Exper 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.006** 0.015 0.016*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) (0.008)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.004 0.003*** -0.009 0.004*** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003)
Educ 0.122*** 0.059*** 0.151*** 0.141*** 0.110*** 0.050***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.033) (0.010) (0.017)
Max_D_Mark 0.006 0.003 0.032 -0.044 -0.025 0.017
(0.023) (0.034) (0.025) (0.076) (0.042) (0.038)
Contract_Type 0.053*** 0.048** 0.138*** 0.202*** 0.022 0.020
(0.015) (0.021) (0.031) (0.052) (0.017) (0.023)
Work_Climate -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.003
(0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.024) (0.007) (0.012)
Work_Stab 0.004 0.004 -0.010 -0.041** 0.009 0.013
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.020) (0.007) (0.011)
Work_Time 0.016*** 0.024** 0.019** 0.030 0.016** 0.022**
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.023) (0.007) (0.011)
Work_Task 0.011* -0.005 0.017** 0.016 0.007 -0.010
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.025) (0.008) (0.013)
Intermed_Prof 0.039*** 0.033* -0.030 0.035 0.063*** 0.037*
(0.011) (0.019) (0.020) (0.062) (0.012) (0.020)
Manager 0.220*** 0.162*** 0.218*** 0.203*** 0.193*** 0.153***
(0.015) (0.028) (0.024) (0.072) (0.020) (0.031)
North 0.021** 0.044** -0.019 0.031 0.045*** 0.047**
(0.009) (0.018) (0.014) (0.039) (0.013) (0.020)
Centre -0.011 -0.019 -0.015 -0.006 -0.004 -0.022
(0.011) (0.021) (0.015) (0.049) (0.014) (0.023)
Home_Time 0.004*** 0.001 0.003** -0.002 0.004*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003)
Married 0.043*** 0.045*** -0.001 -0.008 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.033) (0.012) (0.018)
Italian 0.040 0.020 -0.099 -0.081 0.060 0.026
(0.040) (0.075) (0.075) (0.113) (0.043) (0.077)
Homeowner 0.012 0.002 0.039* -0.001 0.001 0.006
(0.013) (0.019) (0.023) (0.041) (0.015) (0.020)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.022 0.028 0.006 0.001 0.030 0.038
(0.017) (0.027) (0.022) (0.049) (0.024) (0.032)
Educ_Moth_Uni -0.007 0.003 -0.024 -0.067 0.006 0.016
(0.022) (0.034) (0.032) (0.060) (0.030) (0.039)
Constant 1.193*** 1.457*** 1.422*** 1.492*** 1.184*** 1.444***
(0.059) (0.112) (0.105) (0.209) (0.071) (0.121)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,328 4,554 4,404 851 7,924 3,703
R-squared 0.262 0.119 0.264 0.126 0.157 0.077
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.9 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages by Age and Gender – Panel
Year Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Individuals
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Variables Women Men Women Men
Public_Contest 0.111*** 0.066*** 0.183*** 0.115***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017)
Exper 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Educ 0.155*** 0.138*** 0.101*** 0.094***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010)
Max_D_Mark 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.050** 0.034
(0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028)
Contract_Type 0.014 0.072*** 0.006 0.061***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Work_Climate -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Work_Stab 0.002 0.010*** -0.001 0.012**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Work_Time 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Work_Task 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.010 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Intermed_Prof 0.072*** 0.017*** 0.054*** 0.012
(0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010)
Manager 0.180*** 0.155*** 0.086*** 0.051***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.021) (0.018)
North 0.008 0.045*** 0.073*** 0.061***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010)
Centre 0.005 0.016** 0.056*** 0.023*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
Home_Time 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.043*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.068***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
Italian 0.040 0.075* 0.023 0.028
(0.034) (0.039) (0.049) (0.033)
Homeowner 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.013 0.015
(0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.015 0.009 -0.039* -0.014
(0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.020)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.048*** -0.036** 0.075*** -0.021
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.021)
Constant 0.895*** 0.891*** 1.004*** 1.046***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.081) (0.062)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,398 22,447 8,090 8,366
R-squared 0.405 0.364 0.209 0.130
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.10 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages by Age and Gender – 2005
Year 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Individuals
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Variables Women Men Women Men
Public_Contest 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.143*** 0.057
(0.015) (0.016) (0.029) (0.038)
Exper 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.014 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.002* 0.002** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Educ 0.182*** 0.152*** 0.174*** 0.134***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.021) (0.018)
Max_D_Mark 0.054** 0.028 0.063 -0.103
(0.024) (0.035) (0.044) (0.067)
Contract_Type 0.022 0.050*** 0.018 0.046**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023)
Work_Climate 0.000 0.012 -0.001 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Work_Stab 0.003 0.010* -0.007 0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Work_Time 0.005 0.019** 0.009 0.048***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
Work_Task 0.022*** 0.016** 0.033** 0.018
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
Intermed_Prof 0.063*** 0.015 0.050** 0.004
(0.017) (0.012) (0.021) (0.019)
Manager 0.254*** 0.268*** 0.110** 0.099**
(0.026) (0.022) (0.044) (0.039)
Sec_2 0.067** 0.091*** 0.080** 0.043
North 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.150*** 0.035*
(0.014) (0.011) (0.024) (0.018)
Centre 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.119*** 0.010
(0.016) (0.014) (0.027) (0.025)
Home_Time 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Married 0.030** 0.040*** 0.071*** 0.116***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.026) (0.028)
Italian 0.017 0.024 -0.001 -0.024
(0.089) (0.049) (0.141) (0.041)
Homeowner 0.007 0.028** -0.040 -0.021
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.023)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.025 0.006 -0.007 -0.014
(0.025) (0.029) (0.045) (0.050)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.015 -0.020 0.045 0.009
(0.037) (0.037) (0.057) (0.050)
Constant 0.667*** 0.772*** 0.593*** 0.865***
(0.117) (0.073) (0.196) (0.101)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,513 5,007 1,877 1,760
R-squared 0.456 0.431 0.292 0.193
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.11 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages by Age and Gender – 2006
Year 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Individuals
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Variables Women Men Women Men
Public_Contest 0.114*** 0.054*** 0.160*** 0.100***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.031) (0.037)
Exper 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.002** 0.004*** 0.003 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Educ 0.132*** 0.138*** 0.086*** 0.088***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018)
Max_D_Mark 0.037 0.025 0.101** -0.041
(0.024) (0.037) (0.041) (0.087)
Contract_Type 0.030 0.060*** 0.055** 0.039*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
Work_Climate -0.006 0.001 -0.004 -0.017
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Work_Stab 0.005 0.010 0.000 0.014
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Work_Time 0.015* 0.019** 0.029** 0.023**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Work_Task 0.016** 0.020** 0.020 0.026*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Intermed_Prof 0.077*** 0.025* 0.075*** 0.042**
(0.017) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021)
Manager 0.212*** 0.203*** 0.141*** 0.054
(0.026) (0.021) (0.044) (0.039)
North 0.005 0.024** 0.067*** 0.040**
(0.014) (0.011) (0.023) (0.019)
Centre -0.022 0.006 0.051** 0.014
(0.016) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023)
Home_Time 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Married 0.033** 0.042*** 0.019 0.045
(0.013) (0.015) (0.023) (0.030)
Italian 0.052 0.059 0.001 0.042
(0.074) (0.051) (0.089) (0.066)
Homeowner 0.028* 0.022 0.021 0.018
(0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.028)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.018 0.040 -0.046 0.042
(0.023) (0.027) (0.038) (0.047)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.037 -0.012 0.030 0.002
(0.030) (0.032) (0.039) (0.043)
Constant 0.849*** 0.832*** 0.888*** 0.957***
(0.099) (0.077) (0.143) (0.127)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,083 5,222 1,779 1,859
R-squared 0.457 0.408 0.269 0.147
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
CHAPTER 2: THE GPG AMONG PUBLIC-CONTEST SELECTED EMPLOYEES 54
Table 2.B.12 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages by Age and Gender – 2008
Year 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Individuals
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Variables Women Men Women Men
Public_Contest 0.083*** 0.060*** 0.164*** 0.107***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.029) (0.035)
Exper 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.013 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Tenure 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.009** 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
Educ 0.158*** 0.133*** 0.121*** 0.110***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.020) (0.017)
Max_D_Mark 0.057** 0.046 0.104*** 0.034
(0.028) (0.034) (0.037) (0.066)
Contract_Type 0.006 0.054*** 0.003 0.068***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
Work_Climate -0.008 -0.017** 0.000 -0.017
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
Work_Stab 0.013* 0.029*** 0.007 0.030***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
Work_Time 0.032*** 0.015* 0.040*** 0.019
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
Work_Task 0.006 0.015** 0.008 0.017
(0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013)
Intermed_Prof 0.091*** 0.031** 0.050* 0.011
(0.019) (0.013) (0.028) (0.022)
Manager 0.152*** 0.146*** 0.021 0.010
(0.029) (0.022) (0.050) (0.043)
North 0.016 0.032*** 0.104*** 0.044**
(0.014) (0.012) (0.023) (0.021)
Centre 0.015 0.015 0.105*** 0.029
(0.018) (0.015) (0.028) (0.029)
Home_Time 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Married 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.036** 0.086***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.025)
Italian 0.074 0.009 0.079 -0.028
(0.085) (0.058) (0.117) (0.069)
Homeowner 0.034* 0.037** 0.029 0.050*
(0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.030)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.032 0.045* 0.005 0.019
(0.027) (0.026) (0.043) (0.045)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.081** -0.103*** 0.089* -0.078*
(0.038) (0.034) (0.049) (0.044)
Constant 0.773*** 1.026*** 0.744*** 1.089***
(0.109) (0.078) (0.157) (0.129)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,956 4,645 1,742 1,667
R-squared 0.469 0.397 0.300 0.157
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.13 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages by Age and Gender – 2010
Year 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Individuals
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Variables Women Men Women Men
Public_Contest 0.108*** 0.079*** 0.156*** 0.106**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.030) (0.042)
Exper 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.012 0.024**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.009)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.017*** 0.007*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
Educ 0.143*** 0.133*** 0.098*** 0.086***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.030) (0.023)
Max_D_Mark 0.040 0.105*** 0.045 0.162***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.041) (0.052)
Contract_Type 0.005 0.069*** -0.019 0.079***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.029) (0.023)
Work_Climate -0.009 -0.000 -0.009 -0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.017)
Work_Stab -0.001 0.008 -0.003 0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013)
Work_Time 0.015 0.025*** 0.030 0.026*
(0.011) (0.009) (0.019) (0.015)
Work_Task 0.018* 0.006 0.004 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018)
Intermed_Prof 0.058*** 0.012 0.038 -0.020
(0.022) (0.014) (0.033) (0.022)
Manager 0.156*** 0.107*** 0.087* 0.006
(0.028) (0.021) (0.045) (0.040)
North 0.015 0.051*** 0.067** 0.069***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.033) (0.024)
Centre 0.007 0.004 0.024 0.013
(0.018) (0.017) (0.033) (0.030)
Home_Time 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.010** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
Married 0.061*** 0.040** 0.049** 0.044*
(0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026)
Italian 0.020 -0.029 0.075 0.003
(0.052) (0.055) (0.066) (0.056)
Homeowner 0.026 0.061*** -0.000 0.075**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.034) (0.034)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.003 -0.041 -0.073 -0.067
(0.028) (0.027) (0.047) (0.043)
Educ_Moth_Uni -0.024 0.051 -0.001 0.069
(0.039) (0.041) (0.051) (0.055)
Constant 0.981*** 0.978*** 0.997*** 1.003***
(0.084) (0.083) (0.157) (0.133)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,209 5,211 1,913 2,167
R-squared 0.333 0.309 0.140 0.103
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.14 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages by Age and Gender – 2011
Year 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Individuals
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Variables Women Men Women Men
Public_Contest 0.138*** 0.087*** 0.219*** 0.105***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.035) (0.032)
Exper 0.005* 0.018*** -0.003 0.029***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.013) (0.008)
Exper2 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Tenure 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.012*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Educ 0.149*** 0.163*** 0.041 0.094***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.030) (0.024)
Max_D_Mark 0.013 0.025 -0.008 0.053
(0.026) (0.038) (0.046) (0.053)
Contract_Type 0.017 0.070*** -0.006 0.058**
(0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.023)
Work_Climate 0.006 0.008 0.019 -0.007
(0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.018)
Work_Stab -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.005
(0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.011)
Work_Time -0.002 0.010 0.009 0.024
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017)
Work_Task -0.000 0.004 0.007 -0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.014)
Intermed_Prof 0.072*** 0.000 0.089** 0.013
(0.023) (0.015) (0.036) (0.022)
Manager 0.171*** 0.070*** 0.150*** 0.039
(0.028) (0.021) (0.049) (0.036)
North 0.004 0.060*** 0.031 0.113***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.034) (0.023)
Centre 0.023 0.025 0.027 0.041
(0.020) (0.016) (0.040) (0.027)
Home_Time 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
Married 0.041*** 0.062*** 0.057** 0.096***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.028) (0.035)
Italian 0.167*** 0.113 0.177** -0.090
(0.060) (0.132) (0.085) (0.173)
Homeowner 0.034 0.021 0.003 -0.015
(0.023) (0.020) (0.040) (0.029)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.027 -0.002 -0.051 -0.022
(0.033) (0.027) (0.062) (0.036)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.038 -0.017 0.120* 0.013
(0.045) (0.035) (0.063) (0.040)
Constant 0.987*** 0.832*** 1.211*** 1.251***
(0.100) (0.150) (0.161) (0.214)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,168 4,809 1,617 2,034
R-squared 0.303 0.316 0.137 0.101
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.15 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages by Age and Gender – 2014
Year 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Individuals
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-34
Variables Women Men Women Men
Public_Contest 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.142*** 0.123***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.026) (0.032)
Exper 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.022** 0.017*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009)
Exper2 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.001** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001 0.009**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Educ 0.112*** 0.127*** 0.049** 0.071***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.023) (0.020)
Max_D_Mark 0.032 -0.041 0.007 -0.006
(0.023) (0.053) (0.043) (0.052)
Contract_Type 0.038* 0.072*** 0.043 0.048*
(0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.027)
Work_Climate -0.005 -0.008 -0.012 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.017) (0.014)
Work_Stab -0.002 0.012 -0.005 0.015
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Work_Time 0.027*** 0.006 0.043*** 0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012)
Work_Task 0.008 0.013 0.001 -0.010
(0.009) (0.008) (0.019) (0.014)
Intermed_Prof 0.066*** 0.025* 0.041 0.031
(0.018) (0.013) (0.032) (0.024)
Manager 0.279*** 0.170*** 0.181*** 0.149***
(0.025) (0.020) (0.047) (0.033)
North -0.008 0.055*** 0.042 0.049**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.026) (0.023)
Centre -0.036** 0.018 -0.023 -0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.032) (0.028)
Home_Time 0.003** 0.005*** -0.003 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Married 0.029** 0.054*** 0.050** 0.051**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023)
Italian 0.025 0.051 -0.009 0.068
(0.056) (0.051) (0.103) (0.102)
Homeowner 0.021 0.001 -0.001 0.009
(0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.026)
Educ_Fath_Uni -0.013 0.065*** -0.009 0.060
(0.023) (0.024) (0.040) (0.037)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.006 -0.027 0.018 -0.013
(0.031) (0.031) (0.051) (0.044)
Constant 1.219*** 1.096*** 1.517*** 1.312***
(0.086) (0.077) (0.166) (0.148)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,093 6,235 2,254 2,300
R-squared 0.284 0.249 0.136 0.107
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.16 Bivariate Probit Estimation by Gender – 2005
Year 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Variables Public Contest Employment Public Contest Employment
Age 0.061*** 0.006*** 0.035*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Educ 0.791*** 0.511*** 0.506*** 0.209***
(0.030) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023)
Married 0.151*** -0.259*** 0.261*** 0.491***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.048) (0.056)
Homeowner 0.182*** 0.275*** 0.255*** 0.456***
(0.051) (0.037) (0.047) (0.047)
Age5064 1.396*** 0.557***
(0.057) (0.064)
Italian 0.242** -0.026
(0.106) (0.190)
North 0.748*** 0.797***
(0.030) (0.037)
Centre 0.421*** 0.420***
(0.036) (0.043)
Partner_Works 0.231*** 0.091*
(0.043) (0.051)
Kids -0.469*** -0.008
(0.044) (0.046)
Kids_10 0.393*** 0.009
(0.049) (0.086)
Work_Climate -0.009 -0.028
(0.029) (0.027)
Work_Stab 0.131*** 0.228***
(0.021) (0.021)
Work_Time -0.025 -0.050**
(0.027) (0.024)
Work_Task -0.003 -0.030
(0.029) (0.026)
Reloc 0.550*** 0.446***
(0.062) (0.045)
Risp 0.174*** 0.132***
(0.047) (0.045)
Constant -6.182*** -2.560*** -4.594*** -0.592***
(0.184) (0.139) (0.148) (0.219)
ρ 0.571*** 1.324***
(0.079) (0.216)
Observations 10,744 7,648
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.17 Bivariate Probit Estimation by Gender – 2006
Year 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Variables Public Contest Employment Public Contest Employment
Age 0.062*** 0.005* 0.038*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Educ 0.823*** 0.454*** 0.490*** 0.185***
(0.032) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023)
Married 0.021 -0.261*** 0.329*** 0.367***
(0.054) (0.056) (0.049) (0.065)
Homeowner 0.275*** 0.331*** 0.131*** 0.350***
(0.054) (0.041) (0.048) (0.047)
Age5064 0.904*** 0.475***
(0.063) (0.066)
Italian 0.318*** 0.071
(0.117) (0.176)
North 0.692*** 0.653***
(0.032) (0.036)
Centre 0.472*** 0.468***
(0.040) (0.046)
Partner_Works 0.167*** 0.129**
(0.045) (0.051)
Kids -0.121** 0.155**
(0.056) (0.065)
Kids_10 -0.255*** 0.129**
(0.049) (0.065)
Work_Climate -0.059** -0.094***
(0.028) (0.025)
Work_Stab 0.172*** 0.307***
(0.022) (0.023)
Work_Time 0.100*** 0.051**
(0.028) (0.025)
Work_Task -0.039 -0.034
(0.030) (0.026)
Reloc 0.360*** 0.510***
(0.097) (0.062)
Risp 0.104** 0.097**
(0.050) (0.046)
Constant -6.546*** -2.344*** -4.997*** -0.565***
(0.190) (0.154) (0.159) (0.203)
ρ 0.786*** 1.339***
(0.114) (0.252)
Observations 8,702 7,703
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.18 Bivariate Probit Estimation by Gender – 2008
Year 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Variables Public Contest Employment Public Contest Employment
Age 0.066*** 0.011*** 0.045*** -0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Educ 0.760*** 0.499*** 0.503*** 0.243***
(0.034) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025)
Married 0.123** 0.011 0.308*** 0.558***
(0.049) (0.058) (0.053) (0.070)
Homeowner 0.211*** 0.217*** 0.113* 0.164***
(0.067) (0.042) (0.059) (0.047)
Age5064 0.914*** 0.562***
(0.068) (0.073)
Italian 0.333*** 0.278
(0.120) (0.183)
North 0.840*** 0.814***
(0.034) (0.039)
Centre 0.471*** 0.538***
(0.041) (0.049)
Partner_Works -0.044 0.014
(0.049) (0.058)
Kids -0.168*** 0.298***
(0.059) (0.073)
Kids_10 -0.205*** -0.132*
(0.052) (0.072)
Work_Climate 0.005 -0.130***
(0.027) (0.025)
Work_Stab 0.131*** 0.255***
(0.023) (0.024)
Work_Time 0.120*** 0.124***
(0.027) (0.026)
Work_Task -0.054* -0.011
(0.028) (0.026)
Reloc 0.395*** 0.408***
(0.084) (0.067)
Risp 0.040 0.061
(0.054) (0.054)
Constant -6.758*** -2.857*** -5.458*** -1.220***
(0.209) (0.159) (0.180) (0.208)
ρ 0.664*** 1.114***
(0.111) (0.239)
Observations 8,280 7,016
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.19 Bivariate Probit Estimation by Gender – 2010
Year 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Variables Public Contest Employment Public Contest Employment
Age 0.064*** 0.021*** 0.042*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Educ 0.787*** 0.445*** 0.512*** 0.260***
(0.033) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022)
Married 0.125*** 0.085 0.203*** 0.417***
(0.046) (0.055) (0.046) (0.061)
Homeowner 0.144** 0.117*** 0.173*** 0.206***
(0.063) (0.040) (0.057) (0.043)
Age5064 0.748*** 0.395***
(0.066) (0.065)
Italian 0.221** 0.340**
(0.099) (0.140)
North 0.815*** 0.652***
(0.032) (0.033)
Centre 0.466*** 0.397***
(0.039) (0.040)
Partner_Works 0.038 0.163***
(0.047) (0.051)
Kids -0.251*** 0.253***
(0.057) (0.062)
Kids_10 -0.064 -0.226***
(0.051) (0.064)
Work_Climate -0.046* -0.026
(0.028) (0.024)
Work_Stab 0.160*** 0.205***
(0.022) (0.021)
Work_Time 0.118*** 0.067***
(0.028) (0.025)
Work_Task -0.054* -0.022
(0.029) (0.027)
Reloc 0.377*** 0.401***
(0.083) (0.052)
Risp 0.029 0.116***
(0.047) (0.042)
Constant -6.568*** -2.927*** -5.374*** -1.623***
(0.196) (0.136) (0.155) (0.166)
ρ 0.620*** 1.467***
(0.122) (0.559)
Observations 9,204 8,579
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.20 Bivariate Probit Estimation by Gender – 2011
Year 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Variables Public Contest Employment Public Contest Employment
Age 0.060*** 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Educ 0.832*** 0.460*** 0.559*** 0.221***
(0.034) (0.020) (0.030) (0.023)
Married 0.180*** -0.069 0.306*** 0.452***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.053) (0.062)
Homeowner 0.063 0.126*** 0.163** 0.213***
(0.069) (0.042) (0.064) (0.045)
Age5064 0.689*** 0.576***
(0.065) (0.067)
Italian -0.014 0.344**
(0.104) (0.163)
North 0.698*** 0.664***
(0.032) (0.034)
Centre 0.377*** 0.453***
(0.038) (0.041)
Partner_Works 0.117*** 0.161***
(0.041) (0.052)
Kids -0.155*** 0.254***
(0.054) (0.067)
Kids_10 -0.062 0.069
(0.048) (0.069)
Work_Climate -0.036 -0.008
(0.030) (0.028)
Work_Stab 0.180*** 0.224***
(0.023) (0.024)
Work_Time 0.108*** 0.039
(0.032) (0.030)
Work_Task -0.019 -0.014
(0.031) (0.029)
Reloc 0.360*** 0.426***
(0.086) (0.068)
Risp 0.030 0.150***
(0.051) (0.051)
Constant -6.689*** -2.958*** -5.749*** -1.594***
(0.242) (0.147) (0.181) (0.186)
ρ 0.393*** 1.077***
(0.132) (0.269)
Observations 9,347 8,236
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.21 Bivariate Probit Estimation by Gender – 2014
Year 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Variables Public Contest Employment Public Contest Employment
Age 0.044*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Educ 0.693*** 0.566*** 0.536*** 0.366***
(0.031) (0.017) (0.024) (0.019)
Married 0.340*** 0.047 0.405*** 0.525***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.046)
Homeowner 0.226*** 0.107*** 0.159*** 0.146***
(0.057) (0.035) (0.052) (0.038)
Age5064 0.457*** 0.201***
(0.048) (0.051)
Italian 0.037 0.435***
(0.081) (0.098)
North 0.712*** 0.685***
(0.026) (0.029)
Centre 0.432*** 0.441***
(0.032) (0.035)
Partner_Works 0.162*** 0.155***
(0.029) (0.036)
Kids -0.112*** 0.010
(0.041) (0.049)
Kids_10 -0.048 0.121**
(0.038) (0.050)
Work_Climate -0.050** -0.030
(0.022) (0.021)
Work_Stab 0.254*** 0.217***
(0.019) (0.020)
Work_Time 0.051** 0.078***
(0.022) (0.021)
Work_Task -0.017 -0.033
(0.025) (0.023)
Reloc 0.371*** 0.439***
(0.063) (0.050)
Risp 0.044 0.112**
(0.045) (0.045)
Constant -5.766*** -3.104*** -5.184*** -2.441***
(0.200) (0.116) (0.148) (0.133)
ρ 0.343*** 1.298***
(0.093) (0.295)
Observations 13,129 10,584
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.22 OLS Estimates by Gender with Selection Variables – Panel
Year Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Hired by Individuals Not Hired by
by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64
Variables Women Men Women Men
Exper 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Exper2 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Educ 0.322*** 0.203*** 0.089*** 0.101***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011)
Max_D_Mark 0.015 0.049*** 0.045** 0.021
(0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021)
Contract_Type -0.011 0.065*** 0.011 0.070***
(0.017) (0.025) (0.011) (0.009)
Work_Climate -0.008 0.011* 0.006 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Work_Stab 0.024*** 0.016* -0.014*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Work_Time 0.015*** 0.004 0.014** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Work_Task 0.014*** 0.014** 0.012** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Intermed_Prof 0.146*** -0.043*** 0.071*** 0.043***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008)
Manager 0.271*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.138***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
North -0.034*** 0.021* 0.124*** 0.120***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019)
Centre -0.020* 0.035*** 0.089*** 0.060***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Home_Time 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.013 0.083***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016)
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Italian 0.040 0.152 0.074** 0.090**
(0.080) (0.244) (0.036) (0.041)
Homeowner 0.037*** 0.027** 0.048*** 0.051***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.013 -0.008 0.003 0.013
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
Educ_Moth _Uni 0.051*** -0.043 0.050** -0.025
(0.019) (0.026) (0.021) (0.018)
λPCW 0.126*** 0.209*
(0.035) (0.111)
λPCR 0.179*** -0.009
(0.035) (0.039)
λNPCW -0.041 -0.013
(0.032) (0.043)
λNPCR -0.305*** -0.169***
(0.034) (0.032)
Constant -0.034 0.676** 0.894*** 0.848***
(0.162) (0.292) (0.115) (0.089)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,116 6,798 11,282 15,649
R-squared 0.373 0.335 0.206 0.262
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 2.B.23 OLS Estimates by Gender with Selection Variables – 2005
Year 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Hired by Individuals Not Hired by
by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64
Variables Women Men Women Men
Exper 0.017*** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Exper2 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Tenure 0.001 0.003** 0.003** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ 0.271*** 0.142*** 0.103*** 0.095***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022)
Max_D_Mark 0.014 0.041 0.093** -0.043
(0.025) (0.035) (0.040) (0.042)
Contract_Type -0.045 0.115** 0.032 0.040**
(0.032) (0.047) (0.021) (0.019)
Work_Climate 0.001 0.013 0.006 0.014
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009)
Work_Stab 0.030*** -0.021 -0.011 -0.002
(0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008)
Work_Time -0.011 0.009 0.020* 0.028***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
Work_Task 0.007 0.020* 0.010 0.022***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Intermed_Prof 0.081** -0.035 0.076*** 0.036**
(0.037) (0.026) (0.020) (0.015)
Manager 0.338*** 0.259*** 0.143*** 0.238***
(0.039) (0.036) (0.032) (0.025)
North -0.033 0.017 0.134*** 0.060*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.034)
Centre -0.016 0.075*** 0.115*** 0.039
(0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Home_Time 0.010*** 0.001 0.004 0.006***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Married 0.032* 0.003 0.022 0.043*
(0.019) (0.029) (0.021) (0.026)
Italian 0.003 0.981*** 0.026 0.008
(0.195) (0.356) (0.064) (0.068)
Homeowner 0.011 0.034 0.004 0.008
(0.021) (0.029) (0.022) (0.024)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.023 -0.047 0.021 0.042
(0.028) (0.037) (0.039) (0.034)
Educ_Moth_Uni -0.049 0.004 0.089* -0.027
(0.040) (0.055) (0.051) (0.041)
λPCW 0.019 0.375*
(0.045) (0.210)
λPCR 0.118** -0.085
(0.053) (0.070)
λNPCW 0.009 -0.050
(0.037) (0.072)
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λNPCR -0.115** -0.097*
(0.058) (0.055)
Constant 0.379 0.317 0.866*** 1.009***
(0.316) (0.455) (0.182) (0.145)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,987 1,692 2,526 3,315
R-squared 0.406 0.384 0.266 0.338
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 2.B.24 OLS Estimates by Gender with Selection Variables – 2006
Year 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Hired by Individuals Not Hired by
by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64
Variables Women Men Women Men
Exper 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Exper2 -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.000 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ 0.289*** 0.215*** -0.022 0.074***
(0.057) (0.037) (0.037) (0.023)
Max_D_Mark -0.025 -0.021 0.129*** 0.057
(0.027) (0.033) (0.040) (0.045)
Contract_Type -0.006 0.035 0.037* 0.067***
(0.038) (0.051) (0.020) (0.020)
Work_Climate -0.012 -0.005 0.004 0.009
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Work_Stab 0.029** 0.039* -0.016 -0.016
(0.015) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
Work_Time 0.025** 0.006 -0.002 0.022**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Work_Task 0.012 0.017 0.023** 0.024**
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(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Intermed_Prof 0.127*** -0.044* 0.087*** 0.062***
(0.039) (0.024) (0.020) (0.015)
Manager 0.264*** 0.192*** 0.150*** 0.174***
(0.043) (0.034) (0.035) (0.025)
North -0.046* -0.022 0.029 0.078**
(0.025) (0.021) (0.032) (0.032)
Centre -0.077*** 0.017 0.016 0.035
(0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029)
Home_Time 0.009** 0.010*** -0.001 0.006***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.047** 0.049 0.033 0.049
(0.020) (0.031) (0.024) (0.031)
Italian -0.252 0.098 0.085
(0.233) (0.067) (0.076)
Homeowner 0.029 0.041 0.012 0.017
(0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.030 0.021 0.002 0.050
(0.028) (0.035) (0.035) (0.032)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.048 -0.045 0.025 -0.005
(0.038) (0.054) (0.045) (0.039)
λPCW 0.047 0.469**
(0.080) (0.219)
λPCR 0.178** 0.088
(0.088) (0.077)
λNPCW -0.109** 0.006
(0.053) (0.081)
λNPCR -0.220*** -0.123**
(0.059) (0.061)
Constant 0.406 0.599* 1.440*** 0.976***
(0.484) (0.326) (0.203) (0.164)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,715 1,767 2,368 3,455
R-squared 0.376 0.359 0.234 0.317
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.25 OLS Estimates by Gender with Selection Variables – 2008
Year 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Hired by Individuals Not Hired by
by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64
Variables Women Men Women Men
Exper 0.017*** 0.012** 0.009*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Exper2 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ 0.309*** 0.178*** -0.016 0.054**
(0.053) (0.046) (0.036) (0.023)
Max_D_Mark 0.021 -0.015 0.069 0.093*
(0.030) (0.040) (0.043) (0.054)
Contract_Type 0.018 0.106* 0.001 0.051***
(0.037) (0.057) (0.020) (0.019)
Work_Climate -0.019* 0.003 -0.001 -0.006
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
Work_Stab 0.020* -0.006 -0.008 0.012
(0.012) (0.021) (0.009) (0.010)
Work_Time 0.049*** -0.011 0.009 0.009
(0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009)
Work_Task -0.001 0.007 0.015 0.018**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Intermed_Prof 0.208*** -0.035 0.087*** 0.058***
(0.045) (0.026) (0.020) (0.016)
Manager 0.271*** 0.112*** 0.123*** 0.127***
(0.049) (0.033) (0.032) (0.026)
North -0.085*** 0.049** 0.102*** 0.059*
(0.028) (0.024) (0.035) (0.035)
Centre -0.058** 0.026 0.090*** 0.036
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030)
Home_Time 0.008* 0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Married 0.038* 0.011 0.039** 0.060*
(0.021) (0.037) (0.019) (0.031)
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Italian 0.065 -0.160 0.122* 0.031
(0.140) (0.331) (0.069) (0.072)
Homeowner 0.027 0.008 0.019 0.039**
(0.031) (0.030) (0.023) (0.019)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.033 0.016 0.012 0.059*
(0.031) (0.036) (0.033) (0.031)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.117*** -0.082 0.044 -0.097***
(0.041) (0.054) (0.038) (0.037)
λPCW 0.033 0.272
(0.084) (0.252)
λPCR 0.206** -0.099
(0.082) (0.098)
λNPCW -0.065 -0.006
(0.054) (0.074)
λNPCR -0.338*** -0.168***
(0.060) (0.061)
Constant 0.167 1.609*** 1.376*** 1.263***
(0.458) (0.557) (0.214) (0.172)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,586 1,392 2,370 3,253
R-squared 0.373 0.351 0.309 0.300
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.B.26 OLS Estimates by Gender with Selection Variables – 2010
Year 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Hired by Individuals Not Hired by
by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64
Variables Women Men Women Men
Exper 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.009* 0.017***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Exper2 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003** 0.003* 0.003** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Educ 0.230*** 0.228*** 0.003 0.029
(0.059) (0.050) (0.055) (0.031)
Max_D_Mark 0.050* 0.080* 0.030 0.099**
(0.027) (0.041) (0.043) (0.046)
Contract_Type 0.015 0.029 -0.001 0.077***
(0.038) (0.057) (0.026) (0.021)
Work_Climate -0.008 0.012 -0.003 -0.002
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010)
Work_Stab 0.001 0.000 -0.025* -0.015
(0.014) (0.021) (0.013) (0.010)
Work_Time 0.016 0.008 -0.000 0.024**
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010)
Work_Task 0.016 -0.004 0.024* 0.011
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
Intermed_Prof 0.115*** -0.042 0.062** 0.041**
(0.040) (0.030) (0.026) (0.018)
Manager 0.216*** 0.090** 0.136*** 0.091***
(0.044) (0.035) (0.034) (0.025)
North -0.027 0.039* 0.118** 0.083**
(0.034) (0.024) (0.055) (0.036)
Centre 0.003 -0.005 0.064 0.028
(0.030) (0.029) (0.042) (0.030)
Home_Time 0.008** 0.005 -0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Married 0.071*** 0.029 0.039 0.040
(0.021) (0.031) (0.024) (0.034)
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Italian -0.014 0.459 0.057 -0.044
(0.245) (0.392) (0.083) (0.081)
Homeowner 0.057* 0.101** 0.008 0.045*
(0.030) (0.039) (0.029) (0.025)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.032 -0.060 -0.043 -0.036
(0.033) (0.041) (0.045) (0.037)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.022 0.035 -0.041 0.068*
(0.044) (0.064) (0.051) (0.041)
λPCW 0.077 -0.168
(0.104) (0.422)
λPCR 0.116 0.041
(0.089) (0.096)
λNPCW 0.023 -0.041
(0.087) (0.089)
λNPCR -0.313*** -0.251***
(0.089) (0.077)
Constant 0.519 0.353 1.428*** 1.391***
(0.524) (0.606) (0.323) (0.234)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,621 1,416 2,588 3,795
R-squared 0.357 0.303 0.148 0.221
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 2.B.27 OLS Estimates by Gender with Selection Variables – 2011
Year 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Hired by Individuals Not Hired by
by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64
Variables Women Men Women Men
Exper 0.012** 0.014** -0.007 0.014***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Exper2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.002 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002*
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(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Educ 0.285*** 0.268*** -0.057 0.012
(0.069) (0.051) (0.061) (0.029)
Max_D_Mark 0.044 0.042 -0.041 0.011
(0.032) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049)
Contract_Type -0.001 0.082 0.016 0.074***
(0.039) (0.056) (0.027) (0.020)
Work_Climate -0.002 0.019 0.022 0.006
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011)
Work_Stab 0.027* 0.018 -0.057*** -0.022**
(0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.010)
Work_Time 0.007 0.016 -0.027* 0.006
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
Work_Task 0.010 0.007 -0.004 0.005
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011)
Intermed_Prof 0.133*** -0.038 0.086*** 0.018
(0.042) (0.029) (0.027) (0.018)
Manager 0.247*** 0.068** 0.134*** 0.053**
(0.044) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024)
North -0.031 0.028 0.149*** -0.005
(0.036) (0.028) (0.053) (0.035)
Centre 0.024 0.032 0.100** -0.029
(0.031) (0.030) (0.039) (0.030)
Home_Time 0.011** 0.010*** -0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Married 0.056** 0.138*** -0.018 -0.065*
(0.025) (0.041) (0.026) (0.036)
Italian -0.013 0.198*** 0.082
(0.188) (0.073) (0.083)
Homeowner 0.013 0.044 0.052* -0.028
(0.034) (0.037) (0.031) (0.025)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.037 0.011 -0.014 -0.013
(0.036) (0.043) (0.046) (0.034)
Educ_Moth_Uni -0.035 0.000 0.129** 0.001
(0.046) (0.061) (0.056) (0.039)
λPCW -0.018 0.451*
(0.110) (0.261)
λPCR 0.165 0.094
(0.102) (0.097)
λNPCW 0.162 -0.297***
(0.101) (0.080)
λNPCR -0.506*** -0.363***
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(0.090) (0.070)
Constant 0.515 0.368 1.535*** 1.764***
(0.569) (0.463) (0.366) (0.211)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,656 1,249 2,512 3,560
R-squared 0.314 0.359 0.141 0.208
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 2.B.28 OLS Estimates by Gender with Selection Variables – 2014
Year 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individuals Hired by Individuals Not Hired by
by Public Contest and by Public Contest and
Aged 18-64 Aged 18-64
Variables Women Men Women Men
Exper 0.008* 0.010** 0.005 0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Exper2 0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003** 0.003* 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ 0.230*** 0.121*** -0.042 0.103**
(0.056) (0.043) (0.056) (0.040)
Max_D_Mark 0.017 0.064 0.034 -0.123**
(0.032) (0.046) (0.042) (0.049)
Contract_Type 0.115*** 0.202*** -0.004 0.050**
(0.037) (0.051) (0.022) (0.021)
Work_Climate -0.013 -0.005 0.005 -0.007
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Work_Stab 0.014 -0.003 -0.038*** -0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010)
Work_Time 0.039*** -0.009 0.017* 0.003
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
Work_Task 0.016 0.012 -0.000 0.016*
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(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Intermed_Prof 0.063 -0.054** 0.096*** 0.048***
(0.043) (0.027) (0.021) (0.016)
Manager 0.326*** 0.163*** 0.238*** 0.152***
(0.044) (0.034) (0.028) (0.023)
North -0.062 0.022 0.051 0.138***
(0.038) (0.026) (0.048) (0.052)
Centre -0.076** 0.060** 0.009 0.057
(0.030) (0.027) (0.036) (0.039)
Home_Time 0.006* 0.003 -0.005 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Married 0.020 0.032 0.002 0.074
(0.026) (0.039) (0.023) (0.049)
Italian -0.059 -0.139 0.046 0.121*
(0.150) (0.140) (0.053) (0.069)
Homeowner 0.089*** -0.007 -0.035 0.005
(0.031) (0.032) (0.025) (0.023)
Educ_Fath_Uni -0.001 0.023 -0.030 0.081***
(0.031) (0.037) (0.034) (0.031)
Educ_Moth_Uni -0.031 -0.008 0.042 -0.035
(0.039) (0.049) (0.038) (0.037)
λPCW -0.055 0.233
(0.104) (0.291)
λPCR 0.181** -0.027
(0.088) (0.084)
λNPCW 0.010 0.074
(0.092) (0.115)
λNPCR -0.346*** -0.116
(0.087) (0.086)
Constant 0.631 1.593*** 1.804*** 0.999***
(0.473) (0.415) (0.332) (0.312)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,665 1,739 3,428 4,496
R-squared 0.273 0.286 0.146 0.174
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Appendix 2.C Methodological Issues
The probabilities of observing a positive labor income given recruitment through public
contests or recruitment through other channels are given below:
Pr(Y ∗W > 0,Y
∗
R > 0) = Pr(uW >−Z
′
γ,uR >−Q′α) = G(Z ′γ,Q′α,ρ) (2.7)
Pr(Y ∗W > 0,Y
∗
R ≤ 0) = Pr(uW >−Z
′
γ,uR ≤−Q′α) = G(Z ′γ,−Q′α,−ρ) (2.8)
where G(·) is the standard bivariate normal distribution and ρ is the correlation coefficient
between the two selection rules. The subscript W identifies the work decision while R
identifies the recruitment decision. Under the assumption that the two selection rules are not
independent, that is ρ ̸= 0, maximum likelihood of the bivariate probit leads to the following
selection terms for public-contest selected employees, i.e. with m = PC:
λPCW =
f (Z
′γ)F [Q
′α−ρZ′γ√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,Q′α,ρ)
(2.9)
λPCR =
f (Q
′α)F [Z
′γ−ρQ′α√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,Q′α,ρ)
(2.10)
Similarly, for the subsample of not public-contest selected individuals, i.e. with m = NPC,
the corresponding selection terms are given by:
λNPCW =
f (Z
′γ)F [−Q
′α−ρZ′γ√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,−Q′α,−ρ) (2.11)
λNPCR =
− f (Q′α)F [Z
′γ−ρQ′α√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,−Q′α,−ρ) (2.12)
f (·) is the standard normal density function, while F(·) is the standard normal distribution
function and ρ is the correlation coefficient between the two selection rules.
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Chapter 3
Overeducation and the Gender Pay Gap
– A Double Selectivity Approach
3.1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the existing literature by integrating insights from two usually
separate research fields: the Gender Pay Gap (GPG) on the one side and overeducation on
the other. Workers in occupations that require less schooling than they actually have are
labeled ‘overeducated’ (Sicherman, 1991; Hartog, 2000; Sloane, 2014). According to the
literature, overeducation is a pervasive feature of modern labor markets (Groot and Maassen
van den Brink, 2000) and its effects represent a serious concern in Italy, where the predicted
probability of being overeducated is very high, independently from the educational level or
method of assessment (European Commission, 2012). Yet, in Italy, the share of individuals
with tertiary education is among the lowest of all European Union (EU) member states.1 The
case of Italy is thus particularly interesting for the study of overeducation, given that, on the
one hand, a large share of individuals is overeducated, while on the other hand, the amount
of individuals with higher education is very low. This problem is even more important for
women, as their share among graduates is high and growing, and as we show that the wage
penalty for overeducation is higher for women than for men.2
There is a very broad literature on the relationship between overeducation and earn-
ings (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Hartog, 2000; McGuinness, 2006; Rubb, 2003; Pecoraro,
1In Italy about 20.0% of the population holds a university degree, while 40.0% of individuals with a tertiary
degree are overeducated (Meliciani and Radicchia, 2016).
2As in Cutillo and Di Pietro (2006).
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2016) and an even wider literature on the GPG remaining resilient despite more than thirty
years of equal-pay legislation (see e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2000; Goldin, 2014). There is also
a considerable amount of empirical work focusing on differences in overeducation risk by
gender (Groot, 1996; Boll et al., 2016) and individual features associated to higher overe-
ducation probability (European Commission, 2012). However, very few studies focus on
the relationship between overeducation and the GPG (Li and Miller, 2012; Boll and Leppin,
2013). Moreover, these few studies find that overeducation does not matter for explaining
the wage gap between men and women. In particular, they do not explicitly control for
unobserved heterogeneity of the overeducation decision. Unobserved heterogeneity consists
of differences in individual productivity such as innate ability, school quality and on-the-job
training as well as motivation and commitment to paid work. Previous studies on the effects
of overeducation on wages, however, show the need to control either for sample selection
bias (Battu et al., 2000) or for endogeneity of the overducation choice (Dolton and Silles,
2008). We apply a double selectivity model to simultaneously account for both sample
selection bias and endogeneity bias (Tunali, 1986; Sorensen, 1989; Cutillo and Di Pietro,
2006), and find that overeducation is an important driver of the GPG in Italy.
In our data, the GPG is significantly higher among overeducated workers than among
properly educated workers. Women possess better observed characteristics than men and
differences in the wage structure are important for both mis- and properly matched workers
in the base model without selection correction. In the adjusted model, all the unexplained
component of the GPG among overeducated workers vanishes, and the difference is explained
by endowments (a small part) and the selection into overeducation (the big part). In the
properly educated sample, a small fraction of the GPG corrected for double selectivity
is again due to differences in endowments, while both differences in coefficients and the
overeducation choice are main contributors to the differential.
As the discriminatory component of the GPG disappears among overeducated workers
but remains significant among properly educated ones, we further examine the question
why overeducation can fight gender discrimination in pay whereas a proper match fails to
do so. A possible explanation is that by compensating with higher educational attainment
lower levels of unobservable personal characteristics, overeducated women signal their true
productivity to employers and overcome statistical discrimination. If the educational level
is an effective signal of workers’ commitment, then discrimination against overeducated
females should decrease. Also Boll and Leppin (2013), notwithstanding their finding that
overeducation does not matter to explain the GPG among graduates in Germany, report
that a noticeable part of the wage gap may be attributed to gender stereotypes assigned by
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employers and presumably incorporated in women’s labor market decisions. We find that
overeducated men and women possess worse unobservable characteristics than individuals
in the properly educated sample. Moreover, overeducated working women have worse
unobservable characteristics than overeducated men. However, overeducated women (not
men) are better than out of employment individuals. Hence, this is the signal sent by
overeducated women: they possess (for the labor market) valuable, though, unobservable
characteristics, and are available to work. Among the properly educated workers, the
signaling effect is less clear, as education also features human capital skills required for the
job. We draw the conclusion that overeducation is the first-best matching for individuals (both
men and women) with lower levels of productive characteristics. In fact, men and women
compensate with more education for these lower levels. Moreover, it is a signaling device for
women spending their useless-for-the-job diploma to inform employers on their valuable,
though, unobservable productive characteristics and fights gender wage discrimination.
The results are important for policy measures. If overeducation signals the incapacity
of the labor market to absorb higher levels of education, a higher investment in schooling
is a waste of resources by individuals having near the same unobserved characteristics than
properly educated ones. Conversely, if overeducation is merely a choice of individuals
compensating by more human capital investment their lower unobservable differences in
productivity, there is no waste of resources. As our results suggest the latter, the need for
more investment in higher education is not more limited in Italy.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we provide an overview of the
literature on the GPG as well as on overeducation. In Section 3.3, we discuss the standard
approach to decompose mean wage differences between groups. Section 3.4 describes the
problem of double selectivity. In Section 3.5, we outline the data set used. Section 3.6,
presents the estimation results. Finally, we conclude.
3.2 Background Literature
The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between overeducation and the GPG. The
GPG is the difference between the average hourly earnings of men and women expressed as
a percentage of average hourly earnings of men. It is usually called raw or ‘unadjusted’ as it
does not take into account factors that influence the GPG, such as differences in education,
labor market experience or type of job (Eurostat, 2016). In 2014, the unadjusted GPG was
16.1% at EU-28 level and 6.5% in Italy (Eurostat, 2017b). Besides the GPG and the gender
gap in paid hours, it is important to consider gender gaps in employment, as also differences
85
in labor market participation and employment contribute substantially to the difference in
average earnings between men and women (Eurostat, 2016). Gender employment gaps are
particularly pronounced in Italy. In 2014, 19.4% less women than men were engaged in the
Italian labor market (Eurostat, 2017a). For comparison, the difference amounted to 11.5% at
EU-28 level in the same year (Eurostat, 2017a).
The risk of overeducation, too, may differ for men and women, either because of gender
discrimination or because of gender-specific differences in personal and job characteristics.
A meta-analysis of 25 studies on overeducation conducted by Groot and Maassen van den
Brink (2000) concludes that the incidence of overeducation varies from 10.0% to 42.0%.3 On
average, 26.0% of all workers in the United States (US) and 22.0% in European countries are
overeducated. In our data (ISFOL PLUS 2005-2014), the proportion of individuals working
in jobs that require less schooling than they actually have is 33.0% (34.8% in the male
sample; 31.5% in the female sample).
As our main statement in this paper is that overeducation is an important driver of the
GPG, we summarize, first, briefly the literature about the sources of the GPG, and, second,
we review the main theories explaining the overeducation phenomenon. It is worth noting
that the main sources of the GPG and the overeducation choice proposed in the literature
are near the same. We also discuss implications of different methods of assessment for the
phenomenon of overeducation.
3.2.1 Theories on the GPG
The literature on the sources of the GPG emphasizes two broad sets of explanations. Expla-
nations focusing on the supply-side of the labor market, and explanations focusing on the
demand-side of the labor market. These two sets of explanations are not mutually exclusive,
they both play a role in explaining the GPG. However, traditionally, the first set of expla-
nations focuses on the choices made by women, while the second focuses on job-related
constraints faced by women. Supply-side explanations mainly refer to work-life preferences
and cultural beliefs, the sexual division of labor in the household, and the human capital
theory. Demand-side explanations mainly refer to compensating differentials, statistical
discrimination and other allocative gender-biased decisions.
We consider the supply-side explanations first. A preference-based explanation posits
that gender differences in the career path and earnings derive largely from genuine sex role
preferences (Hakim, 2000). However, several scholars indicate that gender stereotypes (that
3Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) look at average values over a period of 20 years (from the 1970s
to the 1990s).
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is, non-conscious beliefs that stem from social norms and affect our expectations and our
judgments of others) may shape individual’s preferences making men and women choose
different jobs and different career paths (Correll, 2001; 2004; Ridgeway, 2009). Economists
also argue that women earn less than men because of the division of labor within the family.
This results in differences between men and women in labor market characteristics as well
as in human capital accumulation. Becker (1985) emphasizes the importance of household
production in economic theory and highlights that much of this output is produced by women.
As a consequence, it is well established in the literature that women are less likely to have
successful careers than men in the labor market (Sasser, 2005), and that women with children
earn less than other women (Waldfogel 1997; Budig and England, 2001). Lastly, the human
capital theory explains women’s lower wages with gender differences in the amount and kind
of education, on-the-job training and other aspects of labor market experience that affect the
individuals’ productivity (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). In the past, men typically had better
access to university-level institutions, while nowadays female graduates exceed the number
of male graduates, and on average female students outperform male students in academic
achievements in most OECD4 countries (OECD, 2009).5
We consider now the demand-side explanations of the GPG. Gender inequality in wages
may also be due to differences in working conditions. According to the compensating
wage theory, jobs with unfavorable conditions receive pecuniary rewards compared to
jobs with better working arrangements (England and Folbre, 2005). If female dominated
occupations have some benefits making it easier to combine work and family life, these
benefits may result in lower wages (Solberg and Laughlin, 1995). Another explanation on
the demand-side of the labor market for gender income differences is discrimination against
women, i.e. employers’ gender-biased decisions on the allocation of individuals across
and within occupations. Empirical analysis show that both the possibility of entering an
occupation and access to promotion within occupations differ between men and women, all
else equal (Anker, 1998). Statistical discrimination occurs, when employers make hiring
and promotion decisions based on the average productivity of the individual’s gender but
not on its personal characteristics (Arrow, 1972; Stiglitz, 1973). For example, based on
higher statistical probability for women to quit (England, 1992), employers may prefer to
allocate women to positions with low turn-over costs (Bielby and Baron, 1986). Both gender
stereotyping and wage discrimination have been well documented in empirical research (e.g.
4OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
5In fact, the catching-up of women in terms of human capital is identified as a major reason for the
convergence of the GPG over time (Goldin, 2006; 2014).
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Blau et al., 2013). For example Castagnetti and Rosti (2013) show that stereotyping is clearly
related to gender wage discrimination.
3.2.2 Theories on Overeducation and Method of Assessment
There are two main (competing) approaches attempting to explain the overeducation phe-
nomenon: the human capital model (Alba-Ramirez, 1993; Büchel and Battu, 2003) and the
signaling model (Kroch and Sjoblom 1994; Dolton and Vignoles 2000).
From the human capital perspective (Mincer, 1958), overeducation is a mechanism for
labor market adjustment when there is an excess supply of high-skilled workers, and it is
considered a second-best employment result. When the increase in the educational level of
the work force is accompanied by lower growth rates of jobs for more educated workers, the
allocation of skills over jobs may be less than optimal, and some individuals accept jobs for
which they are overeducated rather than remaining unemployed. Indeed, there are studies
supporting that theory and finding a negative impact of work experience on overeducation
risk (e.g. Alba-Ramirez, 1993; Nielsen, 2011).
In the job signaling model, education is used as a screening device to identify higher abil-
ity workers (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973). Firms are assumed to have imperfect information
about the productivity of workers, and in response to this information asymmetry between
employers and employees, individuals may use education as a signal of productivity. In this
case, overeducation does not imply overqualification. Overeducation arises when there is a
signaling equilibrium under which it is optimal for individuals to invest in more education
than is strictly required to perform the tasks of their jobs (Spence, 1973). It is worth noting,
however, that whilst overeducation can arise in a signaling equilibrium, it is a Pareto-inferior
equilibrium in which overeducation persists. Education signals to employers that overed-
ucated workers posses higher levels of individual ability, motivation, commitment and so
on, than their unemployed competitors (but lower than their properly educated competitors;
Kedir et al., 2012). Statistical discrimination occurs when employers use average charac-
teristics of groups to predict individual worker productivity (Arrow, 1973). In this context,
the education level can be seen as a proxy for unobserved positive individual characteristics,
such as productivity. As Livanos and Nunez (2012) argue, discrimination arises from an
adverse selection problem, where the hidden information is the individual’s commitment to
a professional career. Education may act as a signal to employers emphasizing the future
commitment of workers to their careers.
Bauer (2002) and Chevalier (2003) argue that overeducation may be only apparent, as
a consequence of measurement errors due to unobserved heterogeneity. Even though the
CHAPTER 3: OVEREDUCATION AND THE GPG 88
returns of overeducation are lower than the returns of required schooling, lower return rates
do not necessarily imply underutilization of human capital. The negative wage effects of
overeducation may be due to self-selection into overqualification. Alba-Ramirez (1993)
finds evidence suggesting that the overeducated may use surplus education as a substitute
for other forms of human capital that they lack. In this case observed overqualification
is simply a measurement error due to the presence of statistically unobserved differences
in abilities or motivation, educational quality, unmeasured skills, or worker preferences
(e.g. preference for family-friendly work schedules). Most of the difference in earnings
between overeducated and properly matched workers identified by the previous literature
are caused by a failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity (as for example in Bauer,
2002; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). The career mobility theory presents overeducation
as an investment to improve future employment opportunities (Sicherman and Galor, 1990;
Sicherman, 1991). The overeducated worker may accept a period of overeducation in order
to achieve higher earnings in the future by gathering experience at low entry levels. If the
hypothesis of upward mobility holds, overeducation should not be seen as a cause for concern,
but merely as a temporary phenomenon consistent with efficiency goals. Sicherman (1991)
and Alba-Ramirez (1993) find empirical support for this. In contrast, Battu et al. (2000)
and Büchel and Mertens (2004) as well as Baert et al. (2013) do not detect significant wage
growth for formerly overeducated workers. The theory of job competition assumes that
workers are primary concerned with competition for jobs, not for wages (Thurow, 1975).
Among equally educated workers, the higher an individual’s ability and experience, the lower
the cost of the individual’s training. As a consequence, smarter people will have a higher
chance of securing better jobs, while less able and less experienced workers will switch to
jobs for which they are overeducated. Also the assignment theory views overeducation as
an inefficient outcome of a job matching procedure (Sattinger, 1993). Due to the existence
of search costs (Jovanovic, 1979), highly educated workers might be satisfied with finding
a position at a level below their formal qualification. This case can be extended to include
all the overeducation choices arising from heterogeneous preferences among individuals,
whether they are genuine or stereotyped. Individuals, both male and female, typically have
preferences and dislikes for certain occupations. These preferences can induce them to
choose matches in which they are paid below their productivity. A specific application
of a job matching framework is the theory of differential overqualification developed by
Frank (1978). As in traditional gender role models, the husband optimizes his job search
first, the opportunities for a successful career of his wife could be more limited because of
higher mobility costs. Empirically, Büchel and Battu (2003) find evidence supporting this
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theory, while McGoldrick and Robst (1996) reject the hypothesis that married women face a
significantly higher probability to be overeducated.
As stated, the literature usually considers workers as overeducated when they have
completed more years of education than the current job requires (e.g. Sloane, 2014). However,
the literature points out that the concept of overeducation may not have a single meaning
and may be open to various interpretations, making the empirical assessment difficult.
The specific definition depends on how overeducation is measured in the data. As the
exact wording of the question varies across studies, different indicators may classify as
overeducation similar, though distinct, phenomena. In particular, it is worth distinguishing
between indicators that refer to the level of education required to get the job (overqualification)
on the one side, and those that refer to the educational level required to perform the job
(overskilling) on the other side. Several methods of overeducation assessment can be
identified in empirical studies (Hartog, 2000; McGuinness, 2006). These indicators can be
classified in three groups: objective, subjective, and statistical.6 While objective indicators
are based on job analysis, that is, on occupational dictionaries that estimate the required
educational level for each occupation, subjective ones are based on workers’ self-assessment.
Self-assessed procedures may consist of either directly or indirectly formulated questions to
the interviewees of a survey. Direct questions ask for example whether the educational level
attained is required to obtain (or perform) a certain job, or if the skills acquired during the
educational career are actually used. Indirect inquiries ask about the most suitable educational
degree (or skills) required to perform the job. In this framework, the presence of overeducation
is identified by comparing the reply with the educational level of the interviewee. The
statistical method classifies as overeducated those individuals that exceed the mean years of
education for their job by more than one standard deviation above the mean. Each of these
indicators has merits and drawbacks (Hartog, 2000). Workers’ self-assessment deals with the
respondent’s job precisely, but it usually lacks rigorous instructions. Systematic job analysis
is a very attractive source for clear definitions and detailed measurement instructions, but it
may be too expensive to carry out on a large scale. Statistical indicators are based on relative
terms and can be easily biased by credential inflation. Therefore, overall, the self-assessment
indicator is considered the best-available measure for overeducation (Hartog, 2000).
6In the data we use, overeducation is based on a subjective measure (direct question).
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3.3 Decomposing Wage Differences between Men and
Women
As we are interested in studying the relationship between overeducation and the GPG, we
focus on the adjusted measures of the disparity in hourly wages that persist even when
employed women and men are similar with regard to personal and job characteristics. This
gap is of special interest for discrimination search, as the measured wage disparity cannot be
justified on grounds of productivity.
The most common applied counterfactual procedure for decomposing the GPG is the Oax-
aca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition (see Fortin et al., 2011, for a survey). The
method divides the wage differential into a part that is ‘explained’ by group differences in
observable labor market characteristics, such as education or work experience, and a part that
cannot be accounted for by such differences in wage determinants. The latter is the so-called
‘unexplained’ part or adjusted GPG and often used as a measure for discrimination. Yet, it
also includes effects of group differences in unobserved predictors (Blau and Kahn, 2006).
In Appendix 3.A, we provide details on the econometric model applied. Before estimating
and decomposing the GPG, i.e. applying the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for the
distinct subsamples (over- and properly educated individuals), we estimate a Mincer-type
wage equation separately for men and women in each subsample (Appendix 3.A.1). Then,
we describe the decomposition method applied (Appendix 3.A.2).
3.4 Accounting for Sample Selection
The outcome of paid work, either for properly educated or overeducated workers, is only
observed for a non-random sample. Therefore, the coefficients obtained from Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regressions are biased. As the origin of the selection could be related to
earnings, one needs to explicitly consider this process in the estimation of the wage equation.
The selection into the labor market may depend on some positive factors such as individual
ability, motivation or educational quality, raising both, the probability of being employed
and wages. Yet, it is omitted in the earnings equation as the factors mentioned above are
unobservable in the data. The sample selection bias that stems from not considering the
participation decision may be particularly relevant in Italy given low female participation in
the Italian labor market (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008; Centra and Cutillo, 2009). Despite the
participation decision in general, individuals are also confronted with the decision whether
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to accept wage offers for jobs that do not match their educational level. Hence, sorting
into the over- or properly educated sample may be a result of differences in unobservable
characteristics between the individuals. Neglecting this problem may lead to the conclusion
that overeducation signals the incapacity of the labor market to absorb all workers according
to their educational level. This would imply that there is an overinvestment in educational
attainment and a waste of resources. However, this may not be the case when overeducation
mainly reflects unobserved differences in characteristics. In particular, failure to account for
these selection choices would lead to inconsistent and biased estimates of both the gender-
specific wage equation as well as the components of the GPG. In contrast, provided that the
estimated impact of overeducation on wages is free from heterogeneity bias, mismatched
workers can expect significant increases in earnings if they were assigned to jobs requiring
a qualification level in accordance with their actual educational attainment. Thus, it is
important to control for the endogeneity of overeducation in the estimation of the wage
equation because the same unobserved characteristics influencing the overeducation choice
may also affect wages.
The standard empirical framework that neglects selectivity issues generally tends to
overestimate the negative wage effects of overeducation (Bauer, 2002; Chevalier, 2003).7
In order to fully correct the wage equation, we estimate a model with a double selection
process, i.e. we control for both the participation and the overeducation decision. Following
the literature, we extend the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model to include multiple
decisions (Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Schmertmann, 1994; Sorensen, 1989; Tunali, 1986).
Our setup refers to the case of a censored probit, i.e. partial partial observability according
to the definition of Meng and Schmidt (1985). We follow the literature to identify the
participation and overeducation decision. In Appendix 3.A.3–3.A.4, we outline both the
estimation procedure of the model with double selection as well as the identification strategy
of the selection equations. We derive the selection terms that are then included in the wage
regressions (in order to obtain consistent parameter estimates) and present the decomposition
expression when accounting for double selection into the sample.
7In contrast, Cutillo and Di Pietro (2006) find that failure to control for this correlation yields an OLS
estimator of the effect of overeducation on wages that is downward biased.
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3.5 Data and Sample Restriction
We use the complete release of the survey PLUS8 from the Italian Institute for the Develop-
ment of Vocational Training for Workers (ISFOL). So far, the following data waves with
panel structure have been released: 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2014. ISFOL PLUS
covers the whole population with focus on the working population. The data was collected by
means of Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) and uses only direct answers,
i.e. no proxies are used.
Even if the major part of empirical research concerning overeducation refers to graduate
workers, overeducation is not a prerogative of tertiary educated individuals only (see e.g.
Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000). ISFOL PLUS includes a direct question asking
whether the individual’s level of education is necessary for the working activity performed.
Thus, all interviewees categorize themselves via self-assessment as over- or properly edu-
cated.9 In particular, the question allows the categorization not only for graduates but for
the whole stock of working individuals in the sample. As stated in Section 3.2.2, estimation
results based on a subjective, an objective or a statistical measure of overeducation may
differ (McGoldrick and Robst, 1996; Pecoraro, 2016).
We use the complete release of panel dimension to study the effect of overeducation
on the GPG. There are new entrants across the releases and through attrition, we loose
individuals. Thus, the sample composition changes. The analysis is based on a pooled
regression model including dummies for the different releases as explanatory variables. The
sample is restricted to individuals that have at least graduated from high school, i.e. enjoyed
minimally 13 years of schooling. This sample restriction is justified by a relatively low risk
of overeducation for individuals with less than high school diploma (Leuven and Oosterbeek,
2011). In the original sample, there are 159,615 observations of panel dimension. We also
exclude students, pensioners and disabled individuals as well as unemployed individuals
from the analysis. The aim of this restriction is to form a homogeneous sample of individuals
(voluntarily) out of the labor force and employed individuals (Heinze et al., 2003). We drop
also missing observations on other variables of interest. This leaves us with a sample size
of 43,178 individual labor-market profiles, whereof 23,726 are female (54.9%) and 19,452
are male (45.1%). In the data, 6,775 men and 7,481 women are working in jobs that require
less schooling than they actually have (i.e. are overeducated). Thus, more than one third of
8PLUS = Participation, Labor, Unemployment Survey
9This implies that overeducation is estimated according to a subjective criterion by the workers and it is
recorded according to a dichotomous classification, i.e. a positive or negative reply to the following direct
question: “Is your level of education necessary for your current job?”.
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the individuals in the sample is overeducated. We use the logarithm of net hourly wages as
dependent variable. The variable is defined as the net monthly wage perceived divided by the
number of actual working hours per month.10
Table 3.1 reports means and standard deviations for some of the explanatory variables used
in the analysis. On average, overeducated workers are younger and (both males and females)
have lower schooling, less experience and job tenure. Moreover, overeducated employees
are less often married or parents than properly matched employees. The higher average age
of properly educated compared to overeducated workers may drive these differences. A full
list of the variables used in the analysis along with their definitions and coding is provided in
Appendix 3.B, Table 3.B.1.
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overeducated Sample Properly Educated Sample
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
female 0.525 0.499 0.562 0.496
Age 35.90 11.80 41.50 12.73
Schooling 13.66 1.244 14.26 1.480
Exper 14.52 11.62 18.94 12.55
Tenure 9.37 9.953 14.40 12.07
Manager 0.080 0.271 0.330 0.470
Intermed_Prof 0.466 0.499 0.549 0.498
North 0.477 0.499 0.467 0.499
Centre 0.216 0.411 0.192 0.394
Italian 0.988 0.108 0.996 0.0651
Married 0.445 0.497 0.576 0.494
Kids 0.440 0.496 0.568 0.495
Kids_3 0.282 0.450 0.291 0.454
Reloc 0.050 0.218 0.080 0.271
Observations 14,256 28,922
10The survey includes monthly as well as annual gross earnings. However, monthly gross earnings are
almost entirely missing (98.0% of all observations in the data are missing values). Gross annual earnings, when
divided by the number of months in a calendar year (including a 13th month income) and compared with the
monthly measure, differ by more than 800 Euro per month. Therefore, we prefer to use the reported monthly
net income.
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3.6 Estimation Results
In this Section, we present our estimation results. We show that the difference in the GPGs
between properly and overeducated individuals is significant, and that the unadjusted as
well as adjusted GPG is higher among overeducated workers. We estimate the effect of
overeducation on wages and calculate the likelihood of overeducation by gender. Lastly, we
discuss the results from the model with double selection.
3.6.1 The Effect of Overeducation on the GPG
Table 3.1 reports the log of hourly wages for overeducated and properly educated individuals
by gender. The GPG in net hourly wages in the full sample amounts to 4.7%.11 The data
also show that the GPG is much higher among overeducated workers (9.6%) compared to
properly educated ones (3.5%).12
Table 3.1 Log of Hourly Wages in Euro and Raw GPG
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Overeducated Sample Properly Educated Sample
ln(WM+F) 2.109 1.938 2.194
Observations 43,178 14,256 28,922
ln(WM) 2.135 1.988 2.214
Observations 19,452 6,775 12,677
ln(WF) 2.088 1.892 2.178
Observations 23,726 7,481 16,245
Raw GPG in % 4.7 9.6 3.5
As our purpose in this paper is to analyze the GPG among overeducated workers as well
as among properly educated workers, we first verify that a statistically significant gap in
pay does not only exist by gender in the respective subsamples (overeducated individuals
and properly educated individuals), but also across them. Hence, we test the hypothesis
that the difference between the GPG among overeducated individuals and the GPG among
properly educated individuals is significantly different from zero. Table 3.2, column (1),
11This value is slightly lower than that estimated by (Eurostat, 2016) in the period 2005-2014 (5.6%). This
is because we keep also the self-employed, while Eurostat considers only employees in enterprises with more
than ten employees.
12For example, Cutillo and Di Pietro (2006) find a lower pay gap for properly educated workers relative to
overeducated workers in Italy.
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shows that the coefficient estimate of overfem13 is negative and statistically significant.
The coefficient estimate is the difference of the GPG between properly and overeducated
individuals; −(∆GPGOver − ∆GPGProper) = ∆GPGProper − ∆GPGOver . Given that the difference
between the GPGs among properly and overeducated individuals is highly statistically
significant, we confirm the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant difference in the
GPG across the subsamples and not merely within each subsample.14 In order to analyze the
GPG among overeducated individuals and the GPG among properly educated individuals, we
estimate a Mincerian wage equation considering as regressors years of education, actual work
experience, as well as experience squared as an indicator of the diminishing marginal utility
of work experience, job tenure (years with present employer), controls for the firm size as well
as a set of job characteristics (type of contract and non-wage compensatings). Additionally,
we include in each wage equation a set of sectoral and occupational dummies, wave or year
dummies as well as a set of variables accounting for personal characteristics. The latter
includes family status, nationality, regional controls and the educational background of the
parents. Table 3.3 reports the effect of overeducation on the log of hourly wages for the entire
sample as well as for the overeducated and properly educated samples, respectively.15 The
estimated coefficient of over is highly statistically significant and negative, indicating that
being overeducated has a negative effect on earnings. The wage penalty for overeducation
is 4.9%.16 The coefficient estimate of the variable female being negative and significant
confirms the usual result in the literature: being a woman reduces earnings. Here, the
female wage penalty amounts to 7.3%. This penalty is higher in the sample of overeducated
individuals (9.6%) and lower in the sample of properly educated individuals (6.9%). The
coefficient for the interaction term overfem, negative and significant, shows that women
receive from being overeducated a wage penalty of 2.2%.
As the effect of overeducation on earnings was found to differ for men and women, we
analyze in the next Section the incidence of overeducation for both men and women.
13Overfem is the interaction of the dummies female and over. The dummy over takes the value one if the
individual’s educational qualification is not a prerequisite to perform his or her current job and zero if the
individual holds the level of education required to perform his or her current job.
14The coefficient estimates of female in column (2) and (3) of Table 3.2 represent the negative of the GPGs,
i.e. βˆ f emalei =−∆GPGi , where i= Over, Proper and ∆GPGi = ln(WM)
i− ln(WF)i, for the respective subsample.
15The full regression output is shown in Table 3.C.1 in Appendix 3.C. Table 3.C.2 in Appendix 3.C shows
the regression output by gender and over- or proper education.
16Cutillo and Di Pietro (2006) find a wage penalty of 4.4% associated with overeducation in a sample
of university graduates; McGuinness and Sloane (2010) find a wage penalty of 4.0% for young university
graduates.
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Table 3.2 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Dummies female, over and overfem
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Full Sample Overeducated Sample Properly Educated Sample
female -0.036*** -0.096*** -0.036***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
over -0.226***
(0.007)
overfem -0.060***
(0.010)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43,178 14,256 28,922
R-squared 0.065 0.023 0.005
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Table 3.3 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages, Selected Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Full Sample Overeducated Sample Properly Educated Sample
over -0.050***
(0.006)
female -0.076*** -0.101*** -0.072***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
overfem -0.022**
(0.009)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43,178 14,256 28,922
R-squared 0.336 0.191 0.352
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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3.6.2 Probability of Overeducation
The literature shows that the risk of overeducation differs by gender, and in many countries
the share of overeducated workers among women is higher than among men.17 In the
following, we explicitly test the incidence of overeducation for men and women via tests of
proportions as well as probit regressions. We have found more pronounced wage penalties
of overeducation for women than for men. However, this does not necessarily imply that
women are more likely to be overeducated than men. Table 3.4, Panel A, shows that in the
full sample men are actually more likely to be overeducated. Panel B of Table 3.4 confirms
this result: being a woman significantly reduces the probability to be overeducated. The
results in the literature concerning the overeducation risk by gender are ambigous. Different
estimation techniques as well as different measures for overeducation (statistical, subjective
or objective) may contribute to this ambiguity (McGoldrick and Robst, 1996). The method
applied for overeducation assessment does not help to explain our result, because women
are significantly more likely to report overeducation under the subjective than under the
objective measure (McGoldrick and Robst, 1996). Robst (2007) finds that men are more
likely to be overeducated due to career-related reasons, while women are more likely to be
mismatched due to family-related reasons. Also Büchel and van Ham (2003) document the
selection process concerning the labor market participation of overeducated women. On
the one hand, a high reservation wage can induce a woman to turn down low pay offers
with low qualification requirements, thereby reducing the overeducation probability. Women
facing a lack of sufficiently adequate matches might prefer to turn inactive rather than
accepting a job below their skill level. Part of the measured lower risk can thus be viewed
as the outcome of a selection process concerning labor market participation. On the other
hand, especially jobs in the public administration allow for more time flexibility than most
high-level positions. Hence, the attractiveness of these jobs is relatively higher for women
increasing the overeducation risk. In our data, the former effect is the dominant one leading
to a lower overeducation probability for women.
17In Section 3.6.4, this non-random selection process is accounted for by adjusting the estimation results for
double selectivity into the labor force as well as into overeducation.
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Table 3.4 Risk of Overeducation by Gender
(a) Panel A: Tests of Proportions by Overeducation
(1)
Full Sample
Proportion Male Sample 0.348
Observations 19,452
Proportion Female Sample 0.315
Observations 23,726
Difference 0.033
H0: diff =0
Test statistic 7.252
P-value 0.000
H1 : Difference > 0
P-value 1.000
H1: Difference < 0
P-value 0.000
(b) Panel B: Likelihood of being female on Overe-
ducation – Probit Estimation
(1) (2)
Variables Full Sample
Reduced Full
Regression
female -0.090*** -0.114***
(0.013) (0.013)
Age -0.020***
(0.001)
Schooling -0.165***
(0.005)
North 0.019
(0.015)
Centre 0.113***
(0.018)
Italian -0.585***
(0.078)
Married 0.018
(0.016)
Homeowner -0.108***
(0.018)
Max_D_Mark -0.222***
(0.033)
Work_Climate 0.023**
(0.009)
Work_Time -0.013
(0.009)
Work_Task -0.199***
(0.010)
Work_Stab -0.056***
(0.007)
Reloc -0.217***
(0.027)
Constant -0.394*** 4.148***
(0.018) (0.114)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 43,178 43,178
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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3.6.3 In Search of Discrimination
In Section 3.6.1, we have found evidence that overeducation has a negative effect on earnings
and that this negative effect is more pronounced for female workers. In this Section, we
use the Oaxaca-Blinder standard methodology to study the GPG and its drivers. Our aim
is to estimate the GPG all else equal, and to find evidence of gender discrimination in
our data (if any). The two-fold decomposition in Table 3.5 shows that the endowments or
explained component is negative and significant among overeducated individuals as well as
among properly educated workers. This means that (average) observable female labor market
characteristics are actually better than males’. The unexplained or coefficients part shows the
hypothetical wage gain for women if their own features were remunerated like men’s. As
this term is positive and significant for both over- and properly educated individuals but is
higher among mismatched workers, it suggests that gender wage discrimination may be more
important among overeducated workers. The unexplained component among overeducated
employees amounts to 83.4% compared to 66.7% among properly educated individuals. The
unexplained part of the GPG is usually attributed to discrimination, but it is important to
recall that it also captures differences in unobserved characteristics (Blau and Kahn, 2000). A
reason for the high fraction of the GPG due to the unexplained part might be that our data is
too poor to capture the differences in observable labor market characteristics that explain the
pay gap between groups. Therefore, we check the adequacy of our data to explain differences
in wages other than the GPG. The results in Table 3.6 show that the same type of wage
decomposition can capture most of the differences in characteristics that explain the pay gap
between groups other than gender. For example, available information on individuals and
jobs can explain almost 80.0% percent of the difference in pay between over- and properly
educated individuals. The comparison between several types of wage differentials shows
that the GPG is by far the most unexplained among the considered groups. Hence, the high
proportion of the coefficients effect in the GPG in the full sample as well as in the GPG by
overeducation is not data-driven.
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Table 3.5 Decomposition of the GPG by Overeducation
(1) (2)
Overeducated Sample Properly Educated Sample
Differential
ln(WM) 1.988*** 2.214***
(0.006) (0.005)
ln(WF) 1.892*** 2.178***
(0.005) (0.004)
Difference 0.096*** 0.035***
(0.008) (0.006)
Decomposition
Endowments -0.024*** -0.035***
(0.008) (0.006)
Coefficients 0.121*** 0.070***
(0.010) (0.008)
Coefficients in % 83.4 66.7
(Absolute Value)
Observations 14,256 28,922
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.14
Table 3.6 Decomposition of the GPG versus Other Pay Gaps
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men vs. Women Properly Educated vs. Public vs. Full time vs.
Overeducated Individuals Private Sector Part-time
Differential
ln(WGroup 0) 2.135*** 2.194*** 2.334*** 2.130***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(WGroup 1) 2.088*** 1.938*** 1.949*** 2.018***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Difference 0.047*** 0.256*** 0.384*** 0.111***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Decomposition
Endowments -0.044*** 0.200*** 0.315*** 0.171***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Coefficients 0.091*** 0.056*** 0.070*** -0.059***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
Coefficients in % 67.4 21.9 18.2 25.7
(Absolute Value)
Observations 43,178 43,178 43,178 43,178
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Notes: Group 0 is the respective first prediction (male, properly educated, public sector, full-time employees) and Group 1
is the respective second prediction (female, overeducated, private sector, part-time employees) of the decomposition.
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3.6.4 Unbiased Estimation Results
In this Section, we analyze the GPG among overeducated workers as well as among properly
educated workers controlling for selection decisions. The ignorance of individual selection
decisions results in Omitted Variable Bias (OVB) and endogeneity problems. The estimated
correlation between the error terms of the two binary choice equations considered, ρ , is
statistically significant if unobserved characteristics such as individual ability influence both
choices. We consider the participation choice and the decision to accept a job that does
not match the individual’s qualification level. Indeed, sorting into the over- or properly
educated sample could be a result of observable as well as unobservable differences in
characteristics between the individuals. In our data, ρ is found to have a positive sign
and to be significantly different from zero for the female sample but insignificant for the
male sample (see Table 3.7).18 Females choosing to participate in the labor market tend to
choose jobs for which they are overeducated more often than individuals actually inactive
would do if they had decided to participate. Table 3.7 shows that relocating singificantly
lowers the probability of being overeducated for both men and women. Having children or
young children lowers the participation probability for women but raises the probability of
participating in the labor force for men.
Next, we define and present in Table 3.8 the values of the four selection variables we
consider in this study for both men and women: λOverPA ,λ
Proper
PA (participation choice) and
λOverOV ,λ
Proper
OV (overeducation choice), where Over identifies the overeducated sample and
Proper the properly educated sample.19 The coefficient estimate of λOverPA is positive and
significant for both women and men indicating that individuals actually out of the labor force
would earn less than their overeducated peers even if they were selected into overeducation.
The coefficient estimate of λProperPA results statistically insignificant for men but statistically
significant for women. Females out of the labor force would earn less than properly matched
women even if they were selected into a job in line with their level of education. Thus, only
women with more favorable unobservable characteristics self-select themselves into the labor
force. Men in employment do not receive a wage gain compared to men out of the labor
force. Thus, inactive women would earn less than a comparably properly matched individual
engaged in the labor market. As expected, the coefficient estimates for the overeducation
choice result positive for overeducated workers and negative for their properly educated
18Table 3.D.1, Appendix 3.D, shows the full regression output for the bivariate probit of the participation
and overeducation selection equations.
19We present in Table 3.D.2, Appendix 3.D, the full regression output with the selection correction terms. In
the following, for notational simplicity; λ¯ = λ and δˆ = δ .
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counterparts. The coefficient estimate of λOverOV is significant and positive for both women
and men, while the estimated coefficient of λProperOV is significant and negative for both, men
and women. For overeducated individuals the same unobserved characteristics that raise the
probability to be overeducated also increase wages. In the properly educated sample, the set
of unobserved characteristics increasing the overeducation probability impacts negatively on
the wage level. The intuition behind this positive selection into overeducation is that properly
educated workers would earn more than their overeducated colleagues even if the latter were
in a job matching their educational background. Overall, our data show that individuals
that select into overeducation obtain lower wages than a randomly chosen individual with a
similar set of observable characteristics.
Finally, we calculate the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition when accounting for double
selection using earnings equations that have been corrected for sample selection and endo-
geneity bias. We provide in Table 3.9 the results of this decomposition. The differential
is again divided in the following parts: the endowments part, which is explained by dif-
ferences in explanatory variables and the coefficients part, which is due to differences in
estimated coefficients. Additionally, there are the parts accounting for gender differences in
selection; Participation and Overeducation. The component attributed to gender differences
in labor market participation or the participation component is: (δmM,PAλ
m
M,PA−δmF,PAλmF,PA),
with m = Over, Proper. Analogously, the overeducation component of the GPG is equal
to; (δmM,OVλ
m
M,OV −δmF,OVλmF,OV). In the overeducated sample, the selection coefficients for
both the participation and the overeducation component are positive. The overeducation part
is statistically significant and allows to explain almost the entire GPG. For overeducated
individulas, the overeducation decision, exerts a strong positive impact on wages for both men
and women (as shown in Table 3.8). However, the corresponding set of unobservables, λOverOV ,
is more favorable for men, i.e. λOverM,OV > λ
Over
F,OV . Conseqeuntly, the overeducation component
is a net driver of the GPG among overeducated workers. In contrast, the overeducation
component is statistically significant but negative for the properly educated sample. The set
of unobservables, λProperOV , is more favorable for women than for men. Thus, the component
reduces the GPG among properly educated workers significantly. Our results show that con-
trolling for unobserved individual characteristics removes the unexplained component of the
GPG among overeducated workers. Yet, it remains a main driver of the GPG among properly
educated individuals. The endowments effect is still significant and negative working towards
a closure of the gap for both over- and properly educated individuals.
As our results show that the discriminatory component in the Oaxaca-Blinder decompo-
sition of the GPG disappears among overeducated workers but remains significant among
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properly educated individuals also when controlling for double selection, we further inves-
tigate why overeducation can fight gender discrimination in pay whereas a proper match
fails to do so. Overeducated female workers compensate with higher educational attainment
their lower level of (generally) unobservable characteristics. Their set of unobservables is
lower than that of their properly educated colleagues and lower than that of overeducated
men. Consequently, overeducation is a signaling device for women spending their useless-
for-the-job diploma to inform employers on their true productivity and thereby fights gender
wage discrimination. For both men and women, overeducation allows to compensate for
differences in unobserved heterogeneity compared to their properly educated peers and thus
is a first-best matching for overeducated workers. In contrast, even though among properly
educated workers, women have more favorable sets of unobservables compared to their male
peers, the discriminatory part remains a main contributor to the wage gap. As the level of
education attained is required for the job performed, the signaling effect is less clear and
hence does not allow to overcome gender discrimination.
Table 3.7 Bivariate Probit Results: Instruments and Correlation Coefficient
for the Participation and Overeducation Decision
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Female Sample Male Sample
Variables Overeducation Participation Overeducation Participation
Reloc -0.228*** -0.214***
(0.041) (0.035)
Kids -0.449*** 0.147**
(0.037) (0.074)
Kids_3 -0.259*** 0.055
(0.030) (0.092)
ρ 0.165*** 0.529
(0.064) (0.440)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Dummies No No No No
Observations 31,516 31,516 21,075 21,075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.8 Selection Variables, Definition and Values
(a) Panel A: Overeducated Sample
(1) (2)
Female Sample Male Sample
λOverPA 0.094** 1.318**
measures the selection bias from the participation (0.044) (0.546)
decision for overeducated individuals
λOverOV 0.498*** 0.478***
measures the selection bias from the overeducation (0.135) (0.120)
decision for overeducated individuals
Observations 7,481 6,775
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
(b) Panel B: Properly Educated Sample
(1) (2)
Female Sample Male Sample
λProperPA 0.049** 0.044
measures the selection bias from the participation (0.022) (0.157)
decision for properly educated individuals
λProperOV -0.351*** -0.260***
measures the selection bias from the overeducation (0.083) (0.095)
decision for properly educated individuals
Observations 16,245 12,677
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
105
Table 3.9 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Gender Log Hourly Wage Gap adjusted for
Double Selection by Overeducation
(1) (2)
Overeducated Sample Properly Educated Sample
Difference 0.096*** 0.035***
Decomposition
Endowments -0.024*** -0.033***
(0.007) (0.006)
Coefficients -0.070 0.186***
(0.066) (0.029)
Participation 0.010 0.004
(0.013) (0.012)
Overeducation 0.180*** -0.121***
(0.060) (0.029)
Coefficients in % 24.6 54.1
(Absolute Value)
Overeducation in % 63.4 42.6
(Absolute Value)
Observations 14,256 28,922
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper is the first study that explicitly considers the effect of the overeducation choice
on the GPG. It analyzes the GPG among overeducated and properly educated workers from
2005 to 2014 in Italy. The GPG by overeducation is decomposed in an explained and an
unexplained part using the Oaxaca-Blinder model. The estimates are then corrected for
sample selection and endogeneity bias controlling for two selection decisions: the decision
to participate in the labor market and the decision to accept a job for that the individual
is overeducated. Neglecting these selection choices would lead to inconsistent and biased
estimates of both the gender-specific wage equation as well as the components of the GPG.
Unlike previous studies, our results suggest that overeducation is relevant in explaining
gender pay differences. The wage gap is significantly higher among overeducated compared
to properly educated workers and the overeducation earnings penalty is higher for women
than for men. The GPG may arise from differences in personal and job characteristics of
working men and women, or may be the result of disparities in wages that persist when
male and female workers have similar personal and job characteristics. In the latter case,
the residual gap cannot be justified on grounds of productivity but indicates the presence of
gender discrimination. By applying the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology to study the drivers
of the GPG, we find that women posses better observable characteristics than men but get
lower reward from their characteristics either among mis- or properly matched individuals.
In our data, the explained component of the GPG halves among overeducated workers
compared to properly educated (16.6% vs. 33.3%) and the unexplained or discriminatory
component is higher in the overeducated sample (83.4% vs. 66.7%). Hence, we inquire,
whether overeducation leads to an increase of gender discrimination in pay. We know from
the literature that most of the difference in earnings between overeducated and properly
educated workers are caused by a failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Bauer,
2002; Chevalier, 2003; Cutillo and Di Pietro, 2006; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). In
order to consistently estimate the gender-specific wage equations and the components of
the GPG, we follow the literature and apply a bivariate selectivity model to simultaneously
account for both sample selection bias and endogeneity bias (as in Tunali, 1986; Sorensen,
1989; Cutillo and Di Pietro, 2006). The unexplained part of the GPG in the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition, i.e. the component usually attributed to discrimination, vanishes when the
estimates are corrected for sample selection and endogeneity bias in the overeducated sample.
The higher GPG among overeducated workers is mainly explained by less favorable sets
of unobservable characteristics of overeducated women (relative to overeducated men). By
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compensating with higher educational attainment their lower level of unobservable personal
characteristics, overeducated women indicate their low but actual productivity to employers
and overcome statistical discrimination. Even though females self-selecting themselves into
proper education have higher motivation and productivity levels or commitment to work
compared to their male peers, the discriminatory part remains significant among properly
educated workers (though decreases; from 66.7% to 54.1%). In fact, for properly matched
workers the signaling effect is less clear, because education testifies human capital skills
required for the job. All in all, the decomposition results adjusted for sample selection
and endogeneity problems show that a significant part of the GPG can be explained by the
overeducation choice.
These results are important for policy issues. In Italy, the share of individuals with tertiary
education is among the lowest in the EU. If overeducation indicates the incapacity of the
Italian labor market to absorb all graduates, there is an overinvestment in education and a
waste of resources. However, this may not be the case if overeducated workers possess lower
levels of unobservable characteristics and try to compensate them with more investment
in education in order to raise their employment probability. As stated, our results suggest
that this is the case in Italy. Overeducation simply compensates for lower unobservable
characteristics, there is no waste of human capital, the need for greater investment in higher
education is not limited, and the share of individuals with tertiary education may grow. This
conclusion is particularly important for women, as their share among graduates is high and
growing in Italy, and as the wage penalty for overeducation is higher in the female sample.
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Appendices
Appendix 3.A Methodological Issues
In this Section, we outline the estimation procedure. Before estimating and decomposing the
GPG, i.e. applying the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, for the distinct subsamples
(overeducated individuals and properly educated individuals), we estimate a Mincer-type
wage equation separately for men and women. Then, we describe the decomposition method
applied. Next, we derive the selection terms, which are then included in the wage regressions
and present the decomposition expression when it is accounted for double selectivity (the
Oaxaca-Blinder model with double selection).
3.A.1 The Wage Model
Consider the following model of wage determination:
ln(Wi) = X
′
iβ + γSi+ εi (3.A.1)
with i = 1, . . . ,N and where ln(Wi) is the natural logarithm of net hourly wages, β is a K×1
vector of coefficients including the intercept, and Xi is a K×1 vector of observable individual
labor market characteristics such as schooling, work experience or tenure. Si is a dummy for
overeducation20 and γ is the corresponding coefficient. The error term is described by εi. In
order to analyze the effect of overeducation on wages, the wage model (3.A.1) is evaluated at
the mean by OLS, separately for men and women:
ln(WG) = X¯
′
GβG+ γSG (3.A.2)
with G = M,F; G = M identifies the male sample and G = F identifies the female sample.
ln(WG) is the natural logarithm of net hourly wages evaluated at the mean, βG is a K× 1
vector of coefficient estimates including the intercept and X¯G is a K×1 vector of average
observable labor market characteristics. SG is a dummy for overeducation.
In order to estimate the GPG for the different subsamples (overeducated individuals and
properly educated individuals), the basic wage model evaluated at the mean becomes:
ln(WG)
m
= X¯m
′
G β
m
G (3.A.3)
20i.e. Si is equal to one, if the individual i is overeducated and zero otherwise.
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with m = Over,Proper; m = Over represents the overeducated individuals and m = Proper
identifies properly educated individuals.
3.A.2 The Oaxaca-Blinder Model
Starting from equation (3.A.3) and using the implicit assumptions in Oaxaca (1973) and Blin-
der (1973), we decompose the wage differential in two parts; endowments and coefficients:21
ln(WM)
m− ln(WF)m = X¯m′M βˆmM− X¯m
′
F βˆ
m
F
= (X¯m
′
M − X¯m
′
F )βˆ
m
M + X¯
m′
F (βˆ
m
M− βˆmF )
where ln(WG)
m
is again the logarithmic net wage evaluated at the mean for the respective
subsample, G=M,F and m=Over,Proper, with X¯mG and β
m
G being K×1 vectors of average
characteristics and the corresponding estimated coefficients. The first term is the endowments
(or characteristics) effect that evaluates the GPG in terms of characteristics at the rate of
return of female characteristics. The second term is the coefficients or wage structure effect
evaluating the GPG in terms of differences in returns given female observable labor market
characteristics. As the same endowments should have the same effect on earnings for both,
men and women, coefficients should not differ by gender, which is why this term is often
referred to as the unexplained part of the GPG. If the GPG depends mainly on differences in
coefficients, this may indicate the presence of gender discrimination.
3.A.3 Selection Rules
Endogeneity arises from correlation of Si with the error term εi. Thus, as long as Corr(Si,εi) ̸=
0, unobservable individual characteristics influence the decision to accept a job offer for
which the individual is overeducated and OLS techniques lead to inconsistent estimates of
the wage model (3.A.1). Despite problems of endogeneity, non-randomness of the sample
leads to sample selection bias. A non-random sample may occur, as we observe only those
individuals actually participating in the labor market but not those out of the labor market. In
order to account for sample selection and endogeneity bias, we set up two selection rules,
one for the decision to participate in the labor market and one for the decision to accept a
21As Jones and Kelley (1984) show, the use of the pay structure of the higher earnings group as the non-
discriminatory norm, i.e. male in the underlying case, in a two-fold model is equivalent to adding the interaction
term of the three-fold model to the endowments component. Similarly, the use of the pay structure for the low
earnings group in the simple decomposition is equivalent to adding the interaction term for the three-way model
to the unexplained component (Li and Miller, 2012).
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wage offer for which the individual is overeducated. The selection rules are described by the
following relations:
Participation Selection: Y ∗iPA = Z
′
iγ+uiPA (3.A.4)
Overeducation Selection: Y ∗iOV = Q
′
iα+uiOV (3.A.5)
where Y ∗iPA represents the unobserved indices of utility that individual i uses to make the
decision to participate in the labor market or not and Y ∗iOV represents the unobserved indices
of utility that individual i uses to make the decision to be overeducated or not; with Zi and Qi
being KZ×1 and KQ×1 vectors of explanatory variables, respectively, and ui is assumed to
be N(0,1) with Cov(uPA,uOV) = ρ .
Each equation describing the respective selection rule has to include at least one variable
that influences the corresponding decision only and, hence, is uncorrelated with wages.
Moreover, these instruments have to be mutually independent. The employment decision
is identified via the dummy variables Kids and Kids_3, as women with children and in
particular with young children spend a significant amount of time with child-care (Martins,
2001; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008; Lee, 2009; Chang, 2011). We assume that these
variables affect the individual propensity to participate in the labor market but not marginal
productivity. For the identification of the overeducation selection equation, we use the
variable Reloc establishing whether the individual had to relocate for his or her current
job. The intuition behind is that individuals willing to relocate are more likely to find a job
appropriate to their educational background (Cutillo and Di Pietro, 2006; Dolton and Silles,
2008). The willingness to relocate thus influences the probability of accepting a job that does
not match the individual’s educational level but is exogenous to the wage level.
The probabilities of observing a positive labor income given overeducation or proper
education are the following:
Pr(Y ∗PA > 0,Y
∗
OV > 0) = Pr(uPA >−Z
′
γ,uOV >−Q′α) = G(Z ′γ,Q′α,ρ) (3.A.6)
Pr(Y ∗PA > 0,Y
∗
OV ≤ 0) = Pr(uPA >−Z
′
γ,uOV ≤−Q′α) = G(Z ′γ,−Q′α,−ρ) (3.A.7)
where G(·) is the standard bivariate normal distribution and ρ is the correlation coefficient
between the two selection rules. The subscript PA identifies the participation decision, while
OV identifies the overeducation decision. Equation (3.A.6) accounts for the probability
of observing a positive wage given overeducation and equation (3.A.7) for the probability
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of observing a positive wage given proper education. Under the assumption that the two
selection rules are not independent, that is ρ ̸= 0, maximum likelihood of the bivariate probit
leads to the following selection terms for overeducated employees, m = Over:
λOverPA =
f (Z
′γ)F [Q
′α−ρZ′γ√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,Q′α,ρ)
(3.A.8)
λOverOV =
f (Q
′α)F [Z
′γ−ρQ′α√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,Q′α,ρ)
(3.A.9)
Similarly, for the subsample of appropriately educated workers, m = Proper, the correspond-
ing selection terms are given by:
λProperPA =
f (Z
′γ)F [−Q
′α−ρZ′γ√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,−Q′α,−ρ) (3.A.10)
λProperOV =
− f (Q′α)F [Z
′γ−ρQ′α√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,−Q′α,−ρ) (3.A.11)
f (·) is the standard normal density, while F(·) is the standard normal distribution.
Adding the selection terms λmPA and λ
m
OV to the earnings equations in (3.A.3) allows us to
consistently estimate the earnings equation for the overeducated and properly educated sub-
samples, respectively. We obtain the following augmented model of wage determination (Lee,
1983; Tunali, 1986):
ln(WG)
m
= X¯m
′
G βˆ
m
G + δˆ
m
G,PAλ
m
G,PA+ δˆ
m
G,OVλ
m
G,OV (3.A.12)
where m = Over,Proper and G = M,F .
In Section 3.6.4, we discuss the results obtained from the bivariate probit estimation for
the participation and overeducation selection equations as well as the estimated correlation
between the error terms of these two binary equations, ρ .
3.A.4 The Oaxaca-Blinder Model with Double Selection
The estimated components of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition may change when
controlling for double selection. When accounting for double selection, the decomposition
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expression (4.A.1) becomes the following:
ln(WM)
m− ln(WF)m = ¯˜Xm′M ˆ˜βmM− ¯˜Xm
′
F
ˆ˜βmF
= (X¯m
′
M − X¯m
′
F )βˆ
m
M + X¯
m′
F (βˆ
m
M− βˆmF )
+(δˆmM,PAλ
m
M,PA− δˆmF,PAλmF,PA)+(δˆmM,OVλmM,OV − δˆmF,OVλmF,OV) (3.A.13)
where X˜ and β˜ contain, despite the explanatory variables X and the corresponding coefficients,
also the selection correction terms and their coefficients. Apart from the endowments and
coefficients component, there is now also a component due to differences in the participation
and overeducation decision by gender, respectively. The latter two components control for
otherwise unobserved factors of the participation and overeducation choice.
Appendix 3.B Definition of Variables
Table 3.B.1 Definition of Variables
Variable Name Definition
Dependent Variables
Lhwage The natural log of net hourly wages; hourly wages in Euros,
net of taxes and social security contributions
lfp One if the respective individual chooses to participate in the labor force,
zero otherwise
over One if the respective individual is overeducated, zero otherwise
Over is also used as independent variable
Independent Variables
Dummy and Interaction Effects
female One if the respective individual is a woman, zero otherwise
overfem Interaction term between the dummy over and female
Human Capital and Labor Market Characteristics
Educ Years of schooling completed
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Max_D_Mark One if individual graduated with the maximum degree 110 e lode from university,
zero otherwise
Age Age of individual (in years) ∈ (18,64)
Age5064 One if age is between 50 and 64 years, zero otherwise
Exper Number of years of prior work experience
Exper2 Exper squared
Tenure Number of years worked for current employer
North One if individual lives and works in the North of Italy, zero otherwise
Centre One if individual lives and works in the Centre of Italy, zero otherwise
Homeowner One if individual owns a house, zero otherwise
This includes bank loan-financed houses
Partner_Works One if partner or spouse of the individual is employed, zero otherwise
Married One if married, zero otherwise
Italian One if individual is Italian, zero otherwise
Educ_Moth_Uni One if mother graduated from university, zero otherwise
Educ_Fath_Uni One if father graduated from university, zero otherwise
Kids One if individual has at least one child, zero otherwise
Kids_3 One if age of youngest child is less or equal to three years, zero otherwise
Reloc One if individual relocated in order to take the current job, zero otherwise
Job and Firm Characteristics
Work_Climate Level of satisfaction with working climate at current job ∈ (0,4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Stab Level of satisfaction with stability of current job ∈ (0,4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Time Level of satisfaction with working time at current job ∈ (0,4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Task Level of satisfaction with tasks at current job ∈ (0,4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Self_Emp One if individual is self-employed, zero otherwise
Part One if individual works part-time, zero otherwise
Contract_Type One if individual holds an unlimited contract, zero otherwise
Big_Firm One if individual is employed in a firm with at least 250 employees, zero otherwise
Med_Firm One if individual is employed in a firm with at least 50 employees, zero otherwise
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Occupations and Industries
Manager One if individual is employed in ‘intellectual professions’; scientific and
highly specialized occupations
Intermediate_Prof One if individual is employed in ‘intermediary positions’ in commercial, technical
or administrative sectors, health services and technicians
Sec_02 - Sec_15 Sectoral dummies for employment in the following sectors or industries:
manufacturing, energy, construction, tourism, commerce, transport,
communication, financial activities, service industry, public administration,
education, health, sciences and family services, respectively
Selection Correction Terms
λOverPA Measures the selection bias from the participation decision
for overeducated individuals
λOverOV Measures the selection bias from the overeducation decision
for overeducated individuals
λProperPA Measures the selection bias from the participation decision
for properly educated individuals
λProperOV Measures the selection bias from the overeducation decision
for properly educated individuals
Appendix 3.C OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages
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Table 3.C.1 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Full Sample Overeducated Sample Properly Educated Sample
over -0.050***
(0.006)
female -0.076*** -0.101*** -0.072***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
overfem -0.022**
(0.009)
Schooling 0.055*** 0.034*** 0.061***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Max_D_Mark 0.036*** 0.022 0.037***
(0.009) (0.022) (0.010)
Exper 0.018*** 0.011*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Intermed_Prof 0.019*** 0.057*** -0.005
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Manager 0.130*** 0.139*** 0.100***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.010)
Big_Firm 0.030*** 0.050*** 0.018
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
Med_Firm 0.009 0.013 0.012
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Self_Emp 0.028 0.001 0.059
(0.035) (0.060) (0.041)
Part 0.085*** 0.110*** 0.061***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Contract_Type 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.063***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
Work_Climate -0.002 0.010** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Work_Time 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Work_Task 0.010*** 0.009* 0.010***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Work_Stab 0.012*** 0.002 0.016***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Married 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.058***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Italian 0.093*** 0.090** 0.087**
(0.028) (0.038) (0.042)
North 0.041*** 0.085*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Centre 0.019*** 0.047*** 0.012*
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
Homeowner 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.014*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.010 -0.008 0.014
(0.009) (0.019) (0.010)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.011 0.037 0.001
(0.012) (0.023) (0.013)
Home_Time 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.627*** 0.914*** 0.533***
(0.049) (0.082) (0.061)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43,178 14,256 28,922
R-squared 0.336 0.191 0.352
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.C.2 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overeducated Sample Properly Educated Sample
Variables Women Men Women Men
Schooling 0.037*** 0.024*** 0.064*** 0.057***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Max_D_Mark -0.002 0.064 0.029** 0.043**
(0.025) (0.045) (0.013) (0.018)
Exper 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Exper2 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Intermed_Prof 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.050*** -0.029***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010)
Manager 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.097***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013)
Big_Firm 0.034* 0.059*** 0.016 0.013
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Med_Firm 0.015 0.008 0.005 0.019
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Self_Emp 0.026 -0.024 0.083 0.022
(0.079) (0.085) (0.052) (0.062)
Part 0.087*** 0.189*** 0.049*** 0.149***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.025)
Contract_Type 0.058*** 0.100*** 0.041*** 0.103***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015)
Work_Climate 0.007 0.012* -0.013*** -0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Work_Time 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.018***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Work_Task 0.008 0.009 0.012** 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Work_Stab 0.001 0.002 0.016*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Married 0.032*** 0.076*** 0.058*** 0.055***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
Italian 0.093** 0.040 0.062 0.132**
(0.045) (0.070) (0.052) (0.066)
North 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.024*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
Centre 0.046*** 0.055*** 0.006 0.021**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Homeowner 0.040*** 0.013 0.006 0.022**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Educ_Fath_Uni -0.009 -0.001 0.017 0.008
(0.028) (0.025) (0.014) (0.015)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.048 0.023 0.044** -0.057***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.018) (0.020)
Home_Time 0.003** 0.003** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.790*** 1.041*** 0.455*** 0.484***
(0.125) (0.115) (0.095) (0.089)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,481 6,775 16,245 12,677
R-squared 0.154 0.227 0.353 0.359
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.D.1 Bivariate Probit Results Overeducation and Participation Selection Equations
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Female Sample Male Sample
Variables Overeducation Participation Overeducation Participation
Age -0.025*** 0.028*** -0.014*** -0.006**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Schooling -0.137*** 0.159*** -0.197*** 0.020
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015)
North 0.051** 0.642*** 0.028 0.159***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.044)
Centre 0.149*** 0.463*** 0.097*** 0.047
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.053)
Italian -0.700*** 0.540*** -0.199 0.302
(0.084) (0.068) (0.143) (0.227)
Married -0.067** -0.543*** 0.036 0.253***
(0.029) (0.037) (0.028) (0.076)
Homeowner -0.087*** -0.002 -0.130*** 0.050
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.055)
Max_D_Mark -0.214*** -0.226***
(0.040) (0.056)
Work_Climate 0.033*** 0.012
(0.012) (0.013)
Work_Time -0.021* -0.010
(0.012) (0.013)
Work_Task -0.190*** -0.195***
(0.012) (0.014)
Work_Stab -0.029*** -0.076***
(0.009) (0.010)
Reloc -0.228*** -0.214***
(0.041) (0.035)
Age5064 1.170*** 0.452***
(0.055) (0.080)
Partner_Works -0.031 0.138**
(0.027) (0.067)
Kids -0.449*** 0.147**
(0.037) (0.074)
Kids_3 -0.259*** 0.055
(0.030) (0.092)
Constant 3.763*** -2.727*** 3.972*** 0.940***
(0.184) (0.131) (0.213) (0.312)
ρ 0.165*** 0.529
(0.064) (0.440)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Dummies No No No No
Observations 31,516 31,516 21,075 21,075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.D.2 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages with Selection Terms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overeducated Sample Properly Educated Sample
Variables Women Men Women Men
Schooling -0.017 -0.044** 0.096*** 0.085***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.007) (0.010)
Max_D_Mark -0.081** -0.021 0.059*** 0.064***
(0.034) (0.050) (0.015) (0.020)
Exper 0.001 0.010*** 0.026*** 0.027***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exper2 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Intermed_Prof 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.057*** -0.027***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010)
Manager 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.145*** 0.098***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013)
Big_Firm 0.034* 0.058*** 0.017 0.013
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Med_Firm 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.020*
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Self_Emp 0.031 -0.022 0.087* 0.022
(0.080) (0.085) (0.051) (0.061)
Part 0.089*** 0.189*** 0.045*** 0.146***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.025)
Contract_Type 0.058*** 0.101*** 0.038*** 0.103***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015)
Work_Climate 0.019*** 0.017** -0.018*** -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Work_Time 0.012* 0.018** 0.029*** 0.019***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Work_Task -0.057*** -0.049*** 0.044*** 0.033***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011)
Work_Stab -0.009 -0.020** 0.020*** 0.031***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006)
Married -0.003 0.102*** 0.049*** 0.058***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014)
Italian -0.111 0.027 0.219*** 0.175**
(0.082) (0.073) (0.061) (0.069)
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North 0.119*** 0.109*** 0.031*** 0.038***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Centre 0.105*** 0.092*** -0.008 0.008
(0.022) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012)
Homeowner 0.012 -0.027* 0.021** 0.036***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013)
Educ_Fath_Uni -0.010 -0.000 0.015 0.008
(0.028) (0.025) (0.014) (0.015)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.047 0.023 0.047*** -0.055***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.018) (0.020)
Home_Time -0.005* -0.000 0.015*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
λOverPA 0.094** 1.318**
(0.044) (0.546)
λOverOV 0.498*** 0.478***
(0.135) (0.120)
λProperPA 0.049** 0.044
(0.022) (0.157)
λProperOV -0.351*** -0.260***
(0.083) (0.095)
Constant 1.609*** 1.789*** -0.612*** -0.292
(0.287) (0.279) (0.233) (0.273)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,481 6,775 16,245 12,677
R-squared 0.155 0.230 0.355 0.360
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Chapter 4
Detailed RIF Decomposition with
Selection
– The Gender Pay Gap in Italy
4.1 Introduction
Gender differences in pay are a well-known phenomenon of modern labor markets. Despite
the promotion of equal-pay legislation and equal-pay opportunities, differences in pay
between men and women persist (Blau and Kahn, 1992; 2003; 2006; 2016; Goldin, 2014;
Kahn, 2015). Adding to the broad literature on the Gender Pay Gap (GPG), research
has recently focused on the estimation of the wage gap beyond the mean (Albrecht et al.,
2003; 2009; Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly, 2005a; 2005b; Lucifora and Meurs 2006;
Arulampalam et al., 2007; Longhi et al., 2012; Xiu and Gunderson, 2014). Analyzing
the GPG along the wage distribution allows to gain additional insights compared to the
mean estimation. In particular, the phenomena of glass ceiling and sticky floors, i.e. more
pronounced pay gaps at the top and bottom of the wage distribution, have been revealed
using quantile-regression approaches. Hence, estimation beyond the mean allows to study
gender wage inequality across the wage distribution. The standard approach in modern
labor economics when it comes to decomposition methods is the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder
(1973) method. Advantages of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition are its relatively simple
implementation and intuitive approach.1 In the literature, the unexplained component, i.e.
1The method is easy to implement as it is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and by decomposing
the pay gap in an explained and unexplained part, it provides an intuitive interpretation of the results.
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the part due to differences in coefficients, is thereby identified as a major contributor to the
wage gap (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2016). A detailed decomposition allows to gain information
on the contribution of various personal, labor market or job characteristics to the GPG.
However, it implies additional functional form restrictions to identify the various elements of
the detailed decomposition. This holds in particular, when the decomposition is conducted
beyond the mean (Fortin et al., 2011; Longhi et al., 2012). A popular approach is the method
proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) based on Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR).
The detailed decomposition, however, is path dependent, i.e. the order of the decomposition
matters (Fortin et al., 2011). Moreover, the method is computationally intense as it calculates
the entire conditional wage distribution and uses simulation techniques to calculate the
counterfactuals. Most importantly, the method based on standard CQRs does not allow
for the unconditional mean interpretation. The latter, however, is used in Oaxaca-Blinder
type decompositions. Despite the estimation beyond the mean, it is important to control for
group-specific sample selection. Indeed, gender differences occur when it comes to labor
market participation (Heckman, 1979). Biases due to differences between men and women
in the propensity to work may be important in determining the GPG and failure to account
for this bias may result in inaccurate and biased estimation of the gender-specific wage
equations. Consequently, also the components of the pay differential may be biased. The
underlying study is applied on Italian microdata. The Italian case is particularly interesting
for the study of sample selection as gender differences in labor market participation are
particularly pronounced in Italy. The female labor force participation in Italy amounted to
50.6% in 2015, while the EU-28 average was at more than 64.0% in the same year (Eurostat,
2017a). Albrecht et al. (2009) extend the method by Machado and Mata (2005) to account for
sample selection showing that sample selection along the wage distribution is important when
considering pay differences between full- and part-time female employees in the Netherlands.
This paper uses linear Recentered-Influence-Function Ordinary Least Squares (RIF-OLS)
regressions to estimate Mincer-type wage equations for men and women (Firpo et al., 2009b).
Estimation at specific-quantiles is thereby based on Unconditional Quantile Regression
(UQR).2 The method has the advantage that it allows to compute a detailed decomposition
in a path-independent way and that it allows for the unconditional mean interpretation
of the coefficient estimates.3 In case of concerns of nonlineartiy, the method may be
combined with a reweighting scheme. For robustness, we apply the reweighting scheme
proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) and show that the results do not change significantly.
2Firpo et al. (2009b) despite RIF-OLS propose also RIF-Logit and a fully nonparametric estimator RIF-NP.
3Contrary to the approach by (e.g. Machado and Mata, 2005).
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The main part of the paper focuses on the extension of the quantile-specific RIF-OLS
decomposition to account for selection into employment. Thereby, consistent estimates of
the components of the GPG along the wage distribution are obtained. The method by Firpo
et al. (2009b) is one of the very few approaches allowing to conduct detailed Oaxaca-
Blinder type decompositions beyond the mean. Thereby, the model allows to calculate the
significance of gender differences in endowments as well as in coefficients at different points
of the wage distribution. In the extended model, the selection effect can be attributed to
the endowments and coefficients part, respectively, explicitly showing the contribution of
(otherwise) unobservable characteristics to the different parts of the GPG. The selection
correction terms are estimated using both parametric and semiparametric single-index models.
The semiparametric binary choice models applied are the Ichimura (1993) and Klein and
Spady (1993) models. The parametric model estimates the incidence of employment via
probit estimation. Sample-selection bias correction is generally conducted via parametric
regression models such as maximum likelihood probit or logit, which assume normally
distributed errors. However, distributional assumptions may play an important role in
sample selection models (Martins, 2001). Semiparametric binary choice estimators, such
as the Ichimura and Klein-Spady estimator, do not require any distributional assumptions.
The semiparametric selection correction terms obtained are then, via polynomial regression,
included in the respective wage equations correcting for selection bias at the specific quantiles.
As the semiparametric models applied are computationally costly, a two-point wild-bootstrap
test based on Horowitz and Härdle (1994) compares the estimation results of the parametric
and semiparametric binary choice models. The test rejects the probit specification against the
semiparametric models.
In line with the literature, differences of the GPG throughout the wage distribution are
found. The results suggest glass ceiling and less pronounced sticky floors. Gender wage
inequality across the wage distribution is measured by the change in the GPG across the
wage distribution. In this paper, we focus on the 90th, 50th and 10th percentiles. Thus, for
the gender wage inequality measure, we estimate the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 wage gaps.4
Despite measuring wage inequality between men and women using the change of the GPG
at different quantiles, estimation of the variance or gini is also possible (see for example
Fortin et al., 2011). The present work focuses on the difference between quantile-specific
wage gaps as the phenomena of glass ceiling and sticky floors are particularly relevant when
studying gender pay differences across the wage distribution. Indeed, they have been heavily
4For example, the 90-10 wage gap is the difference between the GPG at the 90th and the GPG at the 10th
percentile.
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discussed in the literature (Albrecht et al., 2003; Arulampalam, 2007; Xiu and Gunderson,
2014; Cardoso et al., 2016). The detailed decomposition reveals that different categories of
covariates such as educational attainment, labor market characteristics or socio-demographic
characteristics contribute in distinct ways to the gender gaps at as well as to the change of the
gaps between different quantiles. Similarly, the respective categories contribute differently to
the explained (endowments effect) or unexplained part (coefficients effect) of the respective
pay gaps. The results show that selection effects explain a substantial part of the GPG
that would otherwise remain unobserved or be attributed to discrimination. Moreover, the
contribution of the selection component to the GPG varies across the wage distribution. The
selection-corrected decomposition suggests that sample selection substantially contributes to
gender differences in pay along the earnings distribution.
The major contribution of this paper is the extension of the method proposed by Firpo
et al. (2009b) to control for sample selection bias and secondly the empirical application of
the method to Italy. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, the estimation strategy
is presented. Section 4.3 outlines the model extension with sample selection correction.
Section 4.4 describes the data set used in the analysis and provides the empirical results.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
The decomposition proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) is very popular when it
comes to analyzing mean wage differences by groups. In fact, the Oaxaca-Blinder decompo-
sition has become one of the work horses in applied economics (Fortin et al., 2011). Using
assumptions of linearity and zero-conditional mean, the approach allows to decompose pay
gaps between groups in detail. The method is relatively easy to implement and estimated
via OLS. However, the method allows only the estimation at the mean.5 In the literature,
various extensions have been proposed in order to be able to decompose the GPG beyond
the mean (e.g. Juhn et al., 1993; Donald et al., 2000; Machado and Mata, 2005). The
majority of the literature focuses on CQR models (e.g. Buchinsky, 1998; Machado and Mata,
2005). Several of these approaches calculate the aggregate decomposition only and rely
on various assumptions as well as are computationally intense. The latter is in particular
an issue of the detailed (and not for the aggregate decomposition) beyond the mean. The
method proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) that is reconsidered or applied inter alia
by Albrecht et al. (2003) and Melly (2005a; 2005b) allows to conduct a detailed Oaxaca-
5The Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition is outlined in detail in Appendix 4.A.
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Blinder type decomposition beyond the mean.6 The approach is based on CQRs and assigns
to the decomposition the effect of each single covariate for a distributional statistic (quantile,
variance or gini) other than the mean. However, the method is generally path dependent,
i.e. the decomposition outcome depends on the order in which the decomposition is per-
formed (Fortin et al., 2011). In the underlying investigation, UQRs of RIFs are used to obtain
a Oaxaca-Blinder type detailed decomposition beyond the mean (Firpo et al., 2009b). In
the RIF-OLS model applied here, similar to the assumptions in the classical Oaxaca-Blinder
method and the Machado-Mata approach, linearity is assumed. The method based on RIF
regressions is, as well as the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, path independent in
the sense of Gelbach (2016). The main advantage of the UQR model over the CQR model is
that it allows for the unconditional mean interpretation. The latter is used in Oaxaca-Blinder
decompositions and is particularly interesting for policy evaluation as it estimates the effect
of regressors on the entire (unconditional) wage distribution (Borah and Basu, 2013). CQRs
analyze effects over the conditional wage distribution and hence are applicable only to
subgroups of the target population.7 In cases of concerns of model misspecification due to
nonlinearity, the analysis can be repeated with a semiparametric reweighting scheme.8 The
combination of the RIF-OLS decomposition with a semiparametric reweighting estimator
proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) allows to solve the problem of potential misspecification
of the RIF-OLS model if linearity does not hold. The analysis shows only small differences
when using the Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition based on RIF-OLS without or with
reweighting. In particular, the specification and reweighting errors are small. In Section 4.4.3,
we illustrate that the decomposition outcome with and without reweighting are similar and
that the the specification error due to potential nonlinearity is small. This implies that using
the RIF-OLS yields a good estimate of the Unconditional Partial Quantile Effect (UQPE).9
As the main focus of this paper is quantile-specific selection correction and as the estimates
do not change significantly in the linear or non-linear model, in the following the estimation
approach using RIF-OLS is outlined and then extended to allow for sample selectivity. The
paper extends the RIF-OLS model such that it corrects the wage model for selection bias at
the corresponding quantile. It is accounted for sample selectivity issues using three distinct
6Albrecht et al. (2003) and Melly (2005a; 2005b) refer to the working paper version of Machado and Mata
(2005).
7For illustration, we compare estimates of the gender wage penalty obtained from CQRs and UQRs in
Section 4.4.2.
8Indeed, if the assumption of linearity in the RIF-OLS does not hold, the model is misspecified. The
estimation procedure with reweighting is outlined in Appendix 4.B. The results of the method without and with
reweighting are summarized in Section 4.4.3.
9Firpo et al. (2009b) find that RIF-OLS estimates compared to RIF-Logit and the completely nonlinear
RIF-NP estimates are very similar for the effect of union membership on log wages.
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binary choice models; probit, Ichimura (1993) and Klein and Spady (1993). Even though
the semiparametric Ichimura and Klein-Spady models are computationally costly, the paper
focuses on these models for sample correction as distributional assumptions may be important
in sample-selection processes (Martins, 2001; Frölich, 2006). Indeed, a specification test
rejects the parametric selection model and the semiparametric approaches are found to be,
especially at lower quantiles, more informative.10 Using the proposed extension allows to
compute the selection-adjusted quantile-specific Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition of the
GPG showing explicitly the contribution of sample selectivity to the quantile-specific GPGs.
4.2.1 RIF Regressions at Quantiles
The RIF-OLS regression model allows to estimate the effect of explanatory variables, X , on
the unconditional quantile, Qτ , of an outcome variable, Y . The RIF is estimated in quantile
regressions by first calculating the sample quantile Qˆτ and computing the density at Qˆτ , that
is f (Qˆτ) using kernel methods (Firpo et al., 2009b). Moreover, this approach relies on the
indicator function 1{Y ≤ Qτ} taking value one if the condition in {·} is true, zero otherwise.
Estimates for each observation i of the RIF, R̂IF(Yi;Qτ), are then obtained by inserting Qˆτ
and f (Qˆτ) in the aggregate RIF-function, defined as:
RIF(Y ;Qτ) = Qτ + IF(Y ;Qτ)
= Qτ +
τ−1{Y ≤ Qτ}
fY (Qτ)
=
1
fY (Qτ)
1{Y > Qτ}+Qτ − 1fY (Qτ)(1− τ) (4.1)
where the RIF is the first order approximation of the quantile Qτ . IF(Y ;Qτ) represents the
influence function for the τ th quantile. It measures the influence of an individual observation
on the τth quantile. Adding the quantile Qτ to the influence function yields the RIF. The
probability density of Y evaluated at Qτ is fY (Qτ).
Firpo et al. (2009b) model the conditional expectation of the RIF-regression function,
E[RIF(Y ;Qτ)|X ], as a function of explanatory variables, X , in the UQR:
E[RIF(Y ;Qτ)|X ] = gQτ (X) (4.2)
where a linear function Xβτ is specified for gQτ(X) as for example in Borah and Basu
(2013). The average derivative of the UQR, EX
[dgQτ (X)
dX
]
, captures the marginal effect of a
10The specification test is outlined in Section 4.4.4.
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small location shift in the distribution of covariates on the τth unconditional quantile of Y
keeping everything else constant. Therefore, the coefficients, βτ , can be unconditionally
interpreted, as E[RIF(Y ;Qτ)] =EX
[
E
(
RIF(Y ;Qτ)|X
)]
=E(X)βτ . That is the unconditional
expectations E[RIF(Y ;Qτ)] using the Law of Iterated Expectations (LIE) allow for the
unconditional mean interpretation. In contrast, only the conditional mean interpretation is
valid in the context of CQRs; Qτ(Y |X) = XβCQRτ , where βCQRτ can be interpreted as the
effect of X on the τth conditional quantile of Y given X . The LIE does not apply here;
Qτ ̸= EX [Qτ(Y |X)] = E(X)βCQRτ , where Qτ is the unconditional quantile. Hence, βCQRτ
cannot be interpreted as the effect of increasing the mean value of X in the unconditional
quantile Qτ . This is one pitfall of CQRs in decomposition methods. The unconditional mean
interpretation is important for decompositions in the sense of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder
(1973). Indeed, Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions use the unconditional mean interpretation of
βτ , i.e. the interpretation of βτ as the effect of increasing the mean value of X on the mean
value of Y . In UQR, the coefficients βτ can thus be estimated by OLS in the following way:
Qτ = E[RIF(Y ;Qτ)] = EX
[
E
(
RIF(Y ;Qτ)|X
)]
= E(X)βτ (4.3)
The basic wage equation of the RIF-OLS model at quantile τ , with τ ∈ (0,1), is then:
RIF(Y ;Qτ) = Xβτ +uτ (4.4)
where Y is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings and X is a vector of K explanatory
variables (including the constant), βτ is the corresponding coefficient vector and uτ is the
corresponding error term. The coefficient vector of the unconditional quantile is defined as:
βˆτ = (
N
∑
i=1
X ′i Xi)
−1
N
∑
i=1
X ′i R̂IF(Yi;Qτ) (4.5)
UQRs estimate the effect of covariates on all parts of the earnings distribution and are
thus particularly interesting for policy implications or evaluation. CQRs do not allow to draw
conclusions about the impact of a variable on the overall earnings distribution but rather
provide insights about the dispersion of earnings within different subgroups of the target
population (Borah and Basu, 2013).
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4.2.2 Decomposition
Given the assumptions that the mean of the RIF-function is equal to the actual quantile as
well as to the mean of the conditional expectation given X shown in equation (4.3), we have:
E[RIF(YM;Qτ)|XM]−E[RIF(YF ;Qτ)|XF ] = X¯MβMτ − X¯FβFτ
= ∆τ
where ∆ˆτ is the GPG at the τth quantile and M = Male and F = Female.
The GPG is, as in the standard two-fold Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, decomposed in
an endowments (explained) and a coefficients (unexplained) component. The decomposition
has then the following form:
∆ˆτ = ∆ˆEτ + ∆ˆCτ
= (X¯M− X¯F)βˆF,τ + X¯M(βˆM,τ − βˆF,τ) (4.6)
where the index E indicates the Endowments Effect and the index C the Coefficients Effect.
To perform a detailed decomposition, the contribution of each element of the vector
of explanatory variables X¯ on both components is estimated. For identification, a detailed
decomposition underlies thus stronger assumptions such as functional form restrictions as
well as potentially further restrictions on the distribution of the error term. An example is
the assumption of independence of the set of covariates and the dummy identifying group
membership (Fortin et al., 2011). In the RIF-OLS model, the detailed components can be
estimated in the same way as in the detailed Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean.
However, as in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean, the decomposition based
on RIF-OLS changes according to the choice of the reference category (Reimers, 1983;
Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). We follow the standard case
and use male coefficients as the non-discriminatory wage structure. As in standard detailed
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions at the mean, the contribution of the single regressors to the
components of the GPG are path independent also in the RIF-OLS framework.
4.3 Accounting for Selection
The estimation strategy outlined in Section 4.2.1 yields inconsistent and biased estimates
of the wage equation and hence of the decomposition parts due to non-randomness of the
sample (Heckman, 1979; 1990; Buchinsky, 1998; Albrecht et al., 2009). Indeed, the observed
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individuals with a positive labor income may be a non-random subsample of the individuals
in the population. As the origin of the selection could be related to earnings, it is essential to
explicitly consider the selection process in the estimation of the wage equation. The selection
into wage work may depend on some positive factors such as individual ability, motivation
or educational quality, raising both, the probability of being employed and wages. However,
it is omitted in the earnings equation as these factors are unobservable in the data. The
incidence of receiving a wage offer may not only be non-random but also different for men
and women. Using the proposed extension of the quantile-specific wage model allows to
obtain consistent estimates as well as to attribute the selection effect to the endowments and
coefficients part of the quantile-specific GPGs. The estimation procedure consists, similar
to Heckman (1979), of two steps. In a first-step estimation, the semiparametric estimator of
the selection parameter is estimated. In a second-step regression, the selectivity-corrected
model is estimated. The main difference compared to Heckman (1979) is that here the
estimated selection terms are estimated with distribution-free approaches rather than by a
parametric method (Newey, 2009). Moreover, instead of using only the traditional Inverse
Mills Ratio (IMR), an approximation function is used.
The selection decision of interest is the employees’ work decision. The decision is
identified by the indicator variable Ei, which is equal to one if individual i is in employment
and zero otherwise. The reservation wage, Y resi , is not observed but we observe, whether
the difference between the market wage, Yi, and Y resi is positive or not. Hence, Ei = 1 if
Yi−Y resi > 0, Ei = 0 otherwise. In a first-step estimation, the selection equation of the
single-index model is estimated with Semiparametric Least Squares (SLS) and reads as:11
Ei = m(Ziγ)+ vi (4.7)
where Zi is a 1×T vector of regressors influencing the employment decision with t = 0, . . . ,T .
The corresponding parameters are contained in the T ×1 column vector γ and vi is the usual
additive error term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with Zi. The function m(·) is
an unknown link or smooth function. Contrary to parametric models, in semiparametric
single-index models, not only γ but also m(·) must be estimated.12 The set of covariates
Z includes at least one variable not included in X and uncorrelated with the log of hourly
11The parametric selection equation has the following form: Ei = Ziγ+ vi.
12The general form of single-index models is: Ei = m
(
φ(Zi,γ)
)
+ vi, where m(·) is the unknown smooth
function and φ(·) is a known parametric function with T regressors, and coefficient vector γ having dimension
P×1 (Ichimura, 1993; Henderson and Parmeter, 2015). As φ(Zi,γ) is a scalar, it is necessarily single index.
Similar to many other studies, we assume a linear single-index, and thus the number of regressors and parameters
are equal, i.e. T = P.
137
wages Y (the underlying dependent variable) but influencing the work decision. This is
important for identification of the selection decision. Moreover, if the regressors in Z are not
different from the variables in X , the selectivity-corrected regression will be highly collinear.
Semiparametric single-index models (such as the Ichimura and Klein-Spady model) are quite
popular in nonparametric estimation as they work similar to parametric models (Henderson
and Parmeter, 2015). However, no distributional assumptions are required to set up these
models, while in the probit model, the standard normal distribution is assumed. Using the
semiparametric single-index models that do not require any distributional assumptions allows
to circumvent potential bias of the selection-correction terms due to non-normality of the
selection process. Indeed, distributional assumptions may be important when considering
sample-selection processes (Martins, 2001).
The semiparametric single-index models used to estimate the selection equation are
iterative procedures and hence are computationally heavy given that nonparametric kernel
estimation is conducted at each iteration. For the estimation, the second-order Gaussian
kernel is used and the bandwidth is selected by likelihood cross-validation. The SLS estimator
is consistent and independent of the distribution of v (Buchinsky, 1998). The Klein-Spady
model achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound for binary choice models, while the
Ichimura estimator is inefficient if the model suffers from heteroskedasticity (Ichimura,
1993).13 Buchinsky (1998), as well as Albrecht et al. (2009) and Chzhen and Mumford
(2011) use power series estimation in order to estimate the correction term in the CQR model.
We replace the power series by polynomials of order j.14 The following polynomial of order
j is estimated:
hˆτ(mˆ) = δˆτPS(mˆ) (4.8)
where PS(mˆ) is a polynomial vector in m:
PS(mˆ) =
[
PS1(mˆ), . . . ,PSJ(mˆ)
]
and PS j(mˆ) = λ (ZAγˆ) j with j= 1,2, . . . ,J. The correction term hˆτ(mˆ) is an approximation of
the unknown function for selection correction; hˆτ(mˆ)→ hτ(m) as the number of parameters
goes to infinity. The nonlinear function λ is the standard IMR15 and δˆ are the corresponding
13The probit estimate is efficient under normally distributed errors (e.g. Buchinsky, 1998).
14Using orthogonal polynomials allows to rule out multicollinearity issues (see Newey, 2009, for further
details).
15with λ = φ(·)Φ(·) being the usual IMR; φ(·) is the probability density function,Φ(·) the cumulative distribution
function.
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coefficient estimates, which vary with the specific quantile τ . The index A denotes individuals
accepting a wage offer. The parameter estimates γˆ are estimated via semiparametric single-
index methods (Ichimura and Klein-Spady). The correction was shown to be asymptotically
normal (Newey, 2009). In this study second-order polynomials are used as polynomials
allow for more flexibility than standard parametric selection models (Carneiro et al., 2011;
Cornelissen et al., 2016). Even though second-order polynomials rule out a nonmonotonic
shape of hˆ(·), we focus on polynomials of order two as higher order polynomials may become
instable at the boundaries of the data space (Harrell, 2015).
Estimation of semiparametric selection models in the way described above does not
allow for identification of the level of the constant and the first reported continuous vari-
able (Buchinsky, 1998).16 Therefore, we normalize the respective coefficients from the
semiparametric single-index estimations to the corresponding parameter estimates obtained
from the probit model.17 This way of normalizing the coefficients allows also for a better
comparison of the Ichimura and Klein-Spady estimation outcome with the probit estimation
outcome (Albrecht et al., 2009; Chzhen and Mumford, 2011). We have then the following
expression:
hˆ∗τ(mˆ
∗) = δˆ ∗τ PS(mˆ
∗) (4.9)
with PS j(mˆ∗)= λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗) j, where Z∗A =(1,ZA,1,ZA,T−2) and γˆ
∗=(γˆ∗0 , γˆ
∗
1 , γˆT−2)
T include the
normalized constant γˆ∗0 as well as the normalized coefficient estimate of the first continuous
variable γˆ∗1 from the selection decision. The coefficient vector γˆT−2 includes all the remaining
parameter estimates from the single-index models. The (nonlinear) function or the IMR,
λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗), is estimated and depends on the normalized constant, the normalized coefficient
estimate of the first continuous variable in Z as well as on the other variables in Z, δˆ ∗τ contains
the corresponding coefficient estimates.
In the second-step estimation, the function for selection correction hˆ∗τ(·) is included in the
basic wage equation, i.e. equation (4.4), correcting for selection at the τ th quantile. Thereby,
hˆ∗τ(·) acts as the IMR does in the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure but is quantile-specific
and does not require any distributional assumptions of the error terms of the selection process.
16The semiparametric estimators require scale and local normalization (Buchinsky, 1998; Newey, 2009).
17For an overview of normalization in single-index models see for example Cameron and Trivedi (2009).
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The wage equation corrected for selectivity bias at the τth quantile with j = 2 looks as
follows:
R̂IF(Y ;Qτ) = X βˆτ + hˆ∗τ(mˆ
∗)+ εˆτ
= X βˆτ + δˆ ∗τ PS(mˆ
∗)+ εˆτ
= X βˆτ + δˆ ∗1τλ
∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)1+ δˆ ∗2τλ
∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)2+ εˆτ (4.10)
where Y is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings and X is a vector of K explanatory
variables, the selection correction term λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗) j is a function evaluated at Z∗Aγˆ
∗. The
corresponding coefficient vectors are βˆτ and δˆ ∗jτ with j = 1,2. For equation (4.10) to hold,
the following assumptions are made. The reservation and the market wage depend on
unobservables, the joint distribution of u and v is continuous and the probability of observing
a positive difference (Y −Y res) given Z, depends only on Zγ .18 The selectivity-corrected
coefficient estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal distributed. This holds under
the assumption that the second-stage estimation successfully corrects for the selection bias
(see Appendix 4.C for further details). The consistent coefficient estimates are then obtained
from RIF-OLS regression of R̂IF(Y ;Qτ) on X , λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)1 and λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)2.
The parametric selection correction is conducted as in the standard OLS model adjusted
for sample selectivity, i.e. the IMR is added as a regressor to the earnings equation (Heck-
man, 1979). The RIF-OLS model with parametric selection correction is presented in
Appendix 4.D.
4.4 Empirical Application
4.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on the survey PLUS19 from the Italian Institute for the
Development of Vocational Training for Workers (ISFOL). The survey is particularly relevant
for the study of wage inequality by gender as it delivers broad information on the personal
working profiles and individual motivation of the interviewees.
The underlying study uses the complete release of panel dimension.20 The estimation
is based on a pooled regression model including wave or year dummies as explanatory
18Similar to the assumptions made by Buchinsky (1998) for sample correction in CQRs.
19PLUS = Participation, Labor, Unemployment Survey
20Up to now, ISFOL has released the following data waves of the survey PLUS: 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2011, 2014.
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variables. Individuals enter as well as leave the sample (through attrition). Hence, the
composition of the sample changes. The analysis is restricted to the private sector only
as there has been a general ‘wage freeze’ in the Italian public sector at the beginning
of the 21st century (Bordogna, 2012; Piazzalunga and Di Tommaso, 2015). This policy
disproportionately affected women as women are more likely to work in the public sector.
Consequently, the policy influenced the GPG. The analysis focuses on employees working
at least 15 and maximally 45 hours per week. Self-employed, students, pensioners as well
as other inactive and involuntarily unemployed individuals are excluded from the analysis.
The selection decision of interest is thus the employment or work decision from search or
voluntary unemployment. We consider only labor income from the main job (defined as the
job that pays the highest wage). After deleting observations with missing values on other
variables of interest, we are left with a sample size of 24,267 individual wage observations in
the private sector21, of which 11,390 are female and 12,877 are male. This study uses the log
of hourly wage as dependent variable. It is defined as the net monthly wage perceived divided
by the number of actual working hours. An alternative are monthly gross earnings, which,
however, are almost entirely missing (98.0% of all observations are missing). As a second
alternative, gross annual earnings could be used. However, dividing gross annual earnings by
the number of months in a calendar year (plus an additional 13th month), gives a difference
amounting on average to more than 800 Euros per month between the artificially created
monthly gross income and the reported monthly gross income. Therefore, we prefer to use
the monthly-based net income as dependent variable. Individuals with children are granted
tax credits in Italy.22 As the tax credit is granted yearly, it does not impact on the monthly
perceived net income and hence having children does not directly affect monthly perceived
net wages in Italy. The explanatory variables used in the regression analysis are grouped
in the following categories: Education, Experience, Job Characteristics, Occupations and
Industries, Socio-Demographic Background and Selection. The set of regressors labeled
Education contains variables controlling for the level of educational attainment as well as for
excellence in education. The category Experience includes labor market experience and labor
market experience squared as well as job tenure. Job Characteristics include job-specific
variables such as wage compensatings (the level of satisfaction with the working climate,
with work place stability, with the working time as well as with the tasks at the current job).
These job characteristics influence the level of (net hourly) wages as employers offering lower
2117,798 observations of the public sector have been dropped. The sample initially consists of 159,615
observations in total.
22In order to be eligible to the grant, annual gross earnings need to be below 95,000 Euro (see Worldwide
Tax Summaries (2017) for further information).
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wages, may compensate their employees with more satisfactory job characteristics (Filer,
1985). Additionally, dummies controlling for the kind of contract (part-time and unlimited)
are included. The set of explanatory variables Occupations and Industries contains sectoral
and occupational dummies, while the category Socio-Demographic Background contains
geographic controls as well as a dummy accounting for whether the individual holds the
Italian citizenship. The category controls also for the family status (married or not) and the
educational background of the parents (whether they have graduated from university). This
category controls for any potential labor-market favoritism or discrimination coming from
informal social networks. Indeed, informal networks may be important in Italy and may
directly influence the wage level (Pistaferri, 1999).23 Time-varying characteristics are caught
by wave dummies and are included in this category.24 The category Selection contains the
selection correction terms. A complete list of variables used in the study along with their
categories and definitions can be found in Appendix 4.E, Table 4.E.1.
Table 4.1 reports means and standard deviations for some of the variables included in
the analysis. Women have on average higher educational attainment than men, while men
have more years of labor market experience (Exper) and work on average longer for the
same firm (Tenure) than women. The underlying sample shows no huge differences in the
level of satisfaction with particular job characteristics between men and women. However,
differences in the type of contract are found. Women have much more often than men a
part-time contract, while male employees have more often an unlimited contract than female
employees. There are no significant differences in geographic indicators between women
and men (North and Centre). Most of the individuals observed are Italian citizens (Italian).
Men and women are relatively equal in terms of marriage (Married) as well as in having
children at all (Kids). Yet, female employees have more often children with less than ten
years (Kids_10) compared to male employees. Female workers engaged in the labor market
are about four years younger than male employees (Age). The variables Age, Kids and
Kids_10 are included in the selection equation only.
23Individuals with access to these networks are more likely to obtain more attractive and thus generally
better-paying jobs.
24If not stated differently, the category Occupations and Industries contains sectoral dummies and the
category Socio-Demographic Background contains year or wave dummies.
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Education
Elementary_School 0.015 0.120 0.016 0.127
High_School 0.584 0.493 0.590 0.492
University_Degree 0.251 0.433 0.165 0.371
Max_D_Mark 0.039 0.194 0.020 0.139
Experience
Exper 13.942 11.307 17.813 13.396
Tenure 8.380 8.861 11.992 11.636
Job Characteristics
Work_Climate 3.079 0.852 3.055 0.825
Work_Stab 2.937 0.982 2.985 0.949
Work_Time 3.022 0.849 3.021 0.806
Work_Task 3.043 0.777 3.009 0.771
Part 0.251 0.434 0.054 0.227
Contract_Type 0.761 0.426 0.818 0.386
Occupations
Manager 0.111 0.314 0.111 0.314
Intermed Prof 0.555 0.497 0.405 0.491
Socio-Demographic Background
North 0.554 0.497 0.522 0.500
Centre 0.211 0.408 0.198 0.398
Italian 0.988 0.110 0.995 0.074
Married 0.480 0.500 0.446 0.497
Age 34.920 10.508 37.866 12.901
Kids 0.481 0.500 0.461 0.498
Kids_10 0.300 0.458 0.230 0.421
Observations 11,390 12,877
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4.4.2 The Effect of Women on Earnings and Raw GPGs
It is a well-known result in the literature that women perceive lower wages than men – other
things equal (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1992; 2003; England, 2006; Grove et al., 2011). Table 4.2
shows the unadjusted GPG at the mean and at different quantiles (Panel A) as well as the
90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 wage gap (Panel B). The raw mean GPG in log hourly wages in the
underlying sample amounts to 11.8 percentage points. Arulampalam et al. (2007) find for the
Italian private sector in the period 1995-2001 a mean wage gap between men and women
equal to 15.3 percentage points. They find a GPG amounting to 14.5 percentage points at
the 10th percentile, to 13.0 percentage points at the 50th percentile and to 19.4 percentage
points at the 90th percentile.25 In the underlying sample quantile-specific GPGs are equal
to 11.7, 10.0 and 17.9 percentage points at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile, respectively.
Glass ceiling and sticky floors are assumed to exist in an economy, when the 90th and 10th
percentile GPG, respectively, exceeds the reference percentile wage gap by at least two
percentage points (e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2007). Indeed, Table 4.2 shows that class ceiling
is found in the underlying study for the Italian private sector; the 90th percentile wage gap
exceeds the 10th percentile GPG by 6.2 percentage points and the 90th percentile wage gap
exceeds the median pay gap by almost 8.0 percentage points. The 10th percentile pay gap
lies slightly above the 50th pay gap (the 50-10 wage gap is slightly negative). As the 50-10
wage gap is slightly lower than 2 percentage points (in absolute terms), only weak evidence
for sticky floors is found. This result is in line with the finding of Arulampalam et al. (2007)
finding a 50-10 wage gap of -1.9 percentage points for the Italian private sector. Hence, the
pay gap between men and women varies significantly between the top and bottom or median
and the bottom and median of the wage distribution. Yet, in the latter case, the difference is
less pronounced. This finding underlines the importance of considering the GPG at different
quantiles and not only at the mean. Indeed, policy implications may change according to
whether the gap at different quantiles or at the mean is considered. In particular, not only the
magnitude of the raw GPG but also the decomposition may vary across the wage distribution.
Similarly, selection effects may change across the distribution. Even when assuming that men
and women have the same set of observable labor market characteristics, i.e. considering the
unexplained component26, there is a substantial (adjusted) GPG at the mean as well as along
the wage distribution due to differences in returns to observable labor market characteristics
25Eurostat finds for the period considered in this study (2005-2014) an average raw GPG in hourly wages
equal to 5.6% for Italy as a whole, i.e. for the public and private sector (Eurostat, 2017b).
26Following the standard set-up of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the female set of labor market
characteristic, X¯F , is used.
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(see Table 4.2, Panel A).27 This implies that the Italian private sector suffers from a wage gap
that is mainly due to the unexplained component, also referred to as discrimination. Even
though the coefficients component, i.e. the portion of the GPG not due to gender differences
in observed characteristics, is generally taken to be an estimate of gender discrimination,
the unexplained portion of the GPG may include effects of unobserved productivity, innate
ability or other unobserved characteristics (Blau and Kahn, 2006). Hence, the unexplained
component or adjusted GPG may change, when it is accounted for sample selection.
Table 4.2 GPG at Different Quantiles and across the Wage Distribution
(a) Panel A: GPG at the Mean and at Different Quantiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean 10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(Unadjusted Gap) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Adjusted GPG 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.097*** 0.160***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Notes: The unadjusted GPG is equal in magnitude to the raw GPG. The adjusted
GPG is the unexplained or coefficients part of the decomposition. The wage gaps
have been estimated using the decomposition model outlined in Section 4.2.2.
(b) Panel B: GPG across the Wage Distribution
(1) (2) (3)
90-10 90-50 50-10
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Notes: The unadjusted change is the change in the unadjusted GPG from the top to
the bottom and median, column (1) and (2), as well as from the median to the bottom
quantile, column (3).
27The full estimation outcome from the standard decomposition at the mean is shown in Table 4.A.1, while
the regression output from the RIF-OLS decomposition is presented in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.3 reports coefficient estimates for the dummy variable female of a Mincer-type
wage model for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile using standard OLS, RIF-OLS and CQR.28
The effect of being a women is, as expected, strictly negative all along the wage distribution
as well as at the mean. According to the OLS estimate, for female employees earnings
are reduced by approximately 11.5 percentage points. The UQR and CQR show as well
that being a women decreases earnings in the corresponding quantile of the conditional or
unconditional earnings distribution. The unconditional (negative) effect of women on log
hourly earnings decreases in absolute terms from the bottom to the median and increases
thereinafter sharply. The conditional effect decreases slightly from the 10th to the 50th
percentile and increases thereafter. Figure 4.1 plots the effect of being female on log hourly
wages for both quantile methods.29 The partial effect from the UQR is highly nonmonotonic,
while the partial effect from the CQR shows almost a linear pattern from the 20th percentile
onwards. Both, Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 show that the magnitude of the estimation results
changes depending on which approach (UQR or CQR) is used.
Table 4.3 OLS, UQR and CQR of Log Hourly Wages – Gender Wage Penalty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
OLS UQR CQR UQR CQR UQR CQR
female -0.122*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.106*** -0.112*** -0.181*** -0.150***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses for OLS
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications, for UQR and CQR
In the following, the detailed decomposition results at specific quantiles as well as
across the wage distribution using the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 wage gaps as inequality
measures are presented. Then, the estimation results of the parametric and semiparametric
binary choice models are outlined and the set-up of the test for equality of the parametric
and semiparametric models as well as the results from the test are discussed. Finally, the
decomposition outcome with selection adjustment is shown.
28The full regression output of the Mincer-type wage model using OLS, UQR and CQR, respectively, is
shown in Appendix 4.F, Table 4.F.1. For all three model specifications, the same set of regressors is used.
29The CQ and UQ partial effects are evaluated at the 0.05, 0.1, 0.15,. . .,0.90, 0.95 quantile, respectively.
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Figure 4.1 UQR and CQR Estimates of the Effect of Women on Log Hourly Wages
4.4.3 RIF-OLS Decomposition along the Wage Distribution without
Selection Adjustment
Table 4.4 shows the decomposition outcome at specific quantiles. Women are found to have
higher observable educational characteristics than men. The difference between men and
women is highest at the top of the wage distribution. In contrast, male employees have
higher experience and job tenure. Again, the difference is highest at the 90th percentile.
Differences in job characteristics as well as in occupations and industries are insignificant
at the bottom but negative at the median and top of the wage distribution. The endowments
effect of socio-demographic background characteristics reduces the GPG slightly all along
the wage distribution. Hence, employed women generally are more often located in the North
or Centre of Italy, come from families with higher educational background and are more
often married compared to men. The total explained part is positive for low-income earners
but negative for median- and top-income earners. However, differences in observable labor
market characteristics between men and women statistically significantly reduce only the 90th
percentile GPG. In terms of the coefficients effect, educational differences between men and
women are insignificant at the bottom, negative at the median and positive at the top of the
wage distribution. Gender differences in coefficients to experience and job tenure are positive
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throughout the wage distribution. Different remuneration to job characteristics between
men and women significantly raises the GPG only at the 90th percentile. Gender-specific
distributional differences in specific occupations or industries have a statistically significant
impact on the coefficients effect all along the wage distribution. Occupational and industrial
gender differences in coefficients are negative at the bottom but positive at the median and top
of the wage distribution. An intuition of the negative coefficient effect due to distributional
differences in occupations and industries between men and women at the 10th percentile
GPG is that women are relatively more likely to self-select themselves in low-income jobs
and hence to receive the adequate formal education for these jobs (e.g. Brekke and Nyborg,
2010). In contrast, men working in the corresponding sector or occupation at the bottom
of the wage distribution have higher probability of not having the adequate formal training
compared to their female colleagues. The consequences are negative coefficient effects due
to distributional differences in occupations and industries. Negative coefficient estimates due
to gender differences in occupations and industries at the bottom of the wage distribution
are also found by other studies (e.g. Xiu and Gunderson, 2014). The coefficients effect of
socio-demographic background characteristics is generally insignificant all along the income
distribution. Consequently, no evidence for gender-based discrimination or favoritism in the
labor market based on informal networks is found in this study. The total unexplained part
is statistically significant and positive throughout the distribution. In particular, it is a main
driver of the GPG at all quantiles considered, while the total explained part is rather small or
even working towards a closure of the gap. The coefficient component includes the constant
term.30
Table 4.5 shows the detailed decomposition results of the different wage inequality
measures (90-10, 90-50 and 50-10, respectively). By looking at the different components of
the inequality measures in terms of the endowments effect, gender differences in educational
attainment is found to reduce wage inequality between the top and bottom or median of the
wage distribution. Statistically significant and positive endowments effects of experience
and tenure are found for the top-bottom and top-median wage gaps. Hence, in terms of the
explained component gender differences in labor market experience and job tenure increase
the 90-10 and 90-50 wage gaps, respectively. Job characteristics as well as occupational
and sectoral differences reduce the difference in the GPG across the wage distribution.
Differences by gender in socio-demographic characteristics have a relevant but small impact
on glass ceiling. All in all, differences in the explained component decrease the difference
30At the bottom and median there is a premia for simply being male. Contrary, on the top there is a premia
for being female.
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between the GPGs at the top and bottom or median of the wage distribution. In line with
the relatively small 50-10 wage gap, gender differences between the median and bottom of
the earnings distribution are found to be rather negligible. By looking at the unexplained
component, positive coefficients of education are found to be a main driver of the gender pay
disparity between high- and low- or median-income earners. Positive gender differences in
returns to experience are found between the 90-10 and 90-50 wage gaps. Similarly, gender
differences in job characteristics contribute statistically significantly to the difference between
the GPG at the 90th and 10th or 50th percentile. Gender differences in coefficients due to
job- and industry-sorting are another driver of gender wage inequality in the Italian private
sector. In contrast, the coefficients effect due to changes in differences in socio-demographic
characteristics between men and women are found to have no statistically significant impact
on the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 pay gaps. The total unexplained component is an important
driver between the pay gaps at the top and bottom or median of the wage distribution.31
In Appendix 4.B, the reweighted decomposition approach is outlined and the decomposi-
tion outcome with reweighting for both the quantile-specific GPG and the gender wage in-
equality measures is shown (Tables 4.B.1–4.B.2). The total reweighting error, (X¯M−X¯M)βˆ rewτ ,
corresponds to the difference between the Total Explained across the UQ Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition and the reweighted-regression decomposition. The reweighting error reflects the
fact that the endowments effect in the decomposition with reweighting is not exactly equal to
the standard endowments effect, i.e. without reweighting. This occurs, when the reweighted
X¯ rew is not exactly equal to X¯ . Figure 4.2 shows the reweghting error and Figure 4.3 the
specification error graphically along the wage distribution. The (total) specification error
is the difference between the Total Unexplained component from the model without and
with reweighting; X¯ rewM (βˆM,τ − βˆ rewM,τ). The specification error is zero if the base model is
truly linear. Both errors are rather small, therefore, we expect the RIF-OLS model without
reweighting not to be misspecified.
31As stated before, the wage structure component contains the constant term. Differences in the constant
term decrease wage inequality from the top to the bottom.
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Table 4.4 RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.066***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Job Characteristics 0.005 -0.004* -0.030***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Occupations and Industries 0.000 -0.001 -0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Total Explained 0.009 -0.001 -0.031***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.040 -0.027*** 0.102***
(0.026) (0.010) (0.023)
Experience 0.012 0.025** 0.123***
(0.026) (0.010) (0.024)
Job Characteristics -0.009 0.009 0.114**
(0.052) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.288*** 0.052** 0.223***
(0.070) (0.026) (0.062)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.012 -0.030 -0.059
(0.111) (0.043) (0.110)
Total Unexplained 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.210***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.5 Gender Wage Inequality – RIF-OLS Decomposition
Results
(1) (2) (3)
90-10 90-50 50-10
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience 0.041** 0.039*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Job Characteristics -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.009*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Occupations and Industries -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.004** -0.004* -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total Explained -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.010
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Coefficients Effect
Education 0.142*** 0.128*** 0.014
(0.027) (0.023) (0.020)
Experience 0.111*** 0.098*** 0.013
(0.027) (0.023) (0.020)
Job Characteristics 0.123** 0.106** 0.017
(0.056) (0.048) (0.041)
Occupations and Industries 0.511*** 0.172*** 0.340***
(0.071) (0.061) (0.052)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.047 -0.029 -0.018
(0.127) (0.109) (0.092)
Total Unexplained 0.102*** 0.110*** -0.008
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Figure 4.2 Endowments Effect with and without Reweigthing
Figure 4.3 Coefficients Effect with and without Reweighting
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4.4.4 Estimation of the Incidence of Employment
Table 4.6 shows the estimation results of the single-index models (probit, Ichimura and
Klein-Spady, respectively). The set of regressors in the selection equations, Z, contains at
least one variable not included in X .32 The following variables are included in the selection
equation only: Age, Age5064, Partner_Works as well as Kids and Kids_10. These regressors
are excluded from the wage equation as they should not influence the wage level directly but
reservation earnings. The controls for having children, Kids, or young children, Kids_10, are
used to identify the employment decision.33 The variables are assumed to affect individual
propensity to be employed but not the level of (log) hourly wages. The logic behind is that
women with children and in particular young children are less likely to accept wage offers
due to child-rearing. In the empirical literature, most studies on the relationship between
fertility and female labor market participation find a negative correlation among child-care
and female labor force participation (Martins, 2001; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008; Lee,
2009; Chang, 2011). Contrary to mothers, fathers have higher employment probability. This
is due to the persistence of the male-breadwinner and mother-caretaker model in particular
in Southern European countries like Italy (Mínguez, 2004). The dummy variable Age5064
is equal to one if the individual’s age is between 50 and 64 years and zero otherwise. Thus,
Age5064 is a proxy for the last career stage. After child-care and -rearing, the employment
probability may increase especially for women. The variable Partner_Works is equal to one
if the spouse or the partner of the individual is employed and zero otherwise. Devereux
(2004) and Bar et al. (2015) find a strong relationship between spousal income and individual
labor market participation or employment decision. Therefore, omitting a control for the
spouse’s or partner’s labor market status from the selection equation would potentially lead
to inconsistent estimates of the wage equation.
The results in Table 4.6 suggest, on the one hand, that with increasing age, women are
more likely to be employed. This may be driven by career breaks due to child-care at earlier
career stages. On the other hand, men’s incidence of employment decreases slightly with
increasing age. Yet, at the final stage of their career both men and women are more likely to
accept wage offers. Higher education raises the probability to work for both men and women.
Individuals living and working in the North or Centre of Italy have higher probability to be
in employment. The positive impact on the probability is highest for employees in Northern
32The set of regressors Z for the employment decision is the same in each binary choice estimation, i.e. in
the probit, Ichimura and Klein-Spady model, respectively.
33For example Chzhen and Mumford (2011) assume that the age of children in the household does not affect
the wage level and use it (inter alia) to identify selection of women in full-time employment in Great Britain.
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Italy. Married women are less likely to be in employment, while married men are more
likely to be employed.34 Holding the Italian citizenship, if significant, has a positive effect
on the incidence of employment for female as well as for male employees. Owning a house
significantly raises employees’ incidence of employment.35 The control for owning a house
includes bank-financed houses. Consequently, individuals paying-off mortgages are more
likely to accept a wage offer. For other house owners, the variable Homeowner, as a proxy for
wealth, controls for wealthier individuals having better networks and hence are more likely
to receive job offers. This increases in turn their likelihood to accept a job offer. Having a
partner or a spouse in employment significantly increases the employment probability for
men in all three models. For women, the effect is negative in the semiparametric models
and positive in the probit estimation. Having children reduces as expected the employment
probability of women, while it raises the employment probability for men. Having young
children is statistically significant and negative for women, while it impacts positively but
statistically insignificantly on the probability of accepting a wage offer for men.36 The
coefficient estimates from the semiparametric single-index models, are comparable to each
other in terms of magnitude. The coefficient estimates of the probit model are relatively
higher compared to the semiparametric binary choice models in absolute terms. Yet, the
signs of the coefficient estimates point generally in the same directions in all three models.
The difference in magnitude in the point estimates in the probit estimation compared to the
outcome from the semiparametric specifications is in line with results obtained by Buchinsky
(1998) or Albrecht et al. (2009) and Chzhen and Mumford (2011).
In order to check whether running the computationally cumbersome semiparametric
methods is worth it, in Section 4.4.4, the estimation results of the semiparametric selection
models are compared with the regression outcome from the parametric selection model using
a two-point wild-bootstrap test based on the idea in Horowitz and Härdle (1994).
34In the semiparametric models, no significant effect of being married on the employment probability for
men is found.
35Except for women in the Klein-Spady model, where owning a house has a negative effect on females’
employment probability.
36In the semiparametric binary choice models, the effect of having young children on the employment
probability for men is statistically significant and negative. Yet, the total effect of having children (Kids and
Kids_10) is positive.
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Table 4.6 Estimation Outcome Incidence of Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women Men
Probit Ichimura Klein-Spady Probit Ichimura Klein-Spady
Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment
Constant -1.335*** -1.335 -1.335 -1.002*** -1.002 -1.002
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Age 0.003** 0.003 0.003 -0.006*** -0.006 -0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age5064 0.598*** 0.334*** 0.320*** 0.259*** 0.035** 0.025***
(0.038) (0.010) (0.015) (0.043) (0.017) (0.003)
Elementary_School -0.070 0.023*** -0.024 -0.354*** -0.021 -0.018***
(0.059) (0.009) (0.023) (0.063) (0.026) (0.006)
High_School 0.410*** 0.153*** 0.141*** 0.189*** 0.007 0.001
(0.023) (0.002) (0.007) (0.022) (0.005) (0.002)
University_Degree 0.410*** 0.166*** 0.208*** 0.088*** -0.003 -0.014***
(0.026) (0.003) (0.010) (0.031) (0.006) (0.003)
North 0.961*** 0.156*** 0.146*** 0.888*** 0.022*** 0.011***
(0.019) (0.002) (0.007) (0.020) (0.005) (0.002)
Centre 0.641*** 0.151*** 0.100*** 0.584*** 0.001 0.003
(0.021) (0.003) (0.008) (0.023) (0.006) (0.003)
Married -0.036 -0.132*** -0.134*** 0.489*** -0.004 -0.001
(0.033) (0.004) (0.010) (0.038) (0.007) (0.004)
Italian 0.338*** -0.006 0.107*** 0.406*** 0.001 0.001
(0.070) (0.007) (0.011) (0.106) (0.037) (0.004)
Homeowner 0.046** 0.010*** -0.031*** 0.213*** 0.022*** 0.007**
(0.019) (0.003) (0.008) (0.022) (0.006) (0.003)
Partner_Works 0.051* -0.010*** -0.031*** 0.167*** 0.012* 0.010***
(0.026) (0.003) (0.009) (0.030) (0.006) (0.003)
Kids -0.220*** -0.164*** -0.096*** 0.162*** 0.049*** 0.018***
(0.029) (0.005) (0.010) (0.029) (0.007) (0.004)
Kids_10 -0.081*** -0.003 -0.037*** -0.012 -0.027*** -0.016***
(0.027) (0.004) (0.010) (0.039) (0.006) (0.004)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,283 30,283 30,283 22,406 22,406 22,406
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Notes: The constant and the Age coefficients in the semiparametric binary choice models have been normalized to
the corresponding values from the parametric probit model.
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Testing for Equality of the Parametric and Semiparametric Binary Choice Model
The results obtained from the different selection models are compared using a modified
version of the Horowitz and Härdle (1994) test proposed in Henderson and Parmeter (2015).
The test compares the parametric with the semiparametric choice model of the employment
decision E on Zγ . The null hypothesis tests whether the parametric model is the correct
specification. In the underlying case, the parametric form is the probit model and hence
H0 = E(Y |X) = F(Zγ), where F(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
The alternative hypothesis is H1 = E(Y |X) = H(Zγ), where H(·) is the unknown smooth
function. The feasible test statistics looks as follows:
THH = {E−F(Zγˆ)}{H(Zγˆ)−F(Zγˆ)} (4.11)
The intuition behind the test is the following: given that H(·) = F(·) holds, the parametric
model is specified correctly and, therefore, should not differ from the semiparametric estimate
of the function. In this case, cumbersome computation of the semiparametric models is not
necessary. Horowitz and Härdle (1994) pre-multiply the right-hand side of equation (4.11)
by a non-negative weighting function that punishes extreme observations. Yet, the test is
sensitive to the choice of the weighting function (Proenca, 1993). In the underlying analysis
bootstrapping is used what makes the weighting unnecessary (Proenca, 1993; Henderson and
Parmeter, 2015). A two-point wild bootstrap in order to calculate the upper-tail bootstrap
p-value is used. The p-values in Table 4.7 reject the parametric model at a 10.0% significance
level in all cases. In comparison with the Ichimura estimation, the probit model is even
rejected at a 1.0% significance level for both men and women.
Table 4.7 Results of the Horowitz-Härdle Test
(1) (2)
p-Value
Female Sample Male Sample
Probit – Ichimura 0.002 0.002
Probit – Klein and Spady 0.067 0.006
Following Martins (2001), Figure 4.4 represents the parametric and semiparametric fit
for men and women, Figure 4.5 shows the respective fits for the full sample. The Figures
show that the probit specification does not capture the behavior of individuals with low index
numbers very well. This is particularly pronounced for women. Hence, the semiparametric
models provide more information on the selection behavior of the individuals in the sample.
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Figure 4.4 Probit and Semiparametric Fit for the Estimated Index by Gender
Figure 4.5 Probit and Semiparametric Fit for the Estimated Index
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4.4.5 RIF-OLS Decomposition along the Wage Distribution with
Selection Adjustment
In this Section, we estimate the selectivity-corrected wage model using second-order polyno-
mials.37 Tables 4.8–4.9 show the detailed decomposition outcome at specific quantiles when
it is accounted for sample selectivity. Table 4.10 summarizes the main result; the unexplained
component of the GPG being the main driver of the pay disparity at the mean as well as
along the wage distribution changes in the case of sample-selection adjustment. The part
generally attributed to discrimination is reduced at the bottom but increased at the top of the
wage distribution. This implies that without selection correction, we overestimate the part
attributed to gender-wage discrimination for low-income earners and underestimate it for
high-income earners.
In fact, gender differences in unobservables are main drivers of the GPG at the 10th
and 50th percentile. Not accounting for sample selection would therefore significantly
underestimate the total explained part at the 10th and 50th percentile. In terms of the
coefficients effect, the results suggest that women are paid more from the same set of
generally unobservable characteristics at the median and top of the wage distribution. At
the bottom, the sign of the selection component in terms of the coefficients effect works
in the opposite direction: men gain more than women from the same set of unobservable
characteristics. Without selection adjustment, the unexplained component is underestimated
at the top but overestimated at the median and bottom. All in all, the selection component is
one of the most important components explaining gender differences in pay along the earnings
distribution. Hence, otherwise unobservable characteristics and individual heterogeneity
contribute significantly to the quantile-specific GPGs. However, the effect differs both in
sign and magnitude at the distinct points of the wage distribution.
Table 4.11 shows that the selection component also significantly contributes to the
variation of the GPG across the earnings distribution. Between the top and bottom, differences
in the selection correction term increase wage inequality. In contrast, gender differences in
unobservable characteristics reduce wage inequality between the top and median and the
median and the bottom of the wage distribution. Different coefficients of unobservables
between men and women decreases wage inequality all along the wage distribution. This
result is driven by higher prices for women given the same set of unobservable characteristics
between men and women at the top of the wage distribution.
37The polynomials are not orthogonal. However, the selection terms used are not collinear; Corr(λ ,λ 2)<
|0.5|.
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In Appendix 4.D, the contribution of the selection component to the GPG at different
quantiles as well as to the change in the GPG across the wage distribution is presented for
the model with parametric selection correction (Tables 4.D.1 –4.D.2, respectively).
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Table 4.8 RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles with Selection – Ichimura
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.068***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Job Characteristics 0.006 -0.004* -0.030***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Occupations and Industries 0.001 -0.000 -0.026***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Selection 0.050*** 0.013*** -0.013
(0.011) (0.004) (0.013)
Total Explained 0.055*** 0.012** -0.042***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.015)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.047* -0.032*** 0.080***
(0.028) (0.010) (0.024)
Experience -0.010 0.024** 0.142***
(0.028) (0.010) (0.026)
Job Characteristics -0.011 0.008 0.118**
(0.052) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.290*** 0.052** 0.225***
(0.070) (0.026) (0.062)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.031 -0.038 -0.060
(0.112) (0.043) (0.110)
Selection 0.599 -0.114 -0.971**
(0.423) (0.165) (0.429)
Total Unexplained 0.062*** 0.088*** 0.221***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.017)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.9 RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles with Selection – Klein-
Spady
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.065***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Job Characteristics 0.006 -0.004* -0.030***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Occupations and Industries 0.001 -0.000 -0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Selection 0.079*** 0.019** -0.006
(0.023) (0.010) (0.027)
Total Explained 0.084*** 0.018* -0.037
(0.023) (0.010) (0.026)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.054* -0.033*** 0.079***
(0.028) (0.010) (0.024)
Experience -0.006 0.022** 0.130***
(0.028) (0.011) (0.026)
Job Characteristics -0.010 0.009 0.118**
(0.052) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.289*** 0.052** 0.225***
(0.070) (0.026) (0.062)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.045 -0.042 -0.071
(0.112) (0.043) (0.110)
Selection 0.275 -0.040 -0.512
(0.419) (0.162) (0.415)
Total Unexplained 0.033 0.082*** 0.216***
(0.025) (0.010) (0.028)
24,267 24,267 24,267
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.10 GPG and Total Unexplained Component with and without Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean 10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(Unadjusted) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Total Unexplained 0.124*** 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.210***
(No Selection) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Total Unexplained 0.123***
(Selection – Standard Heckman Two-Stage) (0.006)
Total Unexplained 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.211***
(Selection – Probit) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Total Unexplained 0.062*** 0.088*** 0.221***
(Selection – Ichimura) (0.016) (0.006) (0.017)
Total Unexplained 0.033 0.082*** 0.216***
(Selection – Klein-Spady) (0.025) (0.010) (0.028)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Notes: For the mean, the difference in the Total Unexplained component with no selection
and with selection adjustment is statistically significant at a 5.0% significance level. In
the case of the standard probit model, the difference is not statistically significant at all
quantiles. For the semiparametric selection models, the difference is statistically significant
at a 5.0% significance level only for the 10th percentile. At the 50th percentile, the difference
is statistically significant at a 10.0% significance level for the component with no selection
and the Klein-Spady selection-adjusted component. At the 90th percentile, the difference is
not statistically different from zero in both cases. The difference between the respective
components has been tested using a two-sample t-test.
Table 4.11 Gender Wage Inequality – Selection Component
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
90-10 90-50 50-10
Ichimura Klein-Spady Ichimura Klein-Spady Ichimura Klein-Spady
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Endowments Effect
Selection 0.072*** 0.034*** -0.026* -0.037*** -0.025 -0.060**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.025)
Coefficients Effect
Selection -0.311*** -0.138* -0.857* -0.314 -0.472 -0.012
(0.103) (0.112) (0.460) (0.454) (0.445) (0.449)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the GPG at different points of as well as gender wage inequality across
the wage distribution. The empirical application is based on UQR or the RIF-OLS model.
This approach allows to decompose the wage equations by gender in detail along the earnings
distribution using a Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition. The method delivers detailed
information on the drivers of the pay gap between men and women at specific quantiles.
Gender wage inequality in the sample is estimated by the change in the GPG across the
wage distribution, i.e. the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 wage gap. The estimation is based on
linear RIF regressions, as potential misspecification problems of the RIF-OLS are found to
be negligible. The method based on UQRs has several advantages compared to CQR models
such as its intuitive and computationally easy estimation as well as interpretation. However,
CQRs are the standard approach in the quantile-regression literature (Fortin et al., 2011). So
far, sample selection correction beyond the mean is only conducted in the CQR framework.
Studies controlling for selection effects find that the work decision impacts differently along
the earnings distribution. Therefore, in this paper, the RIF-OLS model is extended in order
to allow for sample selection. By adding selection terms as second-order polynomials to the
earnings equation, the estimation results are adjusted for potential non-random selection into
employment (Buchinsky, 1998). The selection correction focuses on semiparametric models
as the selection process may be non-normally distributed (Martins, 2001). Indeed, a two-point
wild-bootstrap test, based on Horowitz and Härdle (1994) and comparing the parametric and
semiparametric binary choice models, rejects the parametric probit specification.
The analysis in this paper shows that different factors, such as educational attainment,
labor market presence, job characteristics, employment in different industries or demographic
and family background characteristics contribute differently to the GPG along the wage distri-
bution. In particular, by splitting the various categories in an endowments and a coefficients
part, differences in the contribution to the GPG at different quantiles are found. Individual
heterogeneity, like individual ability or personal motivation, and other unobservable labor
market characteristics (as for example differences in educational quality) contribute statisti-
cally significantly to pay differences between men and women along the wage distribution.
Moreover, we detect glass ceiling, i.e. significant differences in the GPGs between upper and
lower quantiles. In line with this, the wage penalty of being female is highest at the top. Wage
structure effects of male-female differences in educational attainment are a main driver of
wage inequality between the top and bottom or median quantile, while the endowments effect
of gender differences in education significantly lowers wage inequality. Endowments effects
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of the set of regressors accounting for gender differences in labor market presence across the
wage distribution are relevant in contributing to wage inequality as well as a positive GPG at
all quantiles. The bottom of the wage distribution is relatively more equal in terms of job
characteristics and industrial and occupational differences between men and women in terms
of endowments. Differences in demographic and family background characteristics between
men and women across the wage distribution both in terms of endowments and coefficients
effects are less important.
Overall, the results suggest that it is important to consider GPGs throughout the wage
distribution and hence to go beyond the mean. This may be particularly relevant, when
it comes to policy implications as policy makers want to address potential inequality or
distributional effects. Most of the quantile-specific pay gaps is accounted for by how men
and women are rewarded, i.e. by the unexplained component. This finding is in conformity
with results obtained in other studies on gender differences in pay (see for example Blau
and Kahn, 2016). In contrast, net differences in endowments, i.e. the total explained part,
work towards a reduction of the phenomenon of glass ceiling as well as of the GPGs at the
corresponding quantiles. According to which selection adjustment model (parametric or
semiparametric) is chosen, the correction terms contribute differently to the quantile-specific
GPGs. Yet, in all model specifications, the main pattern of results remains the same. The
unexplained part is overestimated at the bottom and median but underestimated at the top of
the wage distribution. The extension proposed, to the author’s best knowledge, is the first
approach allowing to control for selection issues when conducting detailed Oaxaca-Blinder
type decompositions based on UQRs along the wage distribution.
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Appendices
Appendix 4.A Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
The standard approach in decomposing wage differences between groups is the Oaxaca
(1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition approach outlined in the following:
Y¯M− Y¯F = X¯MβˆM− X¯F βˆF
= (X¯M− X¯F)βˆM + X¯F(βˆM− βˆF) (4.A.1)
where Y¯M and Y¯F are the log hourly wages for the male and female sample evaluated at the
mean, respectively, with X¯G being a 1×K vector of average characteristics and βˆG being
a K× 1 vector of estimated coefficients for G = (F,M), with M = Male and F = Female.
Define Y¯M−Y¯F = ∆ˆ and (X¯M− X¯F)βˆM = ∆ˆE as well as X¯F(βˆM− βˆF) = ∆ˆC, with E identifying
the Endowments Effect and C the Coefficients Effect. The endowments effect, ∆ˆE , evaluates
the GPG in terms of differences in observable characteristics given male prices. The standard
case that is applied here uses male coefficients, βˆM, as the non-discriminatory wage structure
and hence assumes no discrimination against men. The second term, ∆ˆC, i.e the coefficients
part or the adjusted GPG, evaluates the pay gap in terms of different returns for female
characteristics.
Table 4.A.1 shows the result from the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the
mean without and with sample selection correction (column (1) and (2), respectively). For
selection correction, the standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure is applied. The
selection component is significant only in terms of the endowments effect and adjusts both
the total explained and total unexplained part only slightly. In absolute terms both parts are
corrected downwards.
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Table 4.A.1 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition at
the Mean without and with Selection
(1) (2)
No Selection Selectiona
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.118***
(0.005)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.016*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.001)
Experience_Tenure 0.035*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.002)
Job_Char -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Occupations_Industry -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Socio-Demographic_Background -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
Selection 0.003**
(0.001)
Total Explained -0.007 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Coefficients Effect
Education 0.004 0.005
(0.011) (0.013)
Experience_Tenure 0.041*** 0.039***
(0.012) (0.013)
Job_Char 0.016 0.016
(0.023) (0.023)
Occupations_Industry -0.004 -0.006
(0.031) (0.031)
Socio-Demographic_Background -0.029 -0.032
(0.052) (0.053)
Selection 0.010
(0.040)
Total Unexplained 0.124*** 0.123***
(0.006) (0.006)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
a The selection components are estimated via the clas-
sical Heckman two-step correction method (Heck-
man, 1979).
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Appendix 4.B Reweighted-Regression Decomposition
If the assumed linearity in the RIF model does not hold, the model is misspecified and
the decomposition components are incorrect. Adding a reweighting scheme solves this
problem. The reweighted-regression decomposition using the reweighting approach proposed
by DiNardo et al. (1996) consists in performing two Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions; one
for the endowments and one for the coefficients effect.38 In order to use men as the non-
discriminatory wage structure, the sample of men is reweighted to the sample of women,
indicated by the index rew. The method uses a semiparametric reweighting factor and
creates a counterfactual framework by reweighting men’s characteristics to be as women’s.
The marginal and unconditional wage distribution YM|DM is derived via the law of iterated
probabilities by integrating the conditional distribution of wages observed for men given the
set of observable characteristics X , FYM |X ,DM over the male marginal distribution of X :
FYM |DM(Y ) =
∫
FYM |X ,DM(Y |X = x)dFX |DM(x) (4.B.1)
FY rewM :X=X |DF (Y ) =
∫
FYM |X ,DM(Y |X = x)Ψ(X)dFX |DM(x)
=
∫
FYM |X ,DM(Y |X = x)dFX |DF (x) (4.B.2)
where the dummy variable DG with G = M,F identifies group membership, for M = Male
and F = Female and Ψ(X) is the reweighting factor. It reweights female observations and
is derived using the predicted probability of belonging to the male sample, i.e. being male,
given X , Pr(X |DM = 1). The reweighting factor Ψ(X) = dFXF (X)dFXM (X) is the ratio of the marginal
distributions of X for women F and men M. As Ψ(X) is simply a function of X , it can be
derived using the predicted probability of being a woman given X, Pr(X |DF = 1), i.e. via
standard probit or logit. Since dFXF (X) = Pr(X |DF = 1) and dFXM(X) = Pr(X |DF = 0), the
reweighting factor can be re-written as:
Ψ(X) =
Pr(X |DF = 1)
Pr(X |DF = 0) =
Pr(DF = 1|X)Pr(DF = 0)
Pr(DF = 0|X)Pr(DF = 1) (4.B.3)
38The application of other reweighting procedures is possible. For example, propensity score reweighting
could be used (Hirano et al., 2003). Here the method proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) is used as it relies
minimally on functional form assumptions. Alternatively, the model proposed by Ghosh (2014) could be used
as the reweigthing may have relatively poor finite sample performance.
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In order to obtain Pr(X |DF = 1), a probit regression for the pooled sample is run. In the
probit estimation, all regressors used in the decomposition, as well as a set of interaction
terms between educational dummies, experience and occupations (as a proxy for tasks)
are included. In particular, for the detailed decomposition, besides the reweighting factor
described in equation (4.B.3), for each covariate k (with k = 1,2, . . . ,K) a reweighting factor
using all covariates except Xk is estimated:
Ψk(XK−k) =
Pr(XK−k|DF = 1)
Pr(XK−k|DF = 0) =
Pr(DF = 1|XK−k)Pr(DF = 0)
Pr(DF = 0|XK−k)Pr(DF = 1) (4.B.4)
The counterfactual statistic of each covariate k is obtained by using the product of the
reweighting factors (4.B.3) and (4.B.4), Ψ(X)Ψk(XK−k), as weights (instead of using only
Ψ(X) as weight). The counterfactual statistic is then subtracted from Ψ(X) yielding the
contribution of each covariate k (Fortin et al., 2011). As the effect on the single covariates is
estimated conditional on all other covariates, the method is path independent.
In order to obtain a detailed decomposition in the sense of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder
(1973), in a first stage, the distributional changes are estimated separately for an endowments
and a coefficients effect. In a second stage, the two effects are further divided into the
contribution of each set of covariates (or each covariate) using the RIF-regression model
outlined in Section 4.2.1. The endowments effect is obtained by decomposing the wage gap
between the male and the reweighted sample:
∆ˆE,R = ∆ˆE,p+ ∆ˆE,e
= (X¯M− X¯ rewM )βˆM,τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pure Endowments Effect
+ X¯ rewM (βˆM,τ − βˆ rewM,τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Specification Error
(4.B.5)
where p indicates the pure effect, e the part attributed to the error term and R the total
effect when reweighting is conducted. The index E identifies again the Endowments Effect.
The specification error in the linear model is equal to zero, if the model is truly linear;
X¯ rewM (βˆM,τ − βˆ rewM,τ) = 0. Differences between the detailed reweighted RIF-decomposition
and the RIF decomposition without reweighting are caught by the specification error. These
differences can be measured as the difference between the coefficients effect from the
model without and with reweigthing (specification error). The additional term in the (total)
endowments component, the specification error, allows to draw conclusions on the goodness
of specification of the linear model (the specification error is zero if the model is truly
linear). Hence, it adjusts the endowments component, when the linear model is not accurately
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specified. In another Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition, the coefficients part is calculated.
The decomposition is conducted between the reweighted sample, rew, and the female sample,
F :
∆ˆC,R = ∆ˆC,p+ ∆ˆC,e
= X¯F(βˆ rewM,τ − βˆF,τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pure Coefficients Effect
+(X¯ rewM − X¯F)βˆ rewM,τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reweighting Error
(4.B.6)
≈ X¯F(βˆ rewM,τ − βˆF,τ)
where the index C identifies the Coefficients Effect. The reweighting error, (X¯ rewM − X¯F)βˆ rewM,τ ,
goes to zero given that the following property of large samples holds: plim(X¯ rewF ) = plim(X¯M)
leading to ∆ˆC,e → 0 as N → ∞.39
For the quantile-specific reweighted decomposition outcome and the reweighted wage
inequality measures shown in Table 4.B.1 and Table 4.B.2, respectively, the pure endowments
and coefficients effect are referred to as Total Explained or Total Unexplained. The application
of a reweighting approach may be particularly important when considering RIF regressions
as they might not be linear for distributional statistics besides the mean (Fortin et al., 2011).
Advantages of the reweighting scheme applied here are the low dependence on functional
form assumptions of the (flexible) probit for gender effects and that the procedure yields
efficient estimates (Fortin et al., 2011).
39Given that the reweighting function has been correctly specified.
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Table 4.B.1 RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles with
Reweighting
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
F(X) in male sample F(X) in male sample F(X) in male sample
reweighted to reweighted to reweighted to
female sample female sample female sample
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.028***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.062***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Job Characteristics 0.013*** -0.007*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Occupations and Industries -0.002 -0.007*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.003*** -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total Explained 0.025*** 0.004 -0.010
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.024 -0.015 0.146***
(0.028) (0.011) (0.025)
Experience -0.070*** -0.009 0.043*
(0.027) (0.010) (0.024)
Job Characteristics -0.011 0.005 0.089*
(0.053) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.364*** 0.031 0.116*
(0.073) (0.028) (0.064)
Socio-Demographic Background 0.175* -0.059 -0.212**
(0.100) (0.038) (0.090)
Total Unexplained 0.115*** 0.097*** 0.160***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Specification Error -0.007 0.003 0.05
Reweighting Error 0.016 0.005 0.041
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Notes: The Total Unexplained parts from the model without and with reweighting are
not statistically significantly different from each other at the 10th and 50th percentile
of the wage distribution but statistically significantly different at the 90th percentile.
Similarly, the Total Explained components with and without reweighting are not statis-
tically significantly different at the bottom and median but statistically significantly
different at the top. The difference between the respective parts has been tested using a
two-sample t-test.
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Table 4.B.2 Gender Wage Inequality – RIF-OLS Decomposition Results with Reweighting
(1) (2) (3)
90-10 90-50 50-10
F(X) in F(X) in F(X) in
male sample male sample male sample
reweighted to reweighted to reweighted to
female sample female sample female sample
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.017*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Experience 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Job Characteristics -0.038*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Occupations and Industries -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Socio-Demographic Background 0.003 -0.000 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Total Explained -0.035*** -0.014*** -0.021***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Coefficients Effect
Education 0.170*** 0.161*** 0.009
(0.037) (0.027) (0.030)
Experience 0.113*** 0.052** 0.061**
(0.036) (0.026) (0.029)
Job Characteristics 0.100 0.084 0.017
(0.071) (0.052) (0.057)
Occupations and Industries 0.480*** 0.085 0.396***
(0.097) (0.070) (0.078)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.387*** -0.154 -0.234**
(0.135) (0.098) (0.107)
Total Unexplained 0.045** 0.063*** -0.018*
(0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Specification Error 0.057 0.047 0.01
Reweighting Error 0.005 0.016 -0.011
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Appendix 4.C Asymptotic Normality of the RIF-OLS
Model with Semiparametric Estimators for
Selection Correction
We assume that the following model using only the observed data yields biased parameters:
RIF(Y ;Qτ) = Xβτ +uτ (4.C.1)
as
E[RIF(Y ;Qτ)|X ,E = 1] = Xβτ +E[uτ |vτ >−Zγ] (4.C.2)
with E[uτ |vτ >−Zγ] ̸= 0. Firpo et al. (2009a) derive the asymptotic properties of the RIF-
OLS. In the following, the asymptotic normality as derived in Firpo et al. (2009a) is extended
for the model with selection correction. Recall that, in the case of semiparametric estimators
for selection correction, the RIF-OLS regression model corrected for selection bias at τ has
the following form:
R̂IF(Y ;Qτ) = X βˆτ + hˆ∗τ(mˆ
∗)+ εˆτ
= X βˆτ + δˆ ∗1τλ
∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)1+ δˆ ∗2τλ
∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)2+ εˆτ (4.C.3)
where X is a vector of K regressors, εˆτ is the quantile-specific residual.40 βˆτ is the corre-
sponding vector of coefficient estimates at τ . λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗) is the IMR and λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)2 is the
quadratic term of the IMR, δˆ ∗1τ and δˆ
∗
2τ are the corresponding coefficient estimates. We
assume that the wage model in (4.C.3) yields consistent and unbiased parameter estimates
and hence successfully corrects for sample selection. For each observation i, we have:
R̂IF(Yi;Qτ) = Xiβˆτ + δˆ ∗1τλ
∗
i (Z
∗
Aγˆ
∗)+ δˆ ∗2τλ
∗
i (Z
∗
Aγˆ
∗)2+ εˆiτ
where Xi has dimension 1×K and Yi is a scalar with sample size i= 1, . . . ,N. Following Firpo
et al. (2009a), the regression of the RIF-function on Xi, λ ∗i (Z∗Aγˆ
∗) and λ ∗i (Z∗Aγˆ
∗)2 yields the
40For simplicity, λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)1 = λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗) in the following.
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following βˆτ coefficient vector41
βˆτ =
ζˆ (Qˆτ)
fY (Qˆτ)
with dimension K×1 and where fY (Qˆτ) is the kernel density estimator and
ζˆ (Qˆτ) =Ω−1X
1
N
N
∑
i=1
{
X ′i
(
qˆτ +1{Yi > Qˆτ}− (1− τ)
)}
with
ΩX =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
X ′i Xi and qˆτ = Qˆτ fY (Qˆτ)
−1
Consequently, as δˆ ∗1τ and δˆ
∗
2τ are the coefficient estimates obtained from the RIF-OLS
regression of R̂IF(·) on Xi, λ ∗i (Z∗Aγˆ∗) and λ ∗i (Z∗Aγˆ∗)2, we have:
δˆ ∗1τ =
ηˆ1(Qˆτ)
fY (Qˆτ)
δˆ ∗2τ =
ηˆ2(Qˆτ)
fY (Qˆτ)
with
ηˆ1(Qˆτ) =Ω−1λ ∗
1
N
N
∑
i=1
{
λ ∗i (Z
∗
Aγˆ
∗)
(
qˆτ +1{Yi > Qˆτ}− (1− τ)
)}
Ωλ ∗ =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
λ ∗i (Z
∗
Aγˆ
∗)′λ ∗i (Z
∗
Aγˆ
∗)
and
ηˆ2(Qˆτ) =Ω−1λ ∗2
1
N
N
∑
i=1
{
λ ∗i (Z
∗
Aγˆ
∗)2
(
qˆτ +1{Yi > Qˆτ}− (1− τ)
)}
Ωλ ∗2 =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
λ ∗i (Z
∗
Aγˆ
∗)2
′
λ ∗i (Z
∗
Aγˆ
∗)2
Then, we have:
√
Nh( ˆ˜βτ − β˜τ) D−→ N(0,VOLS)
41Firpo et al. (2009a) consider the regression of the RIF-function on Xi in the model without selection
correction.
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with
ˆ˜βτ =
 βˆτδˆ1τ
δˆ2τ
 and X˜ = (X ,λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ∗),λ ∗(Z∗Aγˆ∗)2)
having dimension K+1+1×1, where K+1+1 = K∗ and VOLS =VOLS(Qτ ,κ) with κ(·)
being a real-value kernel function and positive bandwidth h. Following Firpo et al. (2009a),
the asymptotic variance can then be represented as:
VOLS(Qτ ,κ) = lim
h↓0
{
1
f 2y (Qτ)
β˜τ β˜ ′τE[( fy(Qτ))
2]+
= +
1
f 2y (Qτ)
Var[
√
hΩ˜−1X˜ X˜u(Qτ)+ β˜τ(qτ +1{Y > Qτ}− (1− τ))]
}
where
Ω˜X˜ =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
X˜ ′i X˜i
u(Qτ) = qτ +1{Y > Qτ}− (1− τ))− X˜iζ˜ (Qτ)
and
ζ˜ (Qτ) =
 ζτ(Qτ)η1τ(Qτ)
η2τ(Qτ)

The kernel density estimator, fˆy(Qˆτ), has an asymptotic squared bias that will go faster
to zero than the variance (Firpo et al., 2009a). A possible estimator of VOLS(Qτ ,κ) is
VˆOLS(Qˆτ ,hκ) (see Firpo et al., 2009a). Assuming that E[u(Qτ)|X˜ ] = 0 and β˜τ = UQPEτ ,
then:
plimh↓0 VˆOLS(Qˆτ ,h,κ) =VOLS(Qτ ,κ)
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Appendix 4.D The RIF-OLS Model with Parametric
Estimators for Selection Correction
If the selection process is assumed to be normally distributed, the probit model can be used
for selection adjustment. Following Heckman (1979), the RIF-OLS model corrected for
sample selection using a parametric estimator for sample correction is:
R̂IF(Y ;Qτ) = X βˆτ + δˆτλ (ZAγˆ)+ εˆτ (4.D.1)
where λ (ZAγˆ) is the standard IMR evaluated at ZAγˆ , δˆτ is the corresponding coefficient
estimate and εˆτ is the quantile-specific residual. Asymptotic normality of the RIF-OLS
model corrected for sample selection using a parametric estimator follows from the proof
provided by Heckman (1979) for the parametric Heckman estimator at the mean.
The components of the quantile-specific GPG adjusted for selection with the parametric
selection correction term are provided in Table 4.D.1. The effect of the estimated selection
part due to differences in endowments is less strong compared to the results obtained in
Section 4.4.5 but points generally in the same direction; positive at the bottom, negative at the
top of the earnings distribution. At the median no effect is found in the model with parametric
selection correction. Differences in the selection effect in terms of the unexplained part have
again smaller point estimates but the same sign. Except for the median, where the selection
effect is slightly negative in the parametric selection correction approach. Table 4.D.2 shows
that gender differences in unobservables (given same prices) do not differ significantly
across the wage distribution when the parametric correction approach is applied. Similarly,
differences in prices between men and women to the same set of unobservables from higher to
lower quantiles do not significantly impact on the variation of the GPG across the distribution.
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Table 4.D.1 RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles with Selection – Probit
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Job Characteristics 0.006 -0.004* -0.030***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Occupations and Industries 0.001 -0.001 -0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.005** -0.009*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Selection 0.004** 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Total Explained 0.012 -0.000 -0.032***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.024 -0.026** 0.092***
(0.029) (0.011) (0.026)
Experience 0.012 0.025** 0.121***
(0.027) (0.010) (0.025)
Job Characteristics -0.011 0.008 0.116**
(0.052) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.293*** 0.051** 0.225***
(0.070) (0.026) (0.062)
Socio-Demographic Background 0.082 -0.025 -0.116
(0.135) (0.052) (0.130)
Selection 0.110 0.006 -0.064
(0.080) (0.030) (0.071)
Total Unexplained 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.211***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.D.2 Gender Wage Inequality – Selection Component using Parametric Selection
Correction
(1) (2) (3)
90-10 90-50 50-10
Probit
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Endowments Effect
Selection -0.005 -0.001 -0.004
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
Coefficients Effect
Selection 0.174 -0.070 -0.104
(0.107) (0.077) (0.088)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
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Appendix 4.E Definition of Variables
Table 4.E.1 Definition of Variables
Variable Name Definition
Dependent Variables
Lhwage The natural logarithm of net hourly wages; hourly wages in Euros,
net of taxes and social security contributions
E (Employment) One if the respective individual is in employment, zero otherwise
Independent Variables
Dummy and Interaction Effects
female One if the respective individual is a woman, zero otherwise
Education×Experience Quadratic interactions between educational dummies (Elementary_School,
High_School, University_Degree) and experience (Exper)
Education×Occupation Quadratic interactions between educational dummies (Elementary_School,
High_School, University_Degree) and occupational dummies (Manager,
Intermediate_Prof)
Experience×Occupation Quadratic interactions between experience (Exper) and occupational
dummies (Manager, Intermediate_Prof )
Education
Elementary_School One if the highest educational attainment of the individual is
Elementary_School, zero otherwise
High_School One if the highest educational attainment of the individual is High_School,
zero otherwise; High_School corresponds to 13 years of schooling
University_Degree One if the highest educational attainment of the individual is
University_Degree, zero otherwise
Max_D_Mark One if the best degree mark was attained (conditional on having a
University_Degree), i.e. 110 e lode, zero otherwise
Experience
Exper Number of years of prior work experience of the individual
Exper2 Exper squared
Tenure Number of years the individual has worked for his or her current employer
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Job Characteristics
Work_Climate Individual’s level of satisfaction with the working climate at
the individual’s current job ∈ (0,4)
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Stab Individual’s level of satisfaction with the stability of the individual’s
current job ∈ (0,4), where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction
and 0 the lowest
Work_Time Individual’s level of satisfaction with the working time at the individual’s
current job ∈ (0,4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Task Individual’s level of satisfaction with the tasks at the individual’s
current job ∈ (0,4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Part One if the individual holds a part-time contract, zero otherwise
Contract_Type One if the individual holds an unlimited contract, zero otherwise
Occupations and Industries
Manager Intellectual professions; scientific, and highly specialized occupations
Intermediate_Prof Intermediary positions in commercial, technical or administrative sectors,
health services and technicians
Sec_02 - Sec_15 Sectoral dummies for employment in the following sectors or industries:
manufacturing, energy, construction, tourism, commerce, transport,
communication, financial activities, service industry, public administration,
education, health, sciences and family services, respectively
Socio-Demographic Background
Age Age of the individual (in years) ∈ (18,64)
Age5064 One if the age of the individual is between fifty and sixty-four years,
zero otherwise
North One if the individual lives and works in the North of Italy, zero otherwise
Centre One if the individual lives and works in the Centre of Italy, zero otherwise
Homeowner One if the individual owns a house
(including houses financed by bank loans), zero otherwise
Partner_Works One if the partner or the spouse of the individual is employed,
zero otherwise
Married One if the individual is married, zero otherwise
Italian One if the individual is Italian, zero otherwise
Educ_Moth_Uni One if the mother of the individual holds a university degree, zero otherwise
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Educ_Fath_Uni One if the father of the individual holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Kids One if the individual has at least one child, zero otherwise
Kids_10 One if the age of the youngest child of the individual is less than ten years,
zero otherwise
Year_1-Year_5 Year dummies, one if year = 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, respectively,
and zero otherwise
Selection
λ Measures the selection bias from the employment decision
Appendix 4.F Regression Output OLS, UQR and CQR
Table 4.F.1 OLS, UQR and CQR of Log Hourly Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
OLS UQR CQR UQR CQR UQR CQR
female -0.122*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.106*** -0.112*** -0.181*** -0.150***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009)
Elementary_School -0.073*** -0.009 -0.040* -0.065*** -0.080*** -0.108*** -0.042
(0.019) (0.044) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.031) (0.036)
High_School 0.109*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.067*** 0.091*** 0.205*** 0.126***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009)
University_Degree 0.202*** 0.193*** 0.163*** 0.170*** 0.193*** 0.312*** 0.258***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.021) (0.013)
Max_D_Mark 0.032* 0.054** 0.086*** 0.042*** 0.025** 0.013 0.008
(0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.011) (0.035) (0.028)
Exper 0.015*** 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Work_Climate -0.003 0.010 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002
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(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
Work_Stab 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.032*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Work_Time 0.013*** 0.004 0.005 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Work_Task 0.010*** 0.001 -0.001 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Part 0.036*** -0.046** -0.040*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.056*** 0.098***
(0.008) (0.021) (0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
Contract_Type 0.075*** 0.204*** 0.180*** 0.050*** 0.040*** -0.017 0.017
(0.007) (0.020) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
Intermed_Prof 0.055*** 0.086*** 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.047***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009)
Manager 0.116*** 0.034* 0.039** 0.083*** 0.120*** 0.303*** 0.188***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.016)
North 0.056*** 0.177*** 0.103*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
Centre 0.025*** 0.132*** 0.071*** -0.007 0.013** -0.005 0.004
(0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009)
Italian -0.001 0.086 0.002 -0.005 -0.020 -0.080* -0.067
(0.023) (0.055) (0.042) (0.019) (0.017) (0.044) (0.046)
Married 0.067*** 0.029*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.092*** 0.074***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.010)
Homeowner 0.029*** 0.076*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.043***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.026** -0.026 -0.021 0.021** 0.033*** 0.073*** 0.039**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.024) (0.009) (0.011) (0.027) (0.018)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.005 0.042 0.018 0.014 0.002 -0.018 0.026
(0.015) (0.032) (0.026) (0.011) (0.008) (0.028) (0.021)
Constant 1.418*** 0.616*** 0.959*** 1.589*** 1.500*** 1.825*** 1.861***
(0.032) (0.082) (0.053) (0.023) (0.025) (0.066) (0.061)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses for OLS
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications, for UQR and CQR
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Chapter 5
The Convergence of the Gender Pay Gap
– An Alternative Estimation Approach –
5.1 Introduction
Gender differentials in the labor market have obtained much attention from policy makers
and researchers leading to the implementation of equal-pay legislation and the promotion of
equal opportunities. Even though equal-pay legislation and equal opportunities have been
promoted in Western industrialized countries for several decades, differences in pay between
men and women persist (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1992; 2003; 2006; 2016; Goldin, 2014). For
example, in the European Union (EU) in 2014, women earned on average 16.7% less than
men (Eurostat, 2017).
Typically, different Gender Pay Gaps (GPGs) are found across time. In particular,
declining GPGs are observed with slower convergence in recent decades (see Blau and Kahn,
2006; England, 2006). The main reasons for the decline of the GPG over time are found to
be the catching-up of women in terms of education and labor market experience (Goldin,
2006), technical development (Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010), changes in attitudes towards
women in the labor market, less occupational segregation (Cotter et al., 2004; England, 2006)
and anti-discrimination laws (Fortin, 2015). Research has shown that the unexplained or
coefficients effect of the GPG is reduced subsequently over time (e.g. Mandel and Semyonov,
2014). Differences in pay are revealed also across sectors and especially between the public
and the private sector. The Public-Private Sector Wage Gap (PPWG) is found to differ
significantly for men and women (Melly, 2005; Lucifora and Meurs, 2006; Arulampalam
et al., 2007). In fact, the difference in pay by gender is found to be smaller in the public
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compared to the private sector (see for example Melly, 2005; Arulampalam et al., 2007).
Regardless of gender, pay levels in the public sector are on average higher than in the private
sector (Lucifora and Meurs, 2006). The public sector is generally the preferred sector of
women due to its fairer recruitment, selection criteria and remuneration as well as better
implementation of anti-discrimination laws (Gornick and Jacobs, 1998; Grimshaw, 2000).
However, studies examining changes in the wage gap over time and between groups do
not directly estimate the difference of the GPG in year t and year t + 1 (or the wage gap
by sector for men and women for instance), but rather compare the results of the pay gaps
in the corresponding subsamples ex post (e.g. Christofides and Michael, 2013; Mandel and
Semyonov, 2014). Studies estimating the difference of the pay gaps in different subsamples,
often do not even provide standard errors for the decomposition (Mandel and Semyonov,
2014; Bar et al., 2015). Hence, it is not possible to conduct statistical inference. Indeed,
this does not allow to draw conclusions on which of the two wage gaps is more statistically
significant, i.e. whether the difference between the two pay gaps under investigation is
statistically significantly different from zero. Additionally, the conclusion about drivers of
the change of pay gaps between groups may be different, when estimated directly compared
to analyzing results estimated in different subsamples. The reason is that it is not possible
to draw direct inference of the difference of the respective components in the latter case.
Moreover, the standard method, i.e. ex-post comparison of the decomposition results, does
not allow to catch time- (or sector-) and gender-specific effects that may exist simultaneously,
i.e. interactions across gender and time or sector and gender (in the case of the GPG over time
and the PPWG by gender, respectively). We slightly extend the method proposed by Gelbach
(2016) that is based on the Omitted Variable Bias (OVB) formula to estimate directly the
difference between two wage gaps. We are then able to draw inference on the changes of
the pay gap by groups across subsamples and to compare the various contributors directly,
i.e. we can test whether there has been a significant change of the explained or unexplained
part of the gap. Moreover, we can draw conclusions on the relevance of interaction effects
across subsamples and groups. The standard method in applied labor economics, when it
comes to pay gaps between groups is the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition
method (Fortin et al., 2011). The approach, however, suffers from non-invariance with
respect to categorical variables and the index-number problem. The intercept-shift approach
attempts to solve the latter but suffers, in particular, from the indeterminacy problem (Lee,
2015). We extend our proposed method based on the OVB formula and show that it can be
made robust to the above mentioned problems.
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We apply our model to two cases. First, we examine the evolution of the GPG over ten
years, from 2005 to 2014 in Italy. Second, we analyze the PPWG between men and women in
2014 in Italy. We analyze each case with the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method
and then repeat the examination with our proposed extension of the Gelbach decomposition.
We expect to find a statistically significant change in differences in observable character-
istics (such as educational attainment, labor market presence as well as job-, industry- or
occupational-specific characteristics) by gender over time as well as a statistically significant
change in differences in coefficients to these characteristics between men and women over
time. In fact, the latter may indicate the effectiveness of anti-discrimination policies. For
the second empirical application, the PPWG by gender, we expect, to find in line with the
literature larger pay gaps for women between the public and the private sector than for men.
Additionally, we expect to find a larger effect of the unexplained component in the PPWG
for women; while differences in endowments may be the main driver of the pay differential
for men, they may not explain equally the difference in the PPWG for women.
For the first case, the findings of the study reveal interesting differences in results when ap-
plying our proposed estimation methodology compared to the ‘standard’ approach.1 Changes
in gender differences of observable characteristics are found to be the only statistically
significant driving force of the convergence of the GPG in the last decade in Italy. In contrast,
by comparing the different components of the GPGs following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder
(1973), differences in returns to observable characteristics, often referred to as the unex-
plained part of the GPG, seem to play a role in closing the gap over the last decade in Italy. In
the second case, we can confirm the conclusions drawn from the estimation in the respective
subsamples; the higher PPWG for women than for men is due to both differences in the
explained and unexplained component.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the standard Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition. In Section 5.3, we outline the method by Gelbach (2016) as well as our
proposed modification. Similarly, we discuss problems of the standard approach and show
the robustness of our method to these problems. Next, in Section 5.4, we empirically apply
the method proposed to the GPG over time as well as to the PPWG by gender and discuss
the results obtained. Section 5.5 concludes.
1i.e. the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and ex-post comparison of the decomposition results.
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5.2 Standard Estimation Strategy
The standard methodology to decompose pay differentials between two groups is the Oaxaca
(1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition. The methodology estimates Mincer-type wage
regressions separately for a specific group (e.g. men or women, the public or the private
sector) and then decomposes the wage differential in different components. We use the
three-fold Oaxaca-Blinder approach and thus decompose the pay gap in three components;
endowments, coefficients and interactions:2
ln(w0)− ln(w1) = αˆ0+ X¯0βˆ0− αˆ1− X¯1βˆ1
= (X¯0− X¯1)βˆ1+(αˆ0− αˆ1)+ X¯1(βˆ0− βˆ1)
+(X¯0− X¯1)(βˆ0− βˆ1)
where ln(wG) is the logarithmic hourly wage of group G evaluated at the mean, αˆG is the
intercept of group G and X¯ ′G and βˆG are K×1 vectors of average characteristics and estimated
coefficients for G ∈ {0,1}. The first term is the effect due to differences in observable
characteristics. As different observed characteristics are expected to have different effects
on earnings, the difference in observable characteristics is also referred to as the explained
component, the quantity or endowments effect of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The
second term is due to differences in the starting point, i.e. differences in the intercept.
The third term is the effect due to differences in returns on the same set of observable
characteristics. This component is generally referred to as the unexplained part, price or
coefficients effect of the gap. Differences in the intercept are attributed to the coefficients
component. In the case of the GPG, if the differential is mainly due to the price effect, this
may indicate the presence of gender discrimination.3 The last term is the so-called interaction
term. The intuition behind is that differences in endowments and coefficients may exist
simultaneously between groups (Jann, 2008).
2An alternative to the three-fold decomposition outlined here is the standard two-fold decomposition that
decomposes the wage differential in an explained and an unexplained part;
ln(w0)− ln(w1) = αˆ0+ X¯0βˆ0− αˆ1− X¯1βˆ1
= (X¯0− X¯1)βˆ0+(αˆ0− αˆ1)+ X¯1(βˆ0− βˆ1)
We focus here on the three-fold decomposition, as we argue that interaction effects may be important when
considering differences across pay gaps.
3However, as pointed out by Blau and Kahn (2006), the unexplained portion of the GPG may include
effects of unobserved characteristics such as individual productivity, motivation or educational quality.
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5.3 Econometric Model
We propose a slight modification of the decomposition method by Gelbach (2016). The
Gelbach approach decomposes cross-specification differences in Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimates of the group-dummy coefficient from the wage model in a path-independent
way yielding a Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition. By using the OVB formula, the de-
composition is consistently estimated conditional on all covariates used in the regression.
This method, similar to the standard estimation approach outlined in Section 5.2, decom-
poses the sample mean difference in wages between different groups in an explained and an
unexplained part (see Gelbach, 2016, for details).
5.3.1 Extension of Gelbach (2016)
The model outlined in the following allows not only to obtain information on whether the
pay gap has decreased in a statistically significant way on aggregate but also to testify what
are the main contributors to the change (if any) of the differential. Consider the case, when
we estimate the wage equation separately by G (group) and Y (data wave or a group different
from G, i.e. Y ̸= G) for individual i, with i = 1,2, . . .N:
ln(wiGY ) = αGY +XiGYβGY + εiGY (5.1)
with G ∈ {0,1}, Y ∈ {A,B}; and where ln(wiGY ) is individual i’s logarithmic wage of G in Y ,
αGY is a constant, XiGY is a 1×K vector of exogenous regressors, βGY is the corresponding
K×1 vector of coefficients and εiGY is the error term.4 When we evaluate the estimation at
the mean given the OLS property that OLS estimates must go through the mean of the data,
equation (5.1) becomes:
ln(wGY ) = αˆGY + x¯GY βˆGY (5.2)
where αˆGY is the constant, x¯GY is the 1×K row vector of sample means of observable
characteristics in X :
x¯GY =
[
x¯GY k1, x¯GY k2, . . . , x¯GY K
]
4In the first empirical application in Section 5.4, we set the index G equal to gender and the index Y equal to
different years or waves of the data set. Consequently, in case 1 of the empirical implementation, we have for G∈
{0,1}; 0=male and 1= female and for Y ∈{A,B}; A= starting period or 2005 and B= ending period or 2014.
In the second empirical example shown in Section 5.4, group G represents different sectors and Y men or
women. Thus, in case 2 of the empirical part, we have for G ∈ {0,1}; 0 = public-sector employment and
1 = private sector employment and for Y ∈ {A,B}; A = female and B = male.
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and βˆGY is the corresponding K×1 vector of parameter estimates. Four different pairs of
(G,Y ) and thus four regressions of equation (5.2) are possible; (0,A), (0,B), (1,A), (1,B).
The corresponding regressions between G and Y are conducted by assuming the same set of
regressors for all four cases.
Now, consider estimating the joint model. The first group index G is added to the
regression as a dummy variable Gi among the controls on the right-hand side. Analogously,
the second group index Y is transformed in a dummy variable Yi controlling for group Y
membership. The indicator variable takes value one, if the observation corresponds to A and
takes value zero, if we observe B.5 As in Gelbach (2016), we distinguish between two sets
of regressors, Xi1 and Xi2, where the set of regressors Xi1, with dimension 1×4, is the base
specification containing only (for each observation i) a constant, an interaction term between
the group dummies, GiYi, as well as the dummies, Gi and Yi, separately. The interaction
of the dummies for group membership Gi and Yi are contained in GiYi. The base model is
therefore defined as follows:
ln(wiGY ) = Xi1αbase+ εbaseiGY
ln(wiGY ) = αbase0 +GiYiα
base
1 +Giα
base
2 +Yiα
base
3 + ε
base
iGY (5.3)
where αbase0 is the constant and α
base
1 ,α
base
2 ,α
base
3 are the corresponding coefficients con-
tained in the 4×1 column vector αbase, εbaseiGY is the corresponding error term. The second
set of regressors, Xi2, has dimension 1×4K and contains the 1×K vector of explanatory
variables Xi as well as the interactions of Xi with Gi, Yi and GiYi, respectively. The set of
regressors Xi2 will be considered later as omitted variables in order to obtain a decomposition
of the change of the wage gap between Gi across Yi. The full model is then defined as:
ln(wiGY ) = Xi1α f ull +Xi2β + ε
f ull
iGY
ln(wiGY ) = α
f ull
0 +GiYiα
f ull
1 +Giα
f ull
2 +Yiα
f ull
3 +Xiβ1+GiXiβ2+YiXiβ3+GiYiXiβ4+ ε
f ull
iGY
(5.4)
5We thus have the index G ∈ {0,1} and the dummy variable Gi, with
Gi =
{
1 if the index of person i is G = 1
0 if the index of person i is G = 0
For the second group, we have the index Y ∈ {A,B} and the dummy variable Yi, with
Yi =
{
1 if the index of person i is Y = A
0 if the index of person i is Y = B
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where α f ull and β are the 4×1 and 4K×1 vectors of coefficients from Xi1 and Xi2, respec-
tively. The error term is represented by ε f ulliGY .
We can recast the parameters of the full model evaluated at the mean from the pair-wise
regressions of (5.2):
1. When (the indices) G=1 and Y=A, we get:
• αˆ1A = αˆ
f ull
0 + αˆ
f ull
1 + αˆ
f ull
2 + αˆ
f ull
3
• βˆ1A = βˆ1+ βˆ2+ βˆ3+ βˆ4
2. When (the indices) G=0 and Y=A, we get:
• αˆ0A = αˆ
f ull
0 + αˆ
f ull
3
• βˆ0A = βˆ1+ βˆ3
3. When (the indices) G=1 and Y=B, we get:
• αˆ1B = αˆ
f ull
0 + αˆ
f ull
2
• βˆ1B = βˆ1+ βˆ2
4. When (the indices) G=0 and Y=B, we get:
• αˆ0B = αˆ
f ull
0
• βˆ0B = βˆ1
Re-arranging the terms slightly, gives us:
αˆ f ull0 = αˆ0B
αˆ f ull2 = αˆ1B− αˆ0B
αˆ f ull3 = αˆ0A− αˆ0B
αˆ f ull1 = αˆ1A− αˆ0B− αˆ1B+ αˆ0B− αˆ0A+ αˆ0B
= (αˆ0B− αˆ1B)− (αˆ0A− αˆ1A)
βˆ1 = βˆ0B
βˆ2 = βˆ1B− βˆ0B
βˆ3 = βˆ0A− βˆ0B
βˆ4 = βˆ0B− βˆ1B− βˆ0A+ βˆ1A
= (βˆ0B− βˆ1B)− (βˆ0A− βˆ1A)
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By evaluating the base model at the mean and considering the set of regressors X2 as omitted
variables, we obtain the following specification:6
αˆbase = αˆ f ull +(X ′1X1)
−1X ′1X2βˆ
f ull (5.5)
where
• (X ′1X1)
−1X ′1X2βˆ
f ull is the OVB
• The parameter estimates from the base model (5.3) evaluated at the mean are:
αˆbase =
[
αˆbase0 , αˆ
base
1 , αˆ
base
2 , αˆ
base
3
]′
being a 4×1 column vector.
• αˆ f ull is the 4×1 column vector containing the coefficient estimates of Xi1 from the
full model (5.4) evaluated at the mean.
• (X ′1X1)
−1X ′1X2 is the linear projection of X2 on X1, with dimension 4×4K.
•
βˆ f ull =
[
βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3, βˆ4
]′
is a 4K× 1 column vector of coefficients from the full model (5.4) evaluated at the
mean. The model specification in equation (5.5) can be decomposed as follows:
αˆbase = αˆ f ull + δˆ 1+ δˆ 2+ δˆ 3+ δˆ 4 (5.6)
with δˆ ≡ αˆbase− αˆ f ull = (X ′1X1)−1 X ′1X2βˆ f ull , where
• δˆ q = Γˆqβˆ f ullq , with Γˆq = (X ′1X1)−1 X ′1X2q of dimension kX1 × kq and X2q being
the qth column of X2, for q = 1, ..,Q. The column vector βˆ
f ull
q has dimension
kq×1, thus δˆq is a kX1 ×1 column vector;
• kX1 is equal to the number of regressors from X1, i.e. 4 in our case (X1 contains
sample means and has dimension 1×4);
• kq is equal to the number of regressors in the qth column of X2.
6Notably, the set of regressors X1 contains the sample means of Xi1, while the set of regressors X2 contains
the sample means of Xi2.
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5.3.2 Decomposition
Recall that we are interested in the estimation and decomposition of the change in the pay
gap between group G across group Y , i.e.7
∆B−∆A =
(
ln(w0B)− ln(w1B)
)
−
(
ln(w0A)− ln(w1A)
)
with ∆B being the pay gap by group G given that Y = B and ∆A being the wage gap between
G given that Y = A. From equation (5.2), we know that:
∆B =
(
ln(w0B)− ln(w1B)
)
=−αˆbase2
∆A =
(
ln(w0A)− ln(w1A)
)
=−αˆbase1 − αˆbase2
and hence αˆ1 represents the difference of the two wage gaps:
∆B−∆A = αˆbase1
Given the definition of αˆbase, we are interested in the second row of αˆbase, i.e. of equa-
tion (5.5), or αˆbase1 in order to obtain the change of the wage gaps, ∆
B−∆A. Starting from
equation (5.5), we calculate the second row of the 4×4K matrix (X ′1X1)−1X ′1X2 considering
the sample means of observable characteristics:
κ =
[
(x¯0B− x¯1B)− (x¯0A− x¯1A),(x¯1A− x¯1B),(x¯1A− x¯0A), x¯1A
]
with dimension 1×4K. The second row of equation (5.5) or the difference of the respective
wage gap evaluated at the mean is thus:
αˆbase1 = αˆ
f ull
1 +κβˆ
f ull (5.7)
7For example, the change of the GPG across two years.
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and can be re-written as:
αˆ1base = (αˆ0B− αˆ1B)− (αˆ0A− αˆ1A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
αˆ f ull1
+[(x¯0B− x¯1B)− (x¯0A− x¯1A)] βˆ0B︸︷︷︸
βˆ1
+(x¯1A− x¯1B)(βˆ1B− βˆ0B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βˆ2
+(x¯1A− x¯0A)(βˆ0A− βˆ0B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βˆ3
+ x¯1A[(βˆ0B− βˆ1B)− (βˆ0A− βˆ1A)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
βˆ4
= ∆B−∆A (5.8)
where αˆ1base and αˆ1 f ull are scalars and x¯′GY , βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3, βˆ4 are K × 1 column vectors,
respectively. The above expression can be re-written as a ‘double’ (two-fold) Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition:
αˆ1base = (αˆ0B− αˆ1B)+(x¯0B− x¯1B)βˆ0B+ x¯1B(βˆ0B− βˆ1B)
− [(αˆ0A− αˆ1A)+(x¯0A− x¯1A)βˆ0A+ x¯1A(βˆ0A− βˆ1A)]
Decomposing the change in the wage gap between group G across group Y in the following
way allows to better understand the elements that contribute to the earnings differences across
G and Y : ∆B−∆A = E +U + I1+ I2, with
E = [(x¯0B− x¯1B)− (x¯0A− x¯1A)]βˆ0B (5.9)
Here, the same prices, namely the ones of the respective base category, βˆ0B, are assumed.
Thus, E measures the amount of the change of the gap attributable to differences in observed
characteristics. It is the component referred to as differences in quantities, i.e. the explained
part. The unexplained component becomes the following:
U = αˆ f ull1 + x¯1A[(βˆ0B− βˆ1B)− (βˆ0A− βˆ1A)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
= αˆ f ull1 +u (5.10)
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U measures the change of differences in the intercepts, αˆ f ull1 , as well as the change over
Y of the differences in coefficients by G. Characteristics are hold fix at x¯1A. Additionally,
we observe now two interaction terms, I1 and I2, accounting for the fact that differences in
characteristics and parameters exist simultaneously between the four groups. The interaction
effects are the following:
I1 = (x¯1A− x¯1B)(βˆ1B− βˆ0B) (5.11)
and
I2 = (x¯1A− x¯0A)(βˆ0A− βˆ0B) (5.12)
I1 accounts for differences in prices by G given changes in the set of endowments across Y .8
I2 catches changes in coefficients over Y given that endowments between G are different.9
Despite using the decomposition approach based on the OVB formula, we can compare
differences in pay gaps by estimating a system of Seemingly Unrelated Equations (SURE).
Using the SURE method allows errors to be correlated across equations and is more efficient.
However, we prefer the more intuitive or more familiar interpretation of the method outlined
above. Furthermore, the model based on the OVB formula catches otherwise unobserved
interaction effects.
5.3.3 Robustness of the Method Proposed and Problems of the
Standard Approach
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition suffers from various problems. In particular, the method
is not unique and its components may be unstable when different controls are added to the
Mincer-type wage equation. As the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is not unique, the choice
of the non-discriminatory wage structure matters and the results may change according to
the reference category chosen (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988, Neumark, 1988, Oaxaca and
Ransom, 1994; Fortin, 2008). Several solutions have been proposed in the literature to solve
the so-called index-number problem. Suggestions in the literature consist in estimating a
8In the case of the GPG over time, I1 catches year-specific effects in endowments given gender-related
differences in prices in the ending period. That is assuming that in the ending period differences in prices
between men and women persist (compared to the starting period), it accounts for changing endowments of
women over time.
9In the first case of the empirical application, I2 assumes different endowments between women and men
in the starting period and asks how coefficients change over time given gender differences in quantities.
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pooled wage structure (Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994) or assigning different
weights to the two groups (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988). The intercept-shift approach
including the group indicator and parameter restrictions, re-writes the decomposition in
terms of advantages of men and disadvantages of women (Fortin, 2008). Thereby, the
decomposition does no longer depend on the choice of the non-discriminatory wage structure.
In the empirical application in Section 5.3.2, we take men and the ending period as base
category or non-discriminatory wage structure.10 Indeed, the standard case of the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition assumes positive discrimination against women, i.e. it takes men as
the non-discriminatory wage structure. For a recent application, see for example Mandel
and Semyonov (2014). We can easily change the reference category by imposing different
weights across groups (following Cotton, 1988; Reimers, 1983) and show in Appendix 5.A
that the standard case of the GPG can be decomposed in the sense of the intercept-shift
approach as proposed by Fortin (2008) based on the OVB formula. In the case of a detailed
decomposition, the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition varies with the choice of the left-
out category of categorical variables included in the estimation. We show the invariance with
respect to categorical variables of the decomposition approach based on the OVB formula in
Appendix 5.B. The coefficients of the categorical variables are transformed making them
invariant to the choice of the (omitted) base category (Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2004; Fortin,
2008). Moreover, in Appendix 5.C, we show that the decomposition based on the intercept-
shift approach holds also for our proposed decomposition of pay gaps between groups G and
Y . In Appendix 5.D, we show that the critique of Lee (2015) stating that the intercept-shift
approach relies on second moments, while first moments should be considered, does not
apply to our proposed decomposition approach with gender dummies along with parameter
restrictions.11 We derive the results in the appendices based on the GPG. However, the
derived results are not only valid for the case of the GPG but can be applied to a variety of
decomposition problems.
5.4 Empirical Implementation
In this Section, we consider the change of the GPG over time (case 1) as well as the PPWG
between men and women (case 2). By applying our proposed approach, we are able to draw
10In the second empirical application, men in the public sector are the non-discriminatory wage structure.
11That is the model outlined in Appendix 5.C.
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inference on the diverse contributors to the GPG over time.12 The results from the standard
model are also shown for the sake of comparison.
5.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use the 2014 and 2005 cross-sectional files of the survey PLUS13 from the Italian Institute
for the Development of Vocational Training for Workers (ISFOL). The data was collected
jointly with the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. Special characteristics of
the survey are that it provides broad information on the intervieews’ working profiles and
motivation to work as well as on the demographic and family background of the participants.
Data collection is conducted by Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) and the
data set is based on subjective measures only.
In 2005, the original sample contains 38,940 observations. In the wave 2014, 54,961
individuals were interviewed. In our analysis, we focus on full-time employees aged 18-64
years. We include only individuals in the sample that work at least 36 hours per week and
exclude self-employed workers from the analysis. The sample is further restricted to earnings
from the main job only, i.e. from the job that yields the highest income. After dropping
observations with missing data on other variables of interest, our sample contains 9,495
positive wage observations in 2005 and 8,423 in 2014. For the analysis of the evolution
of the GPG over time, we pool together the two cross sections of 2005 and 2014. For the
analysis of the PPWG between men and women, we use the latest release, i.e. the wave of
2014. In 2005, our sample contains 4,778 women (50.3%) and 4,717 men (49.7%). In the
2014-release, 3,828 (45.4%) individuals are female and 4,595 (54.6%) are male. In 2014,
1,799 women (52.8% of total public-sector employment) and 1,607 men (47.2% of total
public-sector employment) are occupied in the public sector. Thus, slightly more women than
men are employed in the public sector. The OLS estimates are based on the natural logarithm
of net hourly wages as dependent variable. The data set includes also a variable for monthly
gross earnings. However, 98.0% of all observations contain missing values.14 Therefore, we
prefer to use the monthly-based net income as dependent variable. Table 5.1 and 5.2 report
means and standard deviations for some of the variables included in the analysis for the two
cases under consideration, respectively. We use the same set of control variables in both
12In the second case, we draw inference on the components of the PPWG by gender.
13Participation, Labor, Unemployment Survey (PLUS)
14The survey contains also gross annual earnings. Unfortunately, gross annual earnings divided by the
number of months in a calendar year (including a 13th month), differ by more than 800 Euros (per month) from
the reported monthly gross income.
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empirical applications of the standard and proposed estimation method. Detailed information
on the variables used in the analysis can be found in Appendix 5.E.
Descriptive Statistics Case 1
Table 5.1 shows that women have on average higher educational attainment than men and
that their human capital increased from 2005 to 2014 (Schooling). For men, the increase is
less pronounced. Men still outperform women in terms of labor market characteristics (Exper
and Tenure). However, while the average years of experience of women increased over the
last decade, men’s average years of experience decreased slightly. Nonetheless, the average
level of labor market experience is still higher for men than for women in 2014. On average,
men hold more often an unlimited contract in both years (Contract_Type). The proportion
of married women and men reduced slightly over the last decade (Married). The share of
individuals employed in Northern Italy decreased slightly for both men and women (North).
In 2014, more females than males are employed in highly specialized occupations, while for
the wave of 2005, the opposite holds (Manager).
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics Case 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Women Men
2005 2014 2005 2014
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Exper 16.23 11.33 17.73 12.08 20.51 12.86 20.19 12.95
Tenure 10.42 9.822 13.52 11.46 14.10 11.70 15.41 12.34
Schooling 12.72 2.722 14.30 1.486 12.26 2.842 13.95 1.397
Contract_Type 0.838 0.369 0.862 0.345 0.879 0.327 0.884 0.321
Married 0.591 0.492 0.580 0.494 0.580 0.494 0.577 0.494
Italian 0.989 0.103 0.987 0.115 0.994 0.0768 0.993 0.0857
North 0.533 0.499 0.502 0.500 0.463 0.499 0.480 0.500
Centre 0.205 0.404 0.223 0.416 0.183 0.387 0.211 0.408
Manager 0.118 0.323 0.247 0.431 0.136 0.343 0.232 0.422
Intermed_Prof 0.617 0.486 0.609 0.488 0.465 0.499 0.499 0.500
Observations 4,778 3,828 4,717 4,595
Descriptive Statistics Case 2
Table 5.2 shows that the average level of educational attainment is higher in the public
compared to the private sector. Women have on average higher educational attainment
than men in both sectors. Female civil servants are even better educated than their female
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colleagues in the private sector. Similarly, men in the public sector have higher educational
performance compared to their male peers in the private sector. Men outperform women in
both sectors in terms of labor market presence and job tenure. About the equal amount of
male and female employees is married, yet, the proportion of married employees is higher in
the public sector. In the public sector, men and women are more often employed in highly
specialized jobs. The proportion of highly specialized females in public employment is
higher than that of males.
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics Case 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Women Men
Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Exper 14.09 10.65 21.83 12.29 17.69 12.57 24.84 12.35
Tenure 9.766 9.442 17.75 12.04 12.57 11.47 20.68 12.18
Schooling 14.13 1.454 14.48 1.500 13.79 1.320 14.26 1.481
Contract_Type 0.819 0.385 0.911 0.286 0.859 0.348 0.928 0.258
Married 0.471 0.499 0.703 0.457 0.495 0.500 0.730 0.444
Italian 0.978 0.147 0.997 0.0577 0.991 0.0964 0.996 0.0610
North 0.555 0.497 0.442 0.497 0.553 0.497 0.343 0.475
Centre 0.218 0.413 0.228 0.420 0.210 0.407 0.214 0.410
Manager 0.140 0.347 0.367 0.482 0.180 0.384 0.327 0.469
Intermed_Prof 0.646 0.478 0.569 0.495 0.498 0.500 0.502 0.500
Observations 2,029 1,799 2,988 1,607
5.4.2 Empirical Results
We first present the decomposition results from the standard Oaxaca-Blinder approach and
discuss the conclusions drawn on the change of the wage gap in this framework. Next, we
apply the method derived in Section 5.3 in order to directly estimate changes of the wage
gaps and in order to draw inference on the diverse contributors to the change of the gap.
The Gender Pay Gap over Time
A general finding in the literature is that the gap in pay by gender was reduced over time (Blau
and Kahn, 2006; Goldin, 2014; Mandel and Semyonov, 2014). The part attributable to
observed characteristics and therefore referred to as explained component increased, while
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the unexplained part, i.e. the component due to differences in returns to wage-related
characteristics and differences in the intercepts, decreased.
Indeed, by applying the traditional approach to our data, we also find a reduction of
the GPG in hourly wages over time; 12.4% in 2005 and 9.5% in 2014.15 Table 5.3 shows
that the gaps are highly statistically significant in either case. The composition of the gap
also changed across the decade. In 2005, the explained component does not play a role in
determining the GPG (as it is not statistically significant), while in 2014, the endowments
part becomes highly statistically significant and contributes to a narrowing of the GPG
(negative term). Differences in the unexplained component are statistically significant in
both years. The component in 2014 decreased slightly (86.2% in 2005 versus 84.3% in
2014). A relatively small decrease in the unexplained component of the GPG in 2014 is
in line with results of other scholars (e.g. Fortin, 2008; Mandel and Semyonov, 2014). In
2005, differences in endowments and coefficients that exist simultaneously between men and
women have a statistically significant impact as well, what is no longer the case in 2014.
All in all, our data delivers results in line with the literature, when applying the standard
estimation methodology. The GPG declined over the last decade, differences in endowments
(in favor of women) have become statistically significant in 2014 and the part of the GPG
due to differences in prices has declined.
15The estimated GPGs in this paper are larger than the pay gaps found by Eurostat (2017). Eurostat (2017)
finds wage gaps amounting to 4.4% in 2006 (missing in 2005) and 6.1% in 2014 for Italy. These relatively
larger gaps are due to our sample restriction of considering only employees working at least 36 hours per week.
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Table 5.3 Standard Decomposition of
the GPG in 2005 and 2014
(1) (2)
Variables 2005 2014
Differential
ln(wM) 1.999*** 2.134***
(0.006) (0.007)
ln(wF) 1.875*** 2.039***
(0.006) (0.007)
Difference 0.124*** 0.095***
(0.008) (0.009)
Decomposition
Endowments 0.008 -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006)
Coefficients 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.008) (0.009)
Interaction 0.009* 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
%–Contribution
Endowments 6.5 12.6
Coefficients 86.2 84.3
Interaction 7.3 3.1
Observations 9,495 8,423
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Notes: For the GPG in 2014, the %–contribution for
the endowments effect is |0.016|(|0.016|+0.107+0.004) ×100.
Next, we directly estimate the change of the GPG between 2014 and 2005 and decompose
that change in explained and unexplained components as well as interaction effects. Table 5.4,
column (1), shows the base model of case 1. The coefficient estimate of femyear shows the
change of the GPG from 2014 to 2005.16 The difference between the GPG in 2014 and 2005
amounts to −0.03 log points and is statistically significant. Given the negative sign, the GPG
has decreased over time. The magnitude as well as the sign of the change is also visible by
16That is femyear is the interaction term of the two group dummies female and year.
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looking at the aggregate GPGs from the outcome of the standard estimation in Table 5.3.
However, now we can also conclude that this reduction in the GPG is statistically significant.
The full model is presented in column (2) of Table 5.4. We immediately see that the part
of the price effect due to differences in the intercepts, αˆ f ull1 , is not statistically significant.
Similarly, the effect of being a woman or in year 2005, all else equal, becomes statistically
insignificant. The remaining coefficient estimates show the expected signs.17
Table 5.4 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages – Case 1, Base and Full Specification
(1) (2)
Basic Specification Full Specification
femyear -0.028** -0.051
(0.012) (0.185)
female -0.095*** -0.148
(0.009) (0.152)
year -0.135*** -0.010
(0.009) (0.130)
Groups of Covariates
Labor Market Presence No Yes
Educational Attainment No Yes
Job Characteristics No Yes
Demographic and Family Background Characteristics No Yes
Industrial and Occupational Dummies No Yes
Interaction Terms No Yes
Observations 17,918 17,918
R-squared 0.050 0.291
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Table 5.5 presents the results from our proposed decomposition. The results show that
the change of the GPG is only explained by the quantity effect. The change of the GPG
over time is explained by changes in observed characteristics between men and women
(in favor of women) over time. We know from Table 5.1 that women’s set of observable
human capital and labor market characteristics (Schooling, Exper) is increasing over the last
decade, while that of men is partly even decreasing (Exper) or remained lower than that
of women (educational attainment). In fact, in educational matters, women have outpaced
men (Goldin, 2006). The results from the standard method suggest that the coefficients
part of the GPGs, i.e. the part due to differences in returns on observable characteristics,
was a main contributor to the GPG in either year with decreasing importance in the ending
17The full regression output is shown in Table 5.F.1 in Appendix 5.F.
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period. However, by estimating the difference of the GPG over time directly, we see that this
so-called discriminatory part has not significantly changed over the last ten years in Italy.
The decomposition shows that the only factor that contributes statistically significantly to the
narrowing of the gap are better observable characteristics of women. Hence, the closing of
the GPG is not explained by anti-discrimination laws, changes in attitudes towards women
in the labor market or changes in the family structure and birth control (Fortin, 2015). The
latter is, apart from the unexplained part (U), caught by the interaction effects accounting for
simultaneous differences in endowments over time and changing prices between men and
women (I1) as well as variation in the set of endowments by gender and changing prices
over time (I2). The components account for the effects of changes in institutional settings or
attributes towards women on prices (given differences in endowments). Yet, the effects are
not statistically significant.
Table 5.5 Decomposition of the Change in the GPG over Time – Case 1
(1)
Pooled Sample (2005 and 2014)
Decomposition
E -0.023***
(0.007)
I1 0.002
(0.013)
I2 -0.006
(0.006)
u 0.050
(0.179)
Total = E + I1 + I2 + u 0.023
(0.185)
Observations 17,918
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The Public-Private Sector Wage Gap between Men and Women
In the literature, a positive wage gap between the public and the private sector is found
(Lucifora and Meurs, 2005; Melly, 2005; Christodfides and Michael, 2006; Arulampalam et
al. 2007; Mandel and Semyonov, 2014). Table 5.6 shows that also in our data for Italy, we
find differences in earnings by sector, with higher wage levels in the public sector. A general
result is that women are better-off in the public compared to the private sector, while for men
the public-sector premia is less important (e.g. Melly, 2005). We find different PPWGs by
CHAPTER 5: THE CONVERGENCE OF THE GPG 206
gender as well; 23.2% for women and 19.8% for men (see Table 5.6). Both gaps are found to
be highly statistically significant. Also, the composition of the PPWGs differs by gender. For
women, the PPWG is mainly due to the unexplained part (54.3%). In contrast, for men, the
endowments effect is the main driver of the pay gap (59.9%). Interaction effects are rather
small but more important for the wage gap in the female subsample (15.5% compared to
6.1% in the male subsample).
Table 5.6 Standard Decomposition of the PPWG for Women and Men in 2014
(1) (2)
Women Men
Differential
ln(wPublic_Sector) 2.162*** 2.263***
(0.009) (0.011)
ln(wPrivate_Sector) 1.930*** 2.065***
(0.010) (0.008)
Difference 0.232*** 0.198***
(0.013) (0.013)
Decomposition
Endowments 0.070*** 0.118***
(0.015) (0.015)
Coefficients 0.126*** 0.067***
(0.016) (0.024)
Interaction 0.036** 0.012
(0.018) (0.023)
%–Contribution
Endowments 30.2 59.9
Coefficients 54.3 34.0
Interaction 15.5 6.1
Observations 3,828 4,595
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The decomposition outcome of the PPWG between men and women using our proposed
model is provided in Tables 5.7–5.8. The results from the base model suggest that there
is a positive and statistically significant difference in the PPWG between men and women
equal to −0.03 log points.18 The dummy variable for working in the private sector (private)
negative and significant, tells us that there is a wage loss for working in the private sector
compared to public-sector employment. As expected, the coefficient on the f emale-dummy
shows that being a women has a significant and negative impact on labor income. In the
18Indicated by the interaction of the dummies female and private; fempriv.
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full model, the effect of private-sector employment as well as being female on wages turns
statistically insignificant. Yet, the interaction term fempriv, is statistically significant and
strongly negative (−0.72). Hence, αˆ f ull1 , i.e. the part of the price or unexplained effect due
to differences in the starting points is statistically significant. This implies that there is a
premia for simply working in the public sector and that this premia is higher for women than
for men. Again, the remaining parameter estimates impact on wages as expected.19
By looking at the decomposition, we find that the difference in observable characteristics
across sectors and gender, E, does play a statistically significant role in explaining the
difference of the PPWG between men and women. In particular, the explained component
drives the negative PPWG by gender as best-educated females are more often located in
the public sector (Bordogna, 2012; Piazzalunga and Di Tommaso, 2015). The difference
in the unexplained component, u, of the PPWG between men and women is significant as
well and shows that the change works towards a positive PPWG between men and women.
This implies that more egalitarian pay schemes in the public sector are ruled out by female
discrimination in prices in both sectors. Moreover, we observe simultaneously differences
in characteristics between women and men as well as difference in coefficients between the
private and the public sector (for men; I1). Hence, more favorable endowments of men in
the private sector compared to women in the private sector and higher pay schemes in the
public sector narrow the (negative) PPWG between men and women. All in all, for case 2,
the conclusions drawn from the standard estimation are confirmed; both quantity and price
effects contribute to the difference in the PPWG between men and women. Yet, we gain
the additional insight that the set-up or organization of the public sector does play a role as
well. That is institutional norms of the public sector being relatively more gender-equal in
combination with more discriminatory practices against women in the private sector lead to
an increase of the significant difference in the PPWG between men and women in 2014 in
Italy.
19The complete regression outcome of the full model is shown in Table 5.F.2 in Appendix 5.F.
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Table 5.7 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages – Case 2, Base and Full Specification
(1) (2)
Basic Specification Full Specification
fempriv -0.034* -0.724**
(0.019) (0.289)
female -0.101*** 0.278
(0.014) (0.196)
private -0.198*** 0.309
(0.013) (0.205)
Groups of Covariates
Labor Market Presence No Yes
Educational Attainment No Yes
Job Characteristics No Yes
Demographic and Family Background Characteristics No Yes
Industrial and Occupational Dummies No Yes
Interaction Terms No Yes
Observations 8,423 8,423
R-squared 0.069 0.236
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.8 Decomposition of the Change in the PPWG by Gender – Case 2
(1)
Pooled Sample (Women and Men)
Decomposition
E -0.028***
(0.011)
I1 0.041*
(0.022)
I2 0.002
(0.011)
u 0.675*
(0.357)
Total = E + I1 + I2 + u 0.689*
(0.360)
Observations 8,423
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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5.5 Conclusion
Adding to the discussion of the convergence of the GPG over time and the persistence
of a PPWG between men and women, we propose an alternative decomposition method
allowing to draw inference on the difference of two wage gaps on aggregate as well as on its
components. The model set-up bases on the OVB formula and the Gelbach decomposition.
Despite additional insights on the composition of differences in gaps, the method can be
made robust to the choice of the reference category (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988, Neumark,
1988, Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994; Fortin, 2008) as well as to the indeterminacy problem (Lee,
2015). The method proposed can be applied to a variety of cases such as differences in
the GPG and its drivers over time, across countries, sectors, occupations or unions. We
empirically consider two cases; the change of the GPG over time as well as the PPWG
between men and women in Italy.
The observed closing of the GPG over time is heavily discussed in the literature and the
determination of the reasons of the narrowing is of huge interest, especially with regard to
policy implications (Blau and Kahn, 2006; 2016; Goldin, 2014). Similarly, the PPWG that
is found to differ for men and women is a topic of on-going research (Melly, 2005). Yet,
up to know, in the standard estimation framework, direct inference on the difference of pay
gaps and changes in their components could not be drawn. Conclusions were rather drawn
by estimating the pay gaps separately in different subsamples and comparing the results ex
post. In this way, it is not possible to test the significance of the change in the estimated
pay gaps on aggregate or the components of the decomposition. Besides the estimation of
the change of the GPG over time on aggregate as well as of the explained and unexplained
component, our method also catches otherwise unobserved interaction effects across the
respective groups of interest.
We find a significant convergence of the GPG over the last decade in Italy. The conver-
gence of the GPG over time was found to be only explained by a reduction in differences in
observable characteristics by gender. In contrast, by estimating the GPG separately for 2005
and 2014, i.e. following the standard approach in the literature, the relative decline in the
contribution of the price component to the wage gap might have led to the conclusion that
the implementation of anti-discrimination laws and changing attitudes towards women in
the labor market have influenced the narrowing of the pay gap over time as well. Yet, these
policies as well as changes in social norms seem to have been less effective than expected
a priori. Thereby, we add to the literature on the convergence of the GPG over time for
the case of Italy the finding that the closing of the pay differential by gender over the last
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decade was only due to the catching-up of women in terms of endowments. The results
for the second case we have examined, i.e. the PPWG between men and women, point the
attention to differences in the structure of the public and private sector, which are found to be
important to explain the differential. Better educated females are more often employed in the
public sector given more egalitarian pay schemes as well as job stability (Bordogna, 2012;
Piazzalunga and Di Tommaso, 2015). In this case, the results derived from the standard
approach concerning the explained and unexplained part are confirmed in the sense that both
components contribute significantly to the change of the PPWG between men and women.
All in all, the analysis with the proposed decomposition method offers a better under-
standing of what has led to the narrowing of the GPG in the last ten years and what drives
the difference in the PPWG between men and women. Most importantly, we can infer
what drives the difference in the respective pay gaps in a statistically significant manner.
The model proposed offers an intuitive approach to directly estimate changes in wage gaps
between groups and can be applied to various problems.
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Appendices
The robustness of the decomposition is for simplicity shown for the case of the GPG. Deriving
the robust model based on the GPG allows also for a better comparison of the method with the
approaches in the literature (e.g. Fortin, 2008, uses the case of the GPG).20 In Appendix 5.C,
when considering differences of gaps, we derive the model for the GPG changing over time.
Notably, the methods can be applied to various other decomposition problems.
Appendix 5.A Solving the Index-Number Problem of
Decompositions using the Intercept-Shift
Approach
As is well known in the literature, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is not unique. Therefore,
the choice of the non-discriminatory wage structure (men or women) matters and leads to
different results (Cotton, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). Several approaches have been
proposed to circumvent this problem (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988, Neumark, 1988, Oaxaca
and Ransom, 1994; Fortin, 2008). We extend the method proposed by Gelbach (2016) in
order to have a wage decomposition invariant to the reference category adopted. In particular,
we adopt the decomposition proposed by Fortin (2008) that includes gender intercept shifts
along with an identification restriction in the regression of females and males pooled together,
when considering the standard case of the GPG for individual i:
ln(wi) = γ0+ γ0FFi+ γ0MMi+Xiγ+ εi
subject to:
γ0F + γ0M = 0
where Fi is equal to one if the individual is female and zero otherwise and Mi equals one if
the individual is male and zero otherwise, i.e. Fi = (1−Mi). Correspondingly, the index F
identifies women and the index M identifies men. For the pooled regression with male and
20The derived model is robust to the index-number problem and invariant with respect to categorical variables
as well as robust to the indeterminacy problem.
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female dummies, respectively, evaluated at the mean, we have:
ln(wM) = γˆ0+ γˆ0MM+ X¯M γˆ
ln(wF) = γˆ0+ γˆ0FF + X¯F γˆ
The identification restriction imposes that the pooled wage equation truly represents a non-
discriminatory wage structure, i.e. a wage structure, where the advantage of men is equal to
the disadvantage of women:
ln(wM)− ln(wF) = (X¯M− X¯F)γˆ+(γˆ0M− γˆ0F)
The first component on the right-hand side, (X¯M− X¯F)γˆ , is the explained part, while γˆ0M and
γˆ0F are the advantage of men and the disadvantage of women, respectively. In particular,
from the difference of the wage regression separately for men and women and the pooled
wage regression with a gender dummy, we have:
γˆ0M = X¯M(βˆM− γˆ)+(βˆ0M− γˆ0) advantage of men
γˆ0F = X¯F(βˆF − γˆ)+(βˆ0F − γˆ0) disadvantage of women
where βˆ0M, βˆ0F are the intercepts and βˆM, βˆF are the estimated coefficients of wage equations
estimated separately for men and women:
ln(wiM) = β0M +XiMβM + εiM (5.A.1)
ln(wiF) = β0F +XiFβF + εiF (5.A.2)
In order to adopt the above wage decomposition within the conditional decomposition
framework proposed by Gelbach (2016), we estimate the following wage equation:
ln(wi) = γ0+ γ0FFi+ γ0MMi+Xiγ+XiFiγXF +XiMiγXM +νi (5.A.3)
subject to:
γ0F + γ0M = 0
γXkF + γXkM = 0 for k = 1 . . .K
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where γXkF and γXkM are the parameters of the interaction term between the kth regressor Xi
and the dummy Fi and Mi, respectively. The error term is represented by vi. Then,
ln(wM) = γˆ0+ γˆ0M + X¯M γˆ+ X¯M γˆXM
ln(wF) = γˆ0+ γˆ0F + X¯F γˆ+ X¯F γˆXF
Consequently, the GPG becomes:
ln(wM)− ln(wF) = (γˆ0M− γˆ0F)+(X¯M− X¯F)γˆ+ X¯M γˆXM− X¯F γˆXF
= −2γˆ0F +(X¯M− X¯F)γˆ− (X¯M + X¯F)γˆXF (5.A.4)
First, we observe that it can be easily shown that there exists the following relationship
between the parameter estimates of equations (5.A.1)-(5.A.2) and (5.A.3):
γˆ+ γˆXF = βˆF
γˆ0+ γˆ0F = βˆ0F
γˆ− γˆXF = βˆM
γˆ0− γˆ0F = βˆ0M
Therefore, the GPG of (5.A.4) can be re-written in terms of the Fortin decomposition as:
ln(wM)− ln(wF) = (βˆ0M− γˆ0)− (βˆ0F − γˆ0)+(X¯M− X¯F)γˆ+ X¯M(βˆM− γˆ)− X¯F(βˆF − γˆ)
= (X¯M− X¯F)γˆ+[X¯M(βˆM− γˆ)+(βˆ0M− γˆ0)]− [X¯F(βˆF − γˆ)+(βˆ0F − γˆ0)]
(5.A.5)
Second, the estimation can be recast in terms of the sequential decomposition of Gelbach by
considering the following base model for individual i:
ln(wi) = γbase0 +(Fi−Mi)γbase0F + εbasei (5.A.6)
where the 1×2 vector of regressors Xi1 of the base specification contains for each observation
i a constant and the difference between the two dummy variables Fi and Mi, (Fi−Mi). The
full model is defined as follows:
ln(wi) = γ f ull0 +(Fi−Mi)γ f ull0F +Xiγ+(Fi−Mi)XiγXF + ε f ulli (5.A.7)
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where the regressors Xi as well as the interaction between Xi and the difference between the
two dummy variables Fi and Mi are contained in the 1×2K vector Xi2. The regressors in
Xi2 are the omitted variables. By the OVB formula the following relationship holds (for the
model evaluated at the mean):[
γˆbase0
γˆbase0F
]
=
[
γˆ f ull0
γˆ f ull0F
]
+(X
′
1X1)
−1X
′
1X2
[
γˆ
γˆXF
]
(5.A.8)
where
[
γˆbase0 , γˆ
base
0F
]′
is the 2×1 vector of coefficient estimates of Xi1 from the base model
(5.A.6) evaluated at the mean;
[
γˆ f ull0 , γˆ
f ull
0F
]′
is the 2× 1 vector containing the coefficient
estimates of Xi1 from the full model (5.A.7) evaluated at the mean and
[
γˆ, γˆXF
]′
is the vector
of coefficients estimates of Xi2 from the full model (5.A.7) evaluated at the mean, i.e. γˆ f ull
with dimension 2K× 1. First observe that γˆbase0F is equal to ln(wF )−ln(wM)2 and that γˆ f ull0F is
equal to βˆ0F−βˆ0M2 . As in Section 5.3, we are interested in the second row of equation (5.A.8).
Given the relationship in (5.A.8), we observe that:
γˆbase0F =−
ln(wM)− ln(wF)
2
=−∆
2
= γˆ f ull0F +ηγˆ
f ull (5.A.9)
where ∆ is the GPG and η =
[
(x¯F−x¯M)
2 ,
(x¯F+x¯M)
2
]
contains the sample means of observable
characteristics in Xi obtained from the linear projection of Xi and (Fi−Mi)Xi with respect
to Xi1 (at the mean). The row vector η has dimension 1×2K. Moreover, we have γˆ f ull0F =
βˆ0F−βˆ0M
2 =
(βˆ0F−γˆ f ull0 )−(βˆ0M−γˆ f ull0 )
2 . Consequently, the GPG can be written as:
−2γbase0F =−2γ f ull0F +(x¯M− x¯F)γ− (x¯M− x¯F)γXF (5.A.10)
what completes the proof of decomposition equivalence.
Appendix 5.B Invariance Decomposition with respect to
Categorical Variables
A second type of identification issue arises when dummy variables are considered in a
detailed wage decomposition. Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) show that the assignment of the
explained part of the GPG to specific variables is not invariant to the choice of reference
groups. This problem can be easily solved by imposing the following parameter restrictions
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as proposed by Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004), Yun (2005) and Fortin (2008):
Ck
∑
j=1
γ jk = 0, k ∈C (5.B.1)
where C denotes the set of categorical variables, and Ck the number of categories for variable
k. The neutral, i.e. non-sensitive to any left-out category, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
follows. The zero-sum restriction (5.B.1) is applied to the wage equation, when female and
male wages are estimated separately as well as to the pooled regression with gender dummies.
The latter is additionally estimated with the identification restriction γ0M + γ0F = 0 on the
gender parameters. Thereby, the intercepts, β0M, β0F and γ0, are no longer influenced by the
choice of the reference category in the case of categorical variables.
The restriction (5.B.1) can also be applied to the method proposed in Section 5.3 leading
to indicator variables that are invariant to the choice of the left-out category in the case of
categorical variables.
Appendix 5.C Estimating Differences of Gaps with the
Intercept-Shift Approach
The extension of the decomposition described in Appendix 5.A to the case of the estimation
of the difference of wage gaps follows straightforward. We consider, as in Section 5.3, the
indicator variable Yi that takes values {0,1}. Again, when the indicator variable Yi is used
as an index (Y ), Yi = 0 corresponds to B and Yi = 1 to A. Similarly, in order to circumvent
confusion with the intercept (referred to as β0 in coherence with Appendix 5.A), the gender
index is not numerical here, but G ∈ {F,M} with F = female and M = male replacing the
numerical index {1,0}, respectively. The set of regressors considered in Section 5.3.2 are
hence transformed as follows:
Xi1 = [1,(Fi−Mi)Yi,(Fi−Mi),Yi]
Xi2 = [X ,(Fi−Mi)Xi,YiXi,(Fi−Mi)YiXi]
for each individual i, with Xi1 having dimension 1×4 and Xi2 having dimension 1×4K. Xi1
contains the interaction of (Fi−Mi) with Yi; (Fi−Mi)Yi. The second set of regressors, Xi2
contains the 1×K vector of characteristics Xi as well as the interaction of Xi with (Fi−Mi)
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and Yi; (Fi−Mi)Xi,YiXi and (Fi−Mi)YiXi, respectively. The base model is then:
ln(wi) = γbase0 +(Fi−Mi)YiγbaseFY +(Fi−Mi)γbaseF +YiγbaseY + εbasei (5.C.1)
while the full model is defined as follows:
ln(wi) = γ f ull0 +(Fi−Mi)Yiγ f ullFiYi +(Fi−Mi)γ
f ull
F +Yiγ
f ull
Y
+Xiγ+(Fi−Mi)XiγXF +YiXiγXY +(Fi−Mi)YiXiγXY F + ε f ulli (5.C.2)
where γbase0 is the constant and γ
base
FY ,γ
base
F ,γ
base
Y are the coefficients of the the base model (5.C.1),
γ f ull0 ,γ
f ull
FY ,γ
f ull
F ,γ
f ull
Y are the corresponding constant and coefficients of Xi1 from the full
model (5.C.2). γ,γXF ,γXY ,γXY F are the K × 1 coefficient vectors of Xi2 from the full
model (5.C.2). The second row of the linear projection of Xi2 with respect to Xi1 at the
mean is contained in the following 1×4K vector:
ζ =
[
(x¯0A−x¯1A)−(x¯0B−x¯1B)
2 ,
(x¯0A+x¯1A)−(x¯0B+x¯1B)
2 ,
(x¯1A−x¯0A)
2 ,
(x¯1A+x¯0A)
2
]
Consider the equivalence between the following parameter estimates evaluated at the mean:
γˆ f ull0 − γˆ f ullFY − γˆ f ullF + γˆ f ullY = βˆ0,MA
γˆ f ull0 + γˆ
f ull
FY + γˆ
f ull
F + γ
f ull
Y = βˆ0,FA
γˆ f ull0 + γˆ
f ull
F = βˆ0,FB
γˆ f ull0 − γˆ f ullF = βˆ0,MB
γˆ+ γˆXF + γˆXY + γˆXY F = βˆFA
γˆ− γˆXF + γˆXY − γˆXY F = βˆMA
γˆ+ γˆXF = βˆFB
γˆ− γˆXF = βˆMB
Observe that γˆbaseFY is equal to
∆GPG
2 and γˆ
f ull
FY is equal to
(βˆ0,MB−βˆ0,FB)−(βˆ0,MA−βˆ0,FA)
2 . Given the
fact that
γˆbaseFY =
(
ln(wMB)− ln(wFB)
)
−
(
ln(wMA)− ln(wFA)
)
2
=
∆GPG
2
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The relationship:
γˆbaseFY = γˆ
f ull
FY +ζ γˆ
f ull
can be re-written in terms of the ∆GPG as:
2γˆbaseFY = ∆GPG =
= [(βˆ0,MB− βˆ0,FB)− (βˆ0,MA− βˆ0,FA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
γˆ f ullFY
+(∆x¯B−∆x¯A)γˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
+(∑ x¯A−∑ x¯B)γˆXF︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω
−∆x¯AγˆXY︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
+∑ x¯AγˆXY F︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϒ
where ∆x¯Y is the difference between the average level of observed characteristics of men
and women in a certain year, with Y ∈ {A,B} and ∑ x¯Y represents the sum of observable
labor market characteristics present for men and women in Y . Recall that the model can be
re-written in terms of the OVB formula as follows:
2γˆbaseFY = γˆ
f ull
FY + δˆ
Λ+ δˆΩ+ δˆΘ+ δˆϒ
Pˆ+ Qˆ = γˆ f ullFY + δˆ
Λ+ δˆΩ+ δˆΘ+ δˆϒ
with P accounting for the price effect and Q for the quantity effect. In particular,
Pˆ = γˆ f ullFY +ϒ
Qˆ =Ω+ Θ︸︷︷︸
Y -specific term
+ Λ︸︷︷︸
gender-specific term
γˆ f ullFY represents the change in the disadvantage of women over time. Thereby, accounting for
the relative improvement (or deterioration) of women’s position in the labor market. Λ mea-
sures the amount of the pay difference attributable to differences in observable characteristics
assuming the same prices over time and gender. Ω accounts for differences in human capital
and other observable labor market characteristics in the economy over time. The underlying
prices are the coefficient estimates obtained when considering only individuals with Fi = 1
given Xi. Equivalently, the prices could be expressed as the coefficient estimates obtained
when considering only individuals with Fi = 0 given Xi thanks to the constraint imposed:
γXF = −γXM. Θ accounts for differences in endowments by gender holding the second
indicator variable fixed, i.e. setting the index Y = A. The component ϒ can be re-written as:
CHAPTER 5: THE CONVERGENCE OF THE GPG 218
ϒ= [∑ x¯AγˆXY F ]
= [x¯1AγˆXY F + x¯0A(−γˆXY M)]
= x¯FAγˆXY F︸ ︷︷ ︸
disadvantage of women
− x¯MAγˆXY M︸ ︷︷ ︸
advantage of men
For the component ϒ, the underlying set of characteristics are the average male and female
endowments observed in Y = A, respectively. The prices can be expressed in terms of men’s
advantage or women’s disadvantage given average characteristics of Xi ∀ i.
Again, the pooled wage equation including the gender parameters and the male and
female earnings equations are estimated separately using additional constraints for each
categorical variable, i.e. under the zero-sum constraint (5.B.1).
Appendix 5.D Intercept-Shift Approach versus
Pooled-Sample Approach
Lee (2015) shows that the intercept-shift approach proposed by Fortin (2008) presents two
drawbacks. Firstly, the reference parameter for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, i.e.
the parameter that would prevail in a ‘fair’ world under no discrimination, relies on the
variance difference among categories. Secondly, the reference intercept is arbitrary: the same
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition holds with vastly different reference intercepts.
However, it can be easily shown that our proposed decomposition does not suffer from
any of these aspects. Our decomposition arises from a specification that allows different
intercepts and slopes. In addition, the constraints imposed on the parameters that identify
the counterfactual reference parameters are the parameters such that the advantage of men is
equal to the disadvantage of women. In fact, in our model the slope that would prevail under
no discrimination, γ , is the sample average of the group slopes; β0M and β0F :
γ = 0.5β0M +0.5β0F
i.e. it is equivalent to considering the weights proposed by Reimers (1983).21 Moreover, the
constraint:
β0F − γ0F = β0M + γ0F
21See also Lee (2015).
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prevents the indeterminacy problem shown by Lee (2015). It turns out, that in our model,
the intercept indeterminacy problem highlighted by Lee (2015) is ruled out by imposing the
constraint that the advantage of men should be equal to the disadvantage of women.
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Appendix 5.E Definition of Variables
Table 5.E.1 Definition of Variables
Variable Name Definition
Dependent Variables
Lhwage Natural logarithm of net hourly wages
Hourly wages in Euros, net of taxes and social security contributions
Independent Variable
Group Dummies and Interaction Terms
female One if the individual is a woman, zero otherwise
year One if year is 2005, zero otherwise
private One if individual is employed in the private sector
femyear Interactive effect of year and female, i.e. one if employee
is observed in 2005 and is female, zero otherwise
fempriv Interactive effect of private and female, i.e. one if employee
is employed in the private sector and is female, zero otherwise
Inter_female_X Interactive effect of female and the set of regressors X ;
Inter_female_Exper–Inter_female_Intermed_Prof
Inter_year_X Interactive effect of year and the set of regressors X ;
Inter_year_Exper–Inter_year_Intermed_Prof
Inter_femyear_X Interactive effect of femyear and the set of regressors X ;
Inter_femyear_Exper–Inter_femyear_Intermed_Prof
Inter_private_X Interactive effect of private and the set of regressors X ;
Inter_private_Exper–Inter_private_Intermed_Prof
Inter_fempriv_X Interactive effect of fempriv and the set of regressors X ;
Inter_fempriv_Exper–Inter_fempriv_Intermed_Prof
Labor Market Presence
Exper Number of years of prior work experience
Exper2 Exper squared
Tenure Number of years worked for current employer
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Educational Attainment
Schooling Number of years of schooling completed
Job Characteristics
Work_Climate Individual’s level of satisfaction with the working climate at the individual’s
current job ∈ (0,4), where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Stab Individual’s level of satisfaction with the stability of the individual’s
current job ∈ (0,4), where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Time Individual’s level of satisfaction with the working time at the individual’s
current job ∈ (0,4), where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work_Task Individual’s level of satisfaction with the tasks at the individual’s
current job ∈ (0,4), where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Contract_Type One if the individual holds an unlimited contract, zero otherwise
Demographic Background
Italian One if individual is Italian, zero otherwise
Homeowner One if individual owns a house (including houses financed by bank loans),
zero otherwise
North One if the individual lives and works in the North of Italy, zero otherwise
Centre One if the individual lives and works in the Centre of Italy, zero otherwise
Family Background
Married One if individual is married, zero otherwise
Educ_Moth_Uni One if mother’s education is equal to Laurea,
i.e. mother holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Educ_Fath_Uni One if father’s education is equal to Laurea,
i.e. father holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Industry and Occupations
Sec_Ind One if individual is engaged in the industrial sector, zero otherwise
Sec_Tour One if individual is engaged in tourism, zero otherwise
Sec_Trans One if individual is engaged in transport, zero otherwise
Sec_Comm One if individual is engaged in communication, zero otherwise
Sec_Fina One if individual is engaged in financial sector, zero otherwise
Sec_Serv One if individual is engaged in firm services, zero otherwise
Sec_PA One if individual is engaged in the public administration, zero otherwise
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Sec_Heal One if individual is engaged in health, zero otherwise
Sec_Prof One if individual is engaged in science and other professional activities,
zero otherwise
Manager One if individual executes intellectual professions;
scientific and highly specialized occupations, zero otherwise
Intermediate_Prof One if individual executes intermediary positions in commercial, technical
or administrative sectors, health services and technicians, zero otherwise
Appendix 5.F Regression Output from the Full
Specification
Table 5.F.1 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages – Case 1, Full Specification
(1)
Variables
femyear -0.051
(0.185)
female -0.148
(0.152)
year -0.010
(0.130)
Exper 0.019***
(0.002)
Exper2 -0.000***
(0.000)
Tenure 0.004***
(0.001)
Schooling 0.038***
(0.005)
Contract_Type 0.080***
(0.023)
Work_Climate 0.001
(0.008)
Work_Time 0.009
(0.007)
Work_Task -0.002
(0.008)
Work_Stab -0.024***
(0.007)
North 0.060***
(0.014)
Centre 0.038**
(0.015)
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Italian 0.004
(0.065)
Homeowner -0.006
(0.018)
Married 0.062***
(0.014)
Educ_Moth_Uni -0.011
(0.033)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.069***
(0.027)
Manager 0.136***
(0.020)
Intermed_Prof 0.035***
(0.013)
Constant 1.163***
(0.110)
Industrial and Occupational Dummies Yes
Interaction Terms Yes
Observations 17,918
R-squared 0.291
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.F.2 OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages – Case 2, Full Specification
(1)
Variables
fempriv -0.724**
(0.289)
female 0.278
(0.196)
private 0.309
(0.205)
Exper 0.019***
(0.004)
Exper2 -0.000***
(0.000)
Tenure 0.002
(0.001)
Schooling 0.055***
(0.007)
Contract_Type 0.182***
(0.057)
Work_Climate 0.014
(0.012)
Work_Time -0.001
(0.013)
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Work_Task -0.004
(0.014)
Work_Stab -0.017
(0.013)
North 0.049**
(0.023)
Centre 0.072***
(0.023)
Italian -0.177***
(0.063)
Homeowner 0.050
(0.032)
Married 0.031
(0.026)
Educ_Moth_Uni 0.074
(0.058)
Educ_Fath_Uni 0.043
(0.046)
Manager 0.118***
(0.032)
Intermed_Prof -0.015
(0.024)
Constant 1.046***
(0.147)
Industrial and Occupational Dummies Yes
Interaction Terms Yes
Observations 8,423
R-squared 0.236
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Gender differences in pay are a pervasive feature of modern labor markets. Despite the
convergence of the wage gap over time and the implementation of equal-pay legislation,
gender-related wage gaps continue to persist all around the world. This thesis examines
gender-specific selection into wage work as well as its effects on the Gender Pay Gap (GPG).
It contributes to the empirical literature on gender differences in pay by providing additional
insights on the drivers of the GPG and by examining the pay gap in different environments
(public-contest recruitment, overeducation). In particular, a double selection approach is
applied in order to obtain consistent estimates of the wage gap and of its components by
public-contest selection or overeducation. From the methodological perspective, this work
provides two new approaches to estimate the GPG. First, the Recentered-Influence-Function
OLS (RIF-OLS) model based on Unconditional Quantile Regressions (UQRs) is extended
in order to account for sample selection issues across the wage distribution. The method
proposed has several advantages compared to the standard approach such as being relatively
easy to implement and interpret. In particular, UQRs allow for the unconditional mean
interpretation that is important in (detailed) decomposition models and especially relevant
for policy makers. Second, it provides an estimation approach for the GPG over time. The
proposed estimation procedure offers a comprehensive and path-independent decomposition.
In particular, direct inference on the change of the GPG as well as of its components over
time can be drawn. The proposed model can be applied to various other decomposition
problems of changes in mean group differences.
After providing an overview of the subject on gender differences in pay as well as its
relevance, the GPG is analyzed separately for public-contest recruited employees and non
public-contest selected employees in Chapter 2. In the former case, the GPG disappears,
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while it remains positive and significant in the latter. For the sample of young individuals, we
find a reversal of the GPG in case of public-contest recruitment. The reversal among young
public-contest selected workers is entirely due to the explained part. In contrast, the GPG
among individuals that are not hired by public contest is mainly driven by the unexplained
part of the wage gap. In particular, the result is valid for a time period of ten years using both
the panel dimension of the data set as well as the single cross sections. The result still holds
when controlling for double selection into employment and public-contest recruitment. The
estimation strategy yields consistent estimates of the gender-specific wage equations, and
thus of the components of the GPG. The disappearance of the GPG among public-contest
selected employees, however, depends on the institutional environment it is conducted in.
Yet, the result is not only driven by the public sector as we find among civil servants that are
not selected by public contest a significant and positive GPG.
Chapter 3 presents the GPG for overeducated and properly educated workers. Overedu-
cation may signal the incapacity of the labor market to absorb higher levels of education. As
policy makers want to address this potential inefficiency, information on the contributors to
pay disparities attributed to overeducation are important. The wage gap between men and
women is found to be significantly higher among overeducated workers. The decomposition
outcome is then adjusted for both labor force participation and the decision to accept a job
offer for that the individual is actually overeducated. After the correction, the discriminatory
part of the wage gap among overeducated workers vanishes. Higher wage gaps between
men and women among overeducated workers are mainly explained by less favorable sets
of unobservable characteristics of overeducated women (relative to overeducated men). So
far, these two research fields, the GPG on the one side and overeducation on the other, have
not been integrated jointly in the literature. Moreover, studies looking at gender differences
in pay in the graduate labor market do not find that overeducation significantly triggers the
wage gap. Contrary, by applying a bivariate probit model, we find that unobservables, due to
the overeducation choice, explain a major part of the pay gap among mismatched workers.
In Chapter 4, a model is proposed in order to correct gender-related selection at specific
quantiles as well as inequality measures across the wage distribution. The approach is
based on the RIF-OLS procedure providing an intuitive and easy way to interpret and to
estimate quantile-specific wage equations. In particular, it allows for the unconditional
mean interpretation, an important feature when decomposing wage gaps. Moreover, the
method is interesting for policy evaluation as it provides estimation results that are applicable
to the entire distribution. In contrast, the main part of the quantile literature focuses on
Conditional Quantile Regressions (CQRs) that allow only for conclusions on the conditional
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wage distribution (and not on the unconditional). In fact, CQRs provide results that are only
relevant for subgroups of the target population. The extended model uses semiparametric
estimators for selection correction and hence does not require any distributional assumptions
of the error terms. In contrast, in the standard selection-correction model, i.e. the Heckman-
two-step procedure, parametric estimators for selection correction, relying on normally
distributed errors are assumed. The results suggest that employment selection significantly
differs among men and women all along the wage distribution. This underlines the importance
of considering quantile-specific selection when it comes to policy measures. Indeed, policy
makers may be particularly interested in addressing wage inequality at diverse or extreme
points of the earnings distribution. The results of Chapter 4 find that the adjusted GPG
is underestimated at the top but overestimated at the median and bottom of the earnings
distribution in the base model, i.e. without sample selection correction.
Finally, in Chapter 5, an alternative estimation approach based on the Omitted Variable
Bias (OVB) formula is proposed allowing to directly estimate the change in the GPG over
time as well as changes in its components over time. The model, contrary to the standard
procedure in the literature, allows to conduct statistical inference of the change in mean group
differences. The proposed method can be applied to a variety of decomposition problems. We
show that the estimation approach can be easily made robust to the index-number problem of
the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as well as to the indeterminacy problem of the
intercept-shift approach. By using the proposed model, it is shown that the convergence of
the GPG, during the last decade in Italy, is entirely due to the catching-up of women in terms
of observable characteristics. As a second empirical application, the Public-Private Sector
Wage Gap (PPWG) between men and women is estimated. The difference in the PPWG for
men and women is driven by both endowments and coefficients. Additionally, interaction
effects significantly impact on the difference of the sector-related wage gap between men
and women.
All in all, the findings show that it is important to consider generally unobserved char-
acteristics in the estimation of the GPG at the mean as well as at different points of the
wage distribution. In particular, the effect of employment selection on earnings varies along
the wage distribution. Public-contest and overeducation selection significantly impact on
the level of wages. Given public-contest recruitment, the GPG disappears on average and
the GPG among overeducated workers is mainly explained by differences in (generally)
unobservable personal characteristics. The unexplained component is an important driver of
the GPG and did not significantly decline over the last decade in Italy.

